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Ethnic diversity has reached unprecedented levels in Western societies, and it is expected 
to increase even further (Coleman, 2013). Diversity creates complex combinations of 
social categorisation which, in turn, create cognitive challenges for members of both 
majority and minority groups. However, as people engage with ethnic diversity on a 
regular basis they might develop the cognitive skills needed to overcome these challenges 
(Crisp & Turner, 2011). This thesis reports a research program that investigated the 
processes underlying this cognitive response to diversity. As a first step, I investigated 
whether experiencing ethnic diversity would lead to enhanced self-regulation. Living in 
an ethnically diverse environment might frequently require the suppression of 
stereotypical information, and stereotype inhibition can be considered an act of self-
regulation. Studies 1-3 investigated the influence of diversity experiences of White 
British participants on impulsiveness, delay of gratification and Stroop performance. In 
general, findings revealed that experiences of diversity affected self-regulation only when 
diversity was first made salient. However, contrary to predictions, participants with more 
experiences of diversity showed impaired rather than enhanced self-regulation when 
diversity was made salient. Integrating these findings with the existing literature 
suggested that individuals respond to diversity not by developing enhanced cognitive 
inhibition, but instead by acquiring a mindset characterised by a low reliance on rules and 
categorical thinking. This hypothesis was supported by the remaining studies in this 
thesis: Participants who had experienced frequent positive contact were less likely to rely 
on rules, conventional values and social conformity (Studies 4-6). Further studies showed 
that frequent positive contact was also associated with a low need for cognitive closure 
(Study 7a and 7b) and a low need for personal structure (Study 8). These findings indicate 
that participants who have experienced more diversity felt a low need to enforce structure 
 
 
by simplifying information through the use of categorical thinking. This thesis offers a 
novel perspective on research on the cognitive impact of diversity by exploring the 
everyday experiences of diversity for ethnic majority members. Furthermore, it offers a 
novel attempt to specify the underlying cognitive mechanisms responsible for the 
enhanced cognitive flexibility observed among individuals who have experienced higher 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Growing ethnic diversity in Western societies leads to various challenges for all 
members of society and demands adaptation to be appropriately handled. Some of these 
challenges concern cognitive processes and managing them requires cognitive adaptation. 
In this chapter, I introduce the debate on ethnic diversity and its cognitive consequences. 
I will then describe the aims of this thesis: a) specify and measure the cognitive processes 
involved in responses to diversity, and b) study the impact of diversity for majority 
members. Finally, I will offer a brief overview of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Rise of Ethnic & Cultural Diversity 
Ethnic diversity is not a new feature of human societies: Through history, 
migration has led to societies with varying degrees of interethnic interaction (Smedley, 
1998). However, the scale and scope of ethnic and cultural diversity in Western societies 
today is unprecedented, as is its rate of growth (Coleman, 2013; Riche, 2000). Since the 
end of the Second World War in 1945, virtually all highly developed countries have faced 
large-scale immigration, a trend that has intensified to this day (Castles, 1995). The result 
has been an unparalleled cultural and ethnic heterogeneity in developed countries (Plaut, 
2010a). 
This means that the social environments face massive changes in their ethnic 
composition, which is well illustrated by demographic projections for the USA and UK: 
The proportion of White Caucasians is projected to fall below 50 percent by 2044 in the 
USA and by 2066 in the UK (Colby & Ortman, 2015; Coleman, 2010). Similar projections 
have been made for other European countries: Luxembourg, Cyprus and Austria are 
expected to have a population share of over 50 percent of citizens with a foreign 
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background by 2061 (Lanzieri, 2011). The European Union as a whole is projected to 
have a population share of 23 percent with foreign background by 2031 and 35 percent 
by 2061 (Lanzieri, 2011). This means that within a few decades a major share of 
interactions will be between members of different ethnic groups, even for the ethnic 
majority. This scenario is already foreshadowed in some states in the USA (Hawaii, 
California, New Mexico and Texas; United States Census Bureau, 2012) and some 
metropolitan centres in Europe such as London, Amsterdam and Brussels where the 
largest ethnic group consists of less than 50 percent of the population (Crul, 2016; White, 
2012). As ethnic and cultural diversity is expected to rise even further in the following 
decades (Coleman, 2013; Lanzieri, 2011) the importance of understanding its impact 
increases as well. 
Consequently, how to evaluate and react to this increase in ethnic diversity has 
been a matter of heated debate among policy-makers that continues to this day (Kymlicka, 
2010; Plaut, 2010a; Triandafyllidou, 2011). The impact of ethnic diversity on human 
societies and individuals has also been a key interest for researchers in various fields such 
as sociology (e.g. Alba, 1999; Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005; Tiryakian, 2003), political 
science (e.g. Putnam, 2007), urban planning (e.g. Talen, 2006; Uitermark, Rossi, & Van 
Houtum, 2005), economy (e.g. Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Bellini, Ottaviano, Pinelli, & 
Prarolo, 2013), educational science (e.g. Banks, 1993; Milem, 2003) and psychology 
(Markus, 2008). Issues of ethnic diversity have been a topic of interest since the early 
days of social psychology, even though research interest has initially been focussed on 
prejudice and bias in intergroup behaviour (e.g. Allport, 1954; Bogardus, 1926; see 
Duckitt, 1992 for an overview). Research has since expanded considerably and explored 
the cognitive and affective basis of intergroup bias, as well as means to reduce it (Brown 
& Hewstone, 2005; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). However, living in an ethnically 
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heterogeneous environment does not just mean managing potential animosities between 
different ethnic groups. Recent research has emphasized that ethnic diversity introduces 
complexity to social identities and environments and that having to manage this 
complexity on a regular basis might have substantial impact on individuals’ cognitive 
skills and functions (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Tadmor, Tetlock, & Peng, 2009).  
Thus, understanding and managing the impact of diversity also involves 
knowledge of how diversity might affect people’s psychological makeup. Such an 
understanding should also make it possible to identify areas in which experiences with 
diversity can be a key advantage. Experiences of diversity should lead to the development 
of skills and strategies to more efficiently deal with diversity. Such skills might have 
important benefits domains outside the intergroup domain. For example, beneficial 
effects of diversity have already been clearly demonstrated for creative performance 
(Leung & Chiu, 2010; Maddux, Adam, & Galinsky, 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; 
Steffens, Gocłowska, Cruwys, & Galinsky, 2015; Tadmor, Hong, Chao, Wiruchnipawan, 
& Wang, 2012). 
1.2 Aims of the Thesis 
This thesis investigates how members of the Ethnic majority respond to the 
experiences of diversity that result from living in ethnically heterogeneous 
neighbourhoods. This investigation applies the Categorization-Processing-Adaptation-
Generalization (CPAG) model (Crisp & Turner, 2011) as a theoretical framework to 
understand the cognitive responses of majority members to prolonged experiences of 
diversity. This approach aims to address two key issues regarding responses to diversity: 
a) the need to specify and measure the cognitive processes involved in responding to 
diversity, and b) study the impact of diversity for majority members. 
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The CPAG model offers an extensive theoretical framework for understanding 
how individuals adapt to the challenges of social diversity. According to the CPAG model, 
repeated experiences of diversity can lead to cognitive adaption if they are cognitively 
challenging – as long as they challenge existing stereotypical knowledge. In this case 
experiences of diversity can instigate an adaptation process that results in enhanced 
cognitive flexibility. There is extensive empirical evidence supporting the idea that 
diversity can promote cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking (Gutierrez & Sameroff, 
2008; Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu, 2008; Maddux et al., 
2010; Tadmor, Hong, et al., 2012), but there is little research on the exact processes that 
enable this improvement. The superior cognitive flexibility observed among individuals 
who have experience a lot of diversity is assumed to be the result of efficiency in 
inhibiting stereotypical content, leaving more cognitive resources for generative thought. 
While this idea is grounded in empirical findings on how people process socially diverse 
stimuli (Hutter & Crisp, 2006; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloerscheidt, & Milne, 1999), 
there is a lack of empirical evidence that this is how people actually respond to prolonged 
experiences of diversity. This thesis therefore attempts to examine the specific processes 
that are affected by prolonged experiences of diversity. 
Furthermore, research on the impact of prolonged experiences has so far been 
focussed on either the effects of managing the influence of two or more cultures for ethnic 
minority members (also called biculturalism, e.g. Cheng, Sanchez-Burks, & Lee, 2008; 
Saad, Damian, Benet-Martínez, Moons, & Robins, 2013) or on the influence of 
experiencing diversity abroad (e.g. Godart, Maddux, Shipilov, & Galinsky, 2015; 
Hellmanzik, 2013; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). This research has 
been invaluable to understand the general response patterns to diversity. However, there 
is a need for more research to generalise these findings to other forms of experiences of 
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diversity which might be more common than biculturalism or time abroad. The way in 
which biculturals experience diversity might not be comparable to the sort of experiences 
majority members make, and most people will spend only a minor part of their time 
abroad. However, as ethnic diversity rises experiences of diversity will become a common 
part of everyday life for majority members as well. Simply living in an area that is 
ethnically diverse should be a source of diversity experiences that is common to a large 
part of society. Studying and understanding the impact of such everyday experiences of 
diversity for majority members should thus be an important part of understanding how 
diversity might lead to cognitive adaptation. 
1.3 Overview 
 In this thesis, I will begin with a review of the literature on social diversity and 
its impact on cognition and beliefs. I will then integrate this literature with research on 
self-regulation and stereotype suppression to highlight the potential role of cognitive 
inhibition in adapting to ethnic diversity. Subsequently, I will present three studies that 
test the impact of diversity on self-regulation. Considering the findings obtained from 
these studies I will suggest a revision of the initial theoretical framework which will be 
tested in six further studies. I will then discuss the implications of the findings from these 
studies under consideration of the current research findings.  
Chapter 2 offers a review of the current literature on the long-term effects of 
diversity on cognition. In this chapter, I will argue that the cognitive challenges emerging 
from social diversity can be generally understood as conflicts of categorical information. 
Consequently, adaptations to diversity should make handling conflicting information 
more efficient. Drawing from the CPAG model I will argue that this is achieved by 
enhanced cognitive flexibility among individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity. 
The CPAG model assumes that this is the result of superior cognitive inhibition, but I will 
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argue that there is need for more thorough research on whether diversity does indeed 
affect self-regulatory ability. 
Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth review of the literature on stereotype 
inhibition and self-regulation. In this chapter, I will argue that controlling stereotypes calls 
on the same processes and resources as other acts of self-regulation (social and non-
social). This argument is supported from behavioural and neurological studies 
investigating stereotype suppression in intergroup interactions. Furthermore, the idea that 
stereotype inhibition engages self-regulatory ability is also supported by research on the 
control of intergroup bias when making social judgements. Thus, individuals living in 
ethnically diverse environments are likely to frequently engage in stereotype inhibition to 
make intergroup interaction and social judgements more efficient. To explore potential 
consequences of such frequent acts of self-regulation, I will also discuss research on the 
effect of self-regulation training. Current findings suggest that frequently engaging in 
self-regulation can have long-term benefits for self-regulatory ability even for unrelated 
tasks. Frequent acts of self-regulation, such as frequent stereotype inhibition, might lead 
to improved cognitive inhibition in general. In other words, individuals with a lot of 
experience with diversity should tend to demonstrate superior self-regulatory ability. This 
idea is further investigated in three studies reported in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 reports three studies which investigate the link between experiences of 
diversity of majority members and self-regulatory ability. More specifically, these studies 
tested the prediction that White British participants who were exposed to a high degree 
of diversity would display superior self-regulation. While diversity did indeed affect self-
regulation, the effect was in reversal to the predicted pattern. Participants who report more 
experience with diversity tended to report high impulsiveness as well as a weaker ability 
to delay gratification (Study 1 and 2), and showed inferior inhibitory performance on the 
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Stroop test (Study 3). However, these effects seem to be moderated by the salience of 
diversity (Study 2 and 3) in the sense that experiences of diversity only affected self-
regulation when diversity was made salient. In other words, self-regulation was only 
affected by diversity when participants were cued to expect socially diverse stimuli. 
Together these findings indicate that the salience of diversity might activate a mindset for 
participants with diversity experience, and this mindset seems to temporarily impair 
performance on cognitive control tasks. The question why such a mindset should be 
activated in the first place and why it would be associated with low performance on self-
regulatory tasks is further explored in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 revisits the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 and 3 and 
revises it under consideration of the findings reported in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I revisit 
the CPAG model and offer a more in-depth review of the empirical evidence for increased 
cognitive flexibility after prolonged exposure to diversity and integrate it with findings 
from Studies 1-3. In these studies, participants with diversity experience reported 
decreased self-regulation when diversity was salient. The salience of diversity also caused 
poor performance on a cognitive control task for these participants. Such weak 
performance on self-regulatory tasks and the decrease in self-reported self-regulation 
could be caused by changes in ability or motivation. That is, what appears to be impaired 
self-regulation could be caused either by a temporarily weakened inhibitory ability or a 
lowered motivation to monitor cognitive rules. The available research suggests that 
making diversity salient might lead to a decreased need for cognitive rules for participants 
with diversity experience. This motivational change might be responsible for improved 
cognitive flexibility commonly observed among individuals who have experienced a lot 
of diversity, but it might also have affected self-regulatory performance in Studies 1-3. 
Generally speaking, the experimental conditions that led to decreased self-regulatory 
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performance in Studies 1-3 have also been associated with divergent thinking and 
cognitive flexibility. This suggests that the increase in cognitive flexibility observed for 
individuals with diversity experience is not achieved via enhanced self-regulatory ability. 
However, research on need for cognitive closure (NFCC) also suggests that being very 
flexible when it comes to following categories and rigid rules can be detrimental for self-
regulation, since self-regulation might sometimes require following clear and specific 
rules. Thus, enhanced cognitive flexibility might be achieved not through improved self-
regulatory ability, but rather by taking a relatively flexible stance towards categorical 
rules. This motivational tendency would be beneficial for resolving categorical conflicts, 
but also produce suboptimal performance when monitoring specific self-regulatory goals 
as the motivation to focus attention on these goals would be low. This idea is expanded 
upon in a suggested revision of the CPAG model which integrates the literature on 
adaptation to diversity with findings on cognitive flexibility and cognitive control and 
results from Studies 1-3. In this revised framework, it is assumed that prolonged 
experiences of diversity lead to superior cognitive flexibility by acquiring a mindset with 
a weak reliance on categorical rules and weak boundaries between cognitive categories. 
This tendency towards a low reliance on rules should also generalise to different types of 
categorical rules such as social norms. These ideas are empirically tested in Chapter 6 and 
7. 
Chapter 6 and 7 investigate the impact of prolonged experiences of diversity on 
the reliance on categorical rules for White British participants. In Chapter 6, I report three 
studies which explore whether diversity is linked to a generalised low reliance on rules, 
affecting the dependence on social norms. Findings revealed that participants with 
frequent positive interethnic contact display a low reliance on rules in general (Study 5 
and 6), as well as a low reliance on conformity (Study 4) and conventional norms (Study 
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5). Participants with frequent positive contact also reported a low willingness to submit 
to authority (Study 6). In Chapter 7, I present three studies that test the hypothesis that 
diversity is associated with low epistemic needs to enforce structure by employing 
categorical thinking. Prolonged experiences of diversity in the form of frequent positive 
contact predicted low need for cognitive closure (Study 7a and 7b) and low need for 
personal structure (Study 8). These and other findings presented in this thesis are finally 
reviewed in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 8 summarises the key findings of this work, and discusses their 
theoretical implications as well as their limitations. I make some suggestions for possible 
avenues for future research to advance the understanding of the nature and scope of 
cognitive change in response to diversity.
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CHAPTER 2: THE COGNITIVE CHALLENGE OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
The cultural diversity of today's world is unprecedented, and it is expected to 
increase even more in the following decades (Coleman, 2013). With diversity on the rise, 
individuals have to learn how to make sense of the increasing complexity in their social 
identity and environment (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). However, it has been suggested that 
individuals who repeatedly experience diversity should over time improve the cognitive 
skills necessary to efficiently handle such complex environments (Crisp & Meleady, 2012; 
Crisp & Turner, 2011). Such cognitive adaptation might prove useful not only for diverse 
environments but in a wide range of other unrelated domains. In this chapter, I will review 
research that highlights how social diversity can affect cognition and beliefs and sketch 
how this might lead to long-term adaptation affecting domains beyond diversity. 
 
Social diversity is a broad concept, but generally describes the degree of 
difference among members of a group. It can be defined as the variations of personal 
attributes within a group (Martín-Alcázar, Romero-Fernández, & Sánchez-Gardey, 2011; 
Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999), as long as these variations are considered to be 
meaningful (Plaut, 2010b; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). That is, social 
diversity refers to the amount of variety in social categories. Diversity comes in many 
varieties such as diversity in age, religion or ethnicity. In this work, I will use ethnic 
diversity as a lens to investigate the impact of social diversity.  
Ethnic diversity has proven to be an especially powerful attribute for perceiving 
differences: Categorisation of ethnicity occurs fast, automatic and effortless (Fazio & 
Dunton, 1997; Ito & Urland, 2003). This is partly due to the fact that categorisation on 
the ethnic domain can be made through visual signifiers (whether these are accurate or 
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not; Bar-Haim, Saidel, & Yovel, 2009; MacLin & MacLin, 2011), while categorisation 
on other domains such as education or occupation requires further inquiry. This probably 
has made ethnic categorization particularly useful for evolved mechanisms of coalition 
detection (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003; Kurzban, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2001). 
Regardless of this focus on ethnic diversity, I want to emphasise that the impact 
of other forms of social diversity should be similar in principle and work through similar 
processes. Furthermore, it is not only ethnic or cultural diversity that is on the rise in our 
societies, but Western societies are experiencing a diversification of social roles in many 
other domains such as gender (Giele & Holst, 2003; Smits, Mulder, & Hooimeijer, 2003), 
age (Riley & Riley, 1994, 1989), sexuality (Cohler & Hammack, 2007), and occupations 
(R. H. Turner, 1990; Wroblewski & Huston, 1987). I will return to this point when I am 
discussing the wider implications of my findings in Chapter 8. 
2.1 The Cognitive Challenges of Diversity  
The increasing diversity of the social environment leads to a multitude of 
challenges and opportunities, as illustrated by the lively debate on how to manage social 
diversity (Kymlicka, 2010; Plaut, 2010a; Triandafyllidou, 2011). Various fields have 
contributed to this debate, and psychology is no exception. Social psychology has 
traditionally focussed on understanding prejudice and conflicts in intergroup behaviour 
(see Duckitt, 1992 for an overview). However, psychological research on diversity has 
considerably expanded since then, and some researchers have shed light on the different 
types of cognitive challenges that emerge from living in an ethnically diverse 
environment. 
In particular, studies have explored the cognitive challenges of immigrants who 
face the difficult task of integrating different cultural identities into one coherent whole 
(Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). Similarly, observers of 
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diverse environments are also facing cognitive challenges, such as making sense of 
individuals with diverse, cross-cutting identities which requires resolving contradictions 
between social categories (Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).   
A common theme in these areas of research is that diversity can be cognitively 
challenging, because it produces experiences that are conflicting with existing categorical 
knowledge (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Categorical knowledge is something we heavily rely 
on to understand our social environment: Social identities inform us about our place in 
the world (Hogg, Hohman, & Rivera, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and stereotypes give 
us guidelines when we try to understand other people (McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 
2004). In a diverse society however, social categories are fluid and interwoven, so their 
boundaries are more likely to be called into question (Hutter & Crisp, 2005), leading to 
challenges for categorical thinking for all members of a diverse society. But research also 
indicates that these demanding features of diversity might encourage people to develop 
cognitive strategies to overcome the cognitive challenge posed by them (Crisp & Meleady, 
2012; Crisp & Turner, 2011). This would also explain the known benefits diversity 
beyond intergroup relations, such as improved creative performance (Gocłowska & Crisp, 
2014; Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung et al., 2008). 
These cognitive challenges resulting from ethnic diversity will be discussed in 
further detail below. Based on this, I will then elaborate on the cognitive processes that 
might be involved in handling these challenges. Subsequently I will discuss how 
employing these processes frequently could lead to cognitive adaptation to ethnic 
diversity. 
2.1.1 Challenges for Immigrants 
The behavioural and cognitive challenge of diversity is probably most apparent 
for immigrants, who have to resolve conflicts between the identities of their original 
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culture and their new host nation (Berry, 1997). Immigrants find themselves in a social 
environment in which they are members of a non-dominant group and have to come to 
terms with the new dominant culture of the larger society they are now a member of. The 
process through which culturally non-dominant members of society adapt to the dominant 
culture has been termed acculturation (Berry, 2009). Acculturation has originally been 
understood in terms of learning and unlearning behaviour patterns to adapt to the new 
cultural environment (Berry, 1997). Subsequent research, however, has emphasized that 
acculturation does also include cognitive adaptation. Of particular importance here is how 
non-dominant members of society define their cultural identity (Benet-Martínez & 
Haritatos, 2005; Benet-Martinez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Sam & Berry, 2010). Non-
dominant members of society must decide how to incorporate the cultural identity of their 
host society with the identity of their original culture. The challenge herein lies in the fact 
that these identities might intersect and overlap, with potentially contradicting aspects 
(Mok & Morris, 2012; Tadmor et al., 2009).  
The experience of difficulties during acculturation are referred to as acculturative 
stress (Berry & Annis, 1974). Acculturative stress can take the form of an increased risk 
for psychopathology (Berry, 1997; Krishnan & Berry, 1992; Zhang & Goodson, 2011), 
as well as an increased chance to have experiences of discrimination (Benet-Martínez & 
Haritatos, 2005). However, acculturative stress is not an inevitable experience during 
acculturation. If acculturative stress is experienced and to what degree is determined by 
several factors (Krishnan & Berry, 1992), a major one being the manner in which the 
immigrant approach the challenge of acculturation (Berry, 1997). 
Acculturation strategies. Exactly how individuals acculturate can be described 
by four possible acculturation strategies, originally proposed by Berry (2009). These 
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strategies differ in the extent to which individuals strive to maintain their original culture 
and to the extent they engage with the dominant culture of the larger society.  
One possible strategy is to simply outright reject both the host nation’s as well as 
one’s own original cultural identity. In this case the individual is said to have marginalized. 
Another option is assimilation, abandoning one’s original culture and fully embracing the 
dominant culture. Individuals can also choose separation. In this case they reject the 
dominant culture, but maintain one’s original culture. Individuals who manage to 
maintain their original culture, but also successfully engage with the new dominant 
culture have achieved integration. Which one of these strategies is chosen will depend on 
the person’s motivation and ability. 
Marginalization has been found to be generally the least adaptive in the sense that 
it leads to the highest levels of acculturative stress. The best protection from acculturative 
stress is offered by integration. Separation and assimilation tend to perform somewhere 
between integration and marginalisation (Berry, 1997). While integration has been shown 
the most effective in preventing acculturative stress, this strategy might also be the most 
challenging. Individuals who want to successfully integrate must incorporate their 
different cultural identities into a coherent whole. This means resolving all potential 
conflicts between the different social identities, conflicts which can occur on the cognitive, 
behavioural or affective level (J. C. Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).  
Consider the case of a Chinese immigrant coming to the United Kingdom. 
Conflicts of behavioural scripts will apparent, for example for conversational norms: 
Even though British culture is considered to favour relatively indirect forms of 
communication for Western standards (Djurssa, 1994; Dunkerley & Robinson, 2002), 
Western norms just differ so drastically from Chinese culture that typical British 
communication is likely to be experienced as aggressive and rude (Durkin, 2011). 
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Underlying these behavioural conflicts are also attitudes, beliefs and feelings about the 
appropriate forms of social interactions, the role of social hierarchy, the importance of 
maintaining social harmony, etc. (Gabrenya, Jr., & Hwang, 1996; Schwartz, 1999). 
Conflicts such as these will have to be resolved for the person to achieve an integration 
of social identities. This requires creating a more complex identity structure in which any 
potential conflicts between different identities have to be resolved (Gocłowska & Crisp, 
2014; Tadmor et al., 2009).  
Acculturation as a conflict of categorical information. The conflict of social 
identities and behavioural patterns could be more broadly summarised as a conflict of 
categorical information (Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014): Cultural identities are a form of 
social category which give people a sense of who they are, and how they are different 
from others (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These social categories are also typically associated 
with sets of behavioural, cognitive and affective schemas which give people a rough 
guideline of how to think, feel and behave as a member of their group (J. C. Turner et al., 
1987). 
These aspects of social identities give people a sense of certainty in a complex 
world precisely because they are categorical, and hence reduce complexity (Forgas, 
Tajifel, & Forgas, 1981). Integrating two different cultural identities therefore demands 
resolving potential conflicts in categorical information. This means not only incorporating 
complex information on their identity (‘Who am I?’), but also conflicting affective, 
cognitive and behavioural norms (‘How should I feel, think and behave as a concurrent 
member of these different groups?’).  
The need to resolve conflicts between categorical information is the unifying 
feature of dealing with challenging diversity not just for ethnic minority members (such 
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as immigrants), but in fact every member of an ethnically diverse society, including 
majority members, as I will demonstrate in the next section.    
2.1.2 Challenges for Dominant Members of a Diverse Society 
Immigrants are not the only members of society facing the need for adaptation to 
diversity. Having to manage two cultural identities is a difficult task but understanding 
diverse environments can be a challenge in itself. Everyone living in a socially diverse 
society must deal with the task of making sense of their social environment, and this 
includes members of the dominant culture (usually the culture of the majority) as well.  
Perceiving and interpreting a socially diverse environment will demand cognitive 
adaptation, because diversity increases the complexity of social environments: A 
culturally diverse society is by definition more heterogeneous, and therefore has many 
members that do not exclusively belong to the dominant culture (individuals with 
migration backgrounds or parents from mixed cultures, expats, etc.). As described in the 
previous section, some of these individuals will choose to integrate their different 
behavioural scripts and cultural identities. As a result, a diverse society will have more 
members with complex identities. Consequently, social identities have been shown to be 
more complex in neighbourhoods which are high in ethnic diversity (Schmid, Hewstone, 
& Ramiah, 2013).  
Individuals with complex identities will be perceived to have distinct and 
orthogonal social identities which will not neatly map onto a common social category 
(Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Forming an impression of such individuals will be more 
challenging and effortful as different pieces of categorical information will be in 
contradiction with each other. When a combination of social categories seems 
contradicting and therefore surprising (e.g. female mechanic, Black CEO), impression 
formation can no longer rely on readily accessible stereotypical information (Hutter & 
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Crisp, 2005; Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). The perceiver instead must ascribe emergent 
attributes to the person in question. Emergent attributes are characteristics which are not 
typically ascribed to any of the simple categories in isolation. They are rather generated 
by causal reasoning about how a person could be a member of these seemingly 
contradicting social categories. Forming an impression of surprising category 
combinations has been found to take more time and effort than for unsurprising ones 
(Hutter, Crisp, Humphreys, Waters, & Moffitt, 2009).  
To sum up this section, understanding individuals with complex, cross-cutting 
social identities is usually cognitively taxing and requires effortful processing. Culturally 
diverse environments have a high density of individuals with complex identities, and are 
therefore more challenging to make sense of, even for members belonging only to the 
dominant culture. The challenge consists in making sense of individuals that belong to 
different social categories that are seemingly at odds with each other. In other words, 
social perceivers in a diverse environment must also actively resolve conflicts of 
categorical information.  
2.2 Diversity Requires Resolving Categorical Inconsistencies 
Living in a diverse environment poses a psychological challenge. As laid out 
above, a major part of that challenge is that diversity requires resolving categorical 
inconsistencies: Diverse societies will have a higher density of individuals with multiple, 
cross-cutting identities. Constructing a coherent sense of identity will require resolving 
potential conflicts between the different identities. The resulting social identities will be 
more complex and will make a diverse environment challenging to understand and predict. 
Making sense of the social world usually relies on stereotypical knowledge as it makes 
the process fast and efficient (McGarty et al., 2004). However, with many complex social 
identities this heuristic process becomes less useful. People with complex identities are 
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likely to contradict stereotypical expectations, because their social identity emerges from 
a complex integration of seemingly contradicting social categories. Social observers will 
therefore also be faced with the task to understand just how these persons have managed 
to overcome these categorical inconsistencies, requiring them to resolve these 
inconsistencies themselves.  
Challenging experiences of diversity can take many different forms, but a 
common theme for all of them is the need to resolve categorical consistencies. At its 
psychological core, social diversity is about the coexistence and combinations of multiple 
social categories. Managing the resulting complexities will often require resolving 
conflicts between the multitudes of category combinations. 
2.3 How Are Conflicts Between Social Categories Resolved? 
Thinking about identity and the social environment in terms of social categories 
is the default mechanism for most people (McGarty, 1999), and has likely evolved to 
quickly recognise friend from foe (Cosmides et al., 2003; Crisp & Meleady, 2012; 
Kurzban et al., 2001). Understanding the world in terms in terms of ingroups and outgroup 
(‘us’ versus ‘them’) has been shown to be a major cognitive mechanism, and can be 
demonstrated even with meaningless (‘minimal’) artificial groups (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, 
& Flament, 1971). 
We should therefore expect managing the conflicting contents of social categories 
to be a serious psychological challenge. However, while the scale of current social 
diversity might be unprecedented, socially complex environments are hardly a novelty to 
the human race (Crisp & Meleady, 2012; Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). It has therefore been 
argued that we must possess the cognitive ability to adapt to diverse environments (Crisp 
& Meleady, 2012). To assure survival it must have been necessary to build coalitions with 
other groups and to be able to understand the increasing complexity of human societies. 
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Furthermore, some individuals clearly do succeed in adapting to socially diverse 
information: Biculturals can demonstrate successful integration of social identities from 
different cultural background (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005), and observers of 
surprising category combination (e.g. female mechanic) in laboratory studies are able to 
make sense of a person without relying on readily accessible stereotypical information 
(Hutter & Crisp, 2005). For such displays of adaptation to social diversity, resolving 
conflicts between social categories has to be a prerequisite, because inconsistencies 
between categories are an integral part of social diversity (Crisp & Turner, 2011). 
If resolving categorical inconsistencies is a crucial part of living in diverse 
environment, just how do people do this? Some observations on how people deal with 
and handle conflicts of social categories come from studies that present participants with 
counterstereotypical combinations.  
When people encounter a person with a surprising combination of social 
categories (e.g. a feminist bank teller, Kunda et al., 1990) they face a conundrum – just 
how does this person happen to have these seemingly contradicting social identities at the 
same time? Research has revealed that such contradictions are resolved by engaging into 
causal reasoning and generating emergent attributes (Hastie, Schroeder, & Weber, 1990; 
Kunda et al., 1990). An emergent attribute is a characteristic that is ascribed to a category 
combination even though it is not usually associated to any of the single categories.  It is 
therefore an emergent property of the specific combination of social categories. Such 
emergent attributes are generated more frequently when the combination of categories 
seem incongruent and therefore surprising (Hastie et al., 1990; Kunda et al., 1990), and 
are generated by a process of causal reasoning (Kunda et al., 1990). Unexpected category 
combinations do not only lead to the generation of more emergent attributes, they also 
lead to the generation of less constituent attributes (attributes commonly associated with 
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one of the single categories; Hutter & Crisp, 2005). This has been taken as evidence for 
the inhibition of constituent properties being part of the underlying process to resolve 
categorical inconsistencies. 
 If resolving categorical conflicts does require cognitive inhibition it should also 
be an effortful process, and hence be impaired under cognitive load. This does indeed 
seem to be the case: Cognitive load eliminates the recollective advantage of 
counterstereotypical attributes (Macrae et al., 1999), indicating that participants were 
impaired in their inconsistency resolution and were therefore unable to organize 
counterstereotypical memories. In a different study, participants under cognitive load 
were found to generate less emergent attributes in response to unexpected combinations 
of social categories (Hutter & Crisp, 2006). This is again indicating that categorical 
inconsistencies require cognitive resources to be properly processed. Furthermore, 
participants presented with surprising category combinations respond slower to 
constituent attributes, indicating that stereotypical information is indeed inhibited when 
processing categorical inconsistencies. 
 To summarise, there is substantial evidence to suggest that participants presented 
with counterstereotypical combinations resolve this categorical inconsistency by a) 
inhibiting the stereotypical information that does not fit the category combination and b) 
generate emergent attributes that diverge from the conventional characteristics ascribed 
to the separate categories.  
Based on these observations, the Categorisation-Processing-Adaptation-
Generalisation (CPAG) model (Crisp & Turner, 2011) suggested that resolving conflicts 
of social categories is a two-step process: Individuals first have to inhibit the conflicting 
stereotypical knowledge. Once stereotypes are suppressed, the conflict can be resolved 
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by employing generative, divergent thought. Both steps are assumed to require effortful 
elaboration, necessitating a switch away from heuristic processing. 
Making such shifts towards a more analytical and less heuristic mode of 
processing will be crucial to navigate socially diverse environments, in which categorical 
inconsistencies are common. According to the CPAG model, these adjustments in 
processing should become easier with repeated experiences of diversity (Crisp & Turner, 
2011). However, for experiences of diversity to trigger cognitive change, they need to 
challenge existing stereotypical knowledge, and the perceiver must be able and motivated 
to resolve the inconsistency. If a person continuously engages in sense-making of 
challenging cases of diversity they eventually adapt and become more efficient in 
handling diversity. They gain the ability to apply and modify categorical knowledge in a 
flexible, non-rigid way and to effortlessly switch to an individualised mode of impression 
formation when necessary. 
The idea that experiences of diversity lead to more competence in processing 
diversity in the future has substantial support: Exposure to a multitude of different 
cultures predicts the ability to adapt and understand different culture, a skill that has been 
called cultural intelligence (Crowne, 2013; Ng, Van Dyne, & Ang, 2012). Similarly, 
biculturals who have managed to integrate both of their cultural identities tend to be more 
proficient in dealing with different cultures (Thomas, Brannen, & Garcia, 2010).  
Consistent exposure to social diversity thus seems to enhance the ability to 
understand diverse environments in the future. However, the skills necessary to make 
sense of complex diverse environments might be useful in other situations as well that are 
not related to intergroup interactions at all. The ability to think flexibly about dynamic 
and complex information should be useful in a wide array of situations. Experiences of 
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diversity might therefore lead to adaptation that impacts domains beyond diverse 
environments. 
2.4 Adaptation to Diversity and its Potential Benefits 
As discussed previously, gaining competence in processing diversity means 
learning to think in a non-rigid and divergent manner relatively detached from cognitive 
categories. In other words, frequently experiencing diversity should lead to more 
flexibility in thinking about social categories. According to the CPAG-model such 
cognitive flexibility should generalise to a wide array situations beyond the intergroup 
domain (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Cognitive flexibility is a key component of divergent 
creativity as it enables to break out of established cognitive structures and to think about 
people and concepts in new and creative ways (Guilford, 1967; Hennessey & Amabile, 
2010). The CPAG model suggests that repeated processing of diversity will lead to 
improved cognitive flexibility in general, mainly by making the inhibition of dominant 
responses more automatic, freeing up resource for generative thought.  
There is indeed ample evidence to suggest that individuals with a lot of exposure 
to diversity think in a more flexible and divergent manner: Research has shown that 
bicultural individuals are more cognitively flexible (Gutierrez & Sameroff, 2008; Tadmor, 
Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012), that multicultural experiences tend to boost creative thinking 
(Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung et al., 2008; Maddux et al., 2010), and that diverse groups 
solve problems in a more innovative manner (Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & 
De Dreu, 2007; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Furthermore, priming counter-
stereotypical exemplars (e.g. female mechanic) can lead to improved cognitive flexibility 
in creative tasks (Gocłowska, Crisp, & Labuschagne, 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013). 
However, the precise cognitive process that leads to an improvement in flexible 
and creative thought is much less clear. Inconsistency resolution usually requires both 
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suppression of stereotypical information as well as divergent, generative thought. 
Improvements resulting from experiences of diversity might affect both areas (inhibitory 
control or divergent creativity) or only one of them. Researchers have traditionally 
emphasised the beneficial effect of diversity on creativity (Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014; 
Leung et al., 2008), but potential effects on inhibitory control are much less clear. If 
diversity does indeed lead to improved self-regulation this might facilitate divergent 
creativity as well as the suppression of dominant responses might be an integral part of 
coming up with innovative ideas (Benedek, Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, 2012). The CPAG 
model also assumes that improvements in self-regulation are an important aspect of 
adaptation to diversity: Repeatedly engaging with challenging diversity is assumed to 
make the inhibition of stereotypical information gradually more automatic, freeing up 
resource for generative thought (Crisp & Turner, 2011). There is thus reason to believe 
that diversity might lead to flexible cognition by providing the opportunity to improve 
one’s self-regulatory ability.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed how the unprecedented rise of diversity in modern 
societies leads to new cognitive challenges for all members of society. Immigrants face 
challenges in constructing a coherent self-identity that integrates both the social identity 
of their original culture as well as that of their new host country. However, members of 
the cultural majority also must come to terms with a complex heterogenous social 
environment that is challenging to make sense of. I have argued that these challenges can 
be subsumed as conflicts of categorical information: People with complex social 
identities must resolve conflicts between the conflicting social categories that they are 
part of. However, merely observing social diversity brings the task to understand others 
with unexpected combinations of social identities, also requiring the resolution of 
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conflicts between the different social categories. The CPAG model (Crisp & Turner, 
2011) has argued that resolving these stereotypical inconsistencies should require 
inhibition of categorical information as well as generative thinking. This implies that 
resolving stereotypical inconsistencies arising from diversity involve processes of 
inhibitory control as well as divergent creativity. While divergent creativity has been 
shown to benefit from experiences of diversity, it is less clear if diversity can lead to 
improvements in cognitive control as well. I will explore this issue further in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: ADAPTING TO ETHNICALLY DIVERSE ENVIRONMENTS 
THROUGH SELF-REGULATION 
 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, repeated exposure to diversity might lead to 
improvements in the ability to suppress the impact of stereotypic content on judgements. 
If stereotype suppression recruits processes required for other acts of effortful cognitive 
control it should be expected that benefits for stereotype suppression can carry over to 
other areas of self-regulation, too. There are good reasons to assume that this is indeed 
the case: Supressing stereotypical information has been shown to tap the same resource 
pool as other self-regulatory processes (Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & Van 
Knippenberg, 2004), and the ability to control racial stereotypes is predicted by neural 
correlates of cognitive control (Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006). Diversity therefore 
has the potential to benefit self-regulation in general, which would affect a whole range 
of domains such as controlling aggression, making healthy life-choices, or academic 
success. In this chapter, I will review the literature that highlights the role of self-
regulation, and describe how chronic exposure to cultural diversity might lead to general 
improvements in cognitive control.  
 
In Chapter 2 I have reviewed evidence for the CPAG model which shows that 
frequent experiences of diversity can promote cognitive flexibility. This increase in 
cognitive flexibility is assumed to primarily stem from enhanced ability to suppress 
stereotypic content (Crisp & Turner, 2011). If diversity leads to improved stereotype 
inhibition, these benefits should also carry over to other areas of self-regulation. Such a 
general improvement in self-regulation should occur if the processes recruited in 
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stereotype suppression are identical to other situations (social and non-social) in which 
cognitive control is required.  
In this chapter, I will review the research on diversity and stereotype suppression, 
and the role of cognitive control for inhibiting stereotypic content. Within this review, I 
will evaluate whether the processes of stereotype suppression are universal for other tasks 
of self-regulation, and whether frequent practice of stereotype suppression could lead to 
improvements in the ability to inhibit stereotypical and other types of content. Research 
looking at the role of conflict and inhibition for social diversity has primarily focused on 
the function of control within intergroup interactions and impression formations of 
outgroup members. In the following, I will offer an overview of the research conducted 
in these areas. 
3.1 Controlling Bias in Intergroup Interactions 
Social diversity inevitably leads to interactions between different social groups, 
so the ability to interact efficiently with outgroup members should be a crucial advantage 
in a socially diverse environment. The value of efficient intercultural communication is 
already apparent in business interactions. Across the world the workforce population is 
becoming increasingly diverse as a result of increased global mobility and immigration 
as well as organizations acting on a more global scale (Rosenzweig, 1998).  Consequently, 
efficiency in intercultural communication and the ability to mediate between different 
cultural groups has become an asset for businesses. Cultural intelligence has been shown 
to have a positive effect on task and leadership performance in ethnically diverse business 
settings (Ang et al., 2007; Groves & Feyerherm, 2011; see Ng et al., 2012 for a review). 
3.1.1 Intergroup Interaction as a Challenge for Self-Regualtion 
However, ensuring successful intergroup interactions can be challenging. For the 
exchange to go well, the involved persons must make sure to avoid any signs of explicit 
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or implicit prejudice. Preventing the expression of explicit prejudice is relatively 
straightforward, as it is the result of a deliberate process. In other words, individuals can 
simply choose to withhold expression of their attitudes (Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-
Jones, & Vance, 2002; Klӧckner & de Raaf, 2013). Implicit prejudice, however, can 
automatically and unintentionally ‘leak’ through uncontrolled behavioural expressions 
(Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). A 
high level of implicit prejudice can express itself in nonverbal signs of discomfort in 
interactions with outgroup members, which in turn leads to leaving an unfriendly 
impression and low quality of the interaction (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & 
Howard, 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, 
Vargas, & von Hippel, 2003). It is therefore not surprising that participants with high 
levels of implicit racial bias tend to have more short-lived relationships with interracial 
roommates (Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006). However, even participants with high levels 
of implicit bias can leave a positive impression in intergroup interactions if they are able 
to control and prevent their bias so that it does not express itself in overt behaviour 
(Gonsalkorale, von Hippel, Sherman, & Klauer, 2009). 
For a successful interaction between members of different social groups, the 
involved individuals must thus carefully monitor and regulate their possibly biased 
responses. In other words, they have to engage in self-regulation (the ability to promote 
intended and goal-oriented behaviour; Amodio, 2014; Bartholow, 2010) 1, through the 
use of inhibitory control (implementing top-down control to constrain dominant 
                                                 
 
1  The term used to refer to the array of processes underlying goal-directed behaviour differs across 
disciplines. These are also referred to as executive control (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008) or 
cognitive control  (Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003) in the cognitive literature. 
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tendencies in favour of more appropriate responses; Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997). 
The importance of self-control in intergroup interactions was already recognised by 
Allport (1954)  when he remarked: “Especially when inner conflict is present, people put 
brakes upon their prejudices. They do not act them out—or they act them out only up to 
a certain point. Something stops the logical progression somewhere.” (pp. 332). 
The ‘inner conflict’ that Allport spoke of has later been more precisely defined by 
researchers as a conflict between the automatic activation of stereotypes and controlled 
processes aiming to inhibit them (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 
2005; Devine & Monteith, 1999; Devine, 1989; Payne, 2005; Sherman et al., 2008). 
However, research has also shown that the pervasiveness of stereotypes can make their 
inhibition an especially challenging task. The activation of implicit stereotypes in 
intergroup encounters has been found to occur automatically and outside of awareness 
(Devine & Monteith, 1999; Devine, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This activation is 
generally assumed to then spread to personality characteristics ascribed to the social 
category in memory. These stereotypical expectancies then influence the judgement about 
the person as well as the behaviour displayed towards them (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & 
Milberg, 1987; Stangor & Lange, 1994).  
In some respects, this process can be adaptive for deriving meaning from social 
stimuli: Stereotypes reduce the complexity and amount of information required to form a 
basic understanding of another person (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; McGarty et al., 2004). 
They allow for rapid and efficient processing of social stimuli by filtering out and 
simplifying the information associated with the other individual. However, social 
categorization and stereotyping is also the basis for prejudice and intergroup bias 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). The prevalent influence of stereotypes on social judgements 
and behaviour can therefore be very problematic for intergroup harmony in a modern 
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society. The influence of automatic stereotypes on judgement and behaviour is indeed so 
pervasive that some researchers initially concluded that prejudice was an inevitable 
outcome of a highly persistent categorisation process (Bargh, 1999). The only chance to 
prevent prejudice from occurring would be to prevent the cultural transmission of 
negative stereotypes in the first place. Attempts to suppress stereotypes might even lead 
to so called rebound effects, the strengthened reappearance of stereotypic thought at a 
later time once cognitive resources are taxed or the motivation to suppress the stereotype 
has waned (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). 
However, subsequent research has demonstrated that in many instances the 
expression of automatically activated prejudice can be regulated and prevented (Devine 
& Monteith, 1999). A multitude of studies have now shown that even if implicit 
stereotypes have been activated individuals can prevent the expression of these 
stereotypes without rebound effects given sufficient internal motivation to do so (Gordijn 
et al., 2004; see Monteith, Lybarger, & Woodcock, 2009 for an overview). While internal 
motivation to control stereotypes has certainly proved vital for acting without prejudice, 
research has shown that motivated individuals can still fail in suppressing the influence 
of stereotypes if they lack the regulatory capacity to do so (Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-
Jones, & Devine, 2006; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Muraven, 2008). 
3.1.2 Behavioural Studies on Intergroup Interactions and Self-Regulation 
The importance of executive control for preventing biased responses in intergroup 
interactions has been clearly demonstrated in the weapon identification task (WIT; Payne, 
2005). In this task participants are primed with the face of a White or Black person and 
are subsequently shown an image of a handgun or tool. Participants then must classify 
the target image as a handgun or tool. Errors on this task are clearly driven by implicit 
stereotypes: Tools are more likely to be identified as handguns after a Black face prime 
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and handguns are more likely to be identified as tools after a White face prime. More 
importantly, however, this paradigm allows to differentiate between contributions of 
automatic and controlled processes using the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 
1991). The control component obtained from the WIT has been found to be lower in states 
of ego depletion and to predict performance on general executive control tasks such as 
the anti-saccade task (Payne, 2005), the Stroop (Govorun & Payne, 2006) and the Flanker 
task (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008). This demonstrates that the control 
component in the WIT is measuring a more general component of cognitive control. That 
is, the control component in this task is not specific to the suppression of social 
stereotypes, but seems to stem from a broad executive process that is at work in other 
non-social tasks calling for the inhibition of dominant responses. This global component 
of cognitive control seems to determine if automatic biases express themselves in biased 
behaviour: Participants high on automatic bias in the weapon identification task are 
especially likely to evaluate a Black person negatively when they are also low in cognitive 
control (Payne, 2005). 
Further research has shown that even when the motivation to prevent stereotyping 
is high, ego depletion can make it difficult to respond without prejudice (Muraven, 2008). 
Similarly, participants under cognitive load are more likely to be guided by stereotypes 
in an impression formation task (D. T. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Reversely, being busy 
with overriding stereotypical thoughts has been shown to lead to a weaker performance 
on tests of self-control, presumably caused by a depletion of regulatory resources (Gordijn 
et al., 2004). Cognitive exhaustion can also be observed after interethnic interactions. 
White participants showed weaker performance on the Stroop task after interacting with 
a Black individual (Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005b; Richeson 
et al., 2003). This was especially true for participants with particularly high implicit bias 
ADAPTING TO ETHNIC DIVERSITY THROUGH SELF-REGULATION 31 
 
 
(Richeson & Shelton, 2003). The same pattern seems to hold for minority members 
involved in an interethnic exchange. Black participants were also impaired in their Stroop 
performance after interacting with a White person (Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005). 
This was again qualified by their implicit intergroup bias. Cognitive depletion was only 
observed for Black participants who showed negative intergroup bias towards Whites 
(ingroup favouritism), not for participants who held favourable implicit attitudes towards 
Whites (outgroup favouritism). Based on these findings it has been suggested that the 
classic rebound effect (Macrae et al., 1994) can be explained in terms of cognitive 
depletion (Gordijn et al., 2004). Since the suppression of stereotypes requires cognitive 
control, engaging in the initial suppression task can lead to the depletion of regulatory 
resources. The subsequent rebound effect occurs, because cognitive resources have been 
depleted and the inhibition of stereotypes fails. 
The vital role of self-control for preventing stereotyping is also highlighted by 
studies with the elderly. Older people tend to be more racially biased, and researchers had 
initially assumed that this reflected socialization at a time of more conservative racial 
attitudes (Danigelis & Cutler, 1991; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Wilson, 1996). While 
older cohorts were indeed socialized in more prejudiced times (G. M. Gilbert, 1951; 
Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969), they are also known to have diminished cognitive 
control compared to younger participants (Connelly, Hasher, & Zacks, 1991; Hartman & 
Hasher, 1991; Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher, 1996). This decline in cognitive control 
seems to be at least partially responsible for the tendency of older participants to express 
stereotypical attitudes. Older participants have been shown to be more likely to rate an 
African American athlete as less intelligent than a Caucasian athlete and to obtain higher 
scores on the modern racism scale (Von Hippel, Silver, & Lynch, 2000). These age 
differences in stereotyping and prejudice were mediated by age-related differences in 
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cognitive control. Subsequent studies confirmed that age differences in the expression of 
stereotypes are indeed due to diminished self-control (and hence failure to inhibit 
stereotypes) rather than increased stereotype activation. One of these studies (Stewart, 
von Hippel, & Radvansky, 2009) employed the process-dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 
1991) on participants’ scores on the implicit association task (IAT;  Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998). This procedure allows for the separation of automatic and controlled 
components of the IAT score, similar to the procedure used in the weapon identification 
task described above (Payne, 2005). Older participants showed more implicit racial 
stereotyping on the IAT, but this age difference was driven exclusively by a decreased 
component of cognitive control rather than a stronger automatic stereotype component. 
Similar findings were obtained when participants’ IAT scores were analysed by using the 
Quad model (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, & Klauer, 2009). The Quad model (Conrey et al., 
2005; Sherman et al., 2008) can be seen as an extension of the process-dissociation 
procedure (Jacoby, 1991). Per the Quad model, responses on measures of implicit bias 
stem from four components: activation of association, detection, overcoming bias and 
guessing. In the study by Gonsalkorale et al. (2009) older participants again showed racial 
bias on the IAT, and this increased bias was fully explained by an age-related decrease of 
the overcoming bias component, a component that is considered to reflect controlled 
attempts to regulate automatic bias. These findings demonstrate that older participants 
exhibit similar levels of stereotype activation, but are more likely to fail in regulating and 
inhibiting them, leading to stronger expressions of stereotypes and prejudice. 
3.1.3 Neuropsychological Studies on Intergroup Interactions and Self-Regulation 
 The idea that inhibitory control can modulate and prevent automatically initiated 
stereotypical responses is also corroborated by findings from neurological studies. 
Electroencephalography (EEG) measurement during the weapon identification task 
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revealed that the control component for black faces in this task was predicted by error 
related negativity (ERN; Amodio et al., 2008). The ERN component of the EEG is 
assumed to indicate the activity of a conflict monitoring system, located in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), and nearby medio-frontal regions (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Participants with large ERNs are also more likely to take more 
time and respond with greater accuracy in all trials (Amodio et al., 2004). Other neural 
correlates of the self-regulatory system include the N2 and the negative slow wave (NSW) 
of the event related potential in EEG measures. The N2 is considered to also reflect the 
activity of the conflict monitoring system (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van Den Wildenberg, 
& Ridderinkhof, 2003), and has also been linked to the conflict monitoring function of 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). The amplitude of the 
NSW is assumed to indicate the implementation of cognitive control (Curtin & Fairchild, 
2003; West & Alain, 1999). These components were both found to be modulated by the 
inhibition of race-biased responses (Bartholow et al., 2006). When participants had to 
withhold a response to Black-stereotypic words (e.g. lazy, violent, athletic) following a 
Black face prime, the amplitude of the N2 and NSW component was increased indicating 
a conflict between stereotypic content and intended response (N2), as well as increased 
efforts to resolve this conflict (NSW). Furthermore, successful inhibition of the response 
was associated by a larger NSW amplitude, supporting the idea that inhibiting stereotypic 
responses requires the implementation of cognitive control. 
Research has also found that subliminal presentation of masked black faces can 
lead to increased activation of the amygdala (compared to white faces), a brain area 
associated with automatic emotional responses (Cunningham et al., 2004). Unmasked 
conscious presentation of the same stimuli, however, did not lead to an activation of the 
amygdala but rather to increased activity in areas of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
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(DLPFC) and ACC. As mentioned above, the ACC is assumed to be part of a conflict 
detection system while the DLPFC has been associated with regulation and inhibition of 
unintended responses (Botvinick et al., 2001). In another study, the same regions were 
found to be more active during the presentation of black faces for White participants with 
strong automatic racial bias (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Activity of the right DLPFC to 
black faces in the same study also predicted cognitive depletion after interaction with a 
Black experimenter. 
3.1.4 Controlling Intergroup Bias Motivated by Norms 
Based on the research to date there is thus strong evidence to suggest that people 
engage in cognitive control in interethnic interactions to inhibit stereotypical responses. 
This regulatory process likely stems from the motivation to prevent appearing prejudiced 
(Bodenhausen, Todd, & Richeson, 2009; Devine et al., 2002; Richeson & Shelton, 2007). 
Open expression of prejudice has become increasingly unacceptable as prevailing social 
norms have become more liberal (Devine, Plant, & Blair, 2001). Thus, expressing 
prejudice has become undesirable, because doing so would risk disapproval and sanctions 
from others (Plant & Devine, 1998).  
The impact of these norms is demonstrated by studies manipulating the salience 
of social norms. When norms to be unprejudiced are made salient, participants tend to 
report lower levels of prejudice and stronger antiracist opinions (Blanchard, Crandall, 
Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Blanchard, Lilly, & Vaughn, 1991; Monteith, Deneen, & 
Tooman, 1996; Zitek & Hebl, 2007). Furthermore, external pressure is not the only 
motivation to appear unprejudiced. As the norm to be unprejudiced becomes more 
pervasive and widely held, individuals should internalize these values and strive to adhere 
to them simply to satisfy their own personal standards and maintain a positive sense of 
self (Higgins, 1987). In this case failure to prevent expression of prejudice might pose a 
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threat to the individual’s self-image. In studies where false feedback suggested to 
participants that they are at risk of being prejudiced, they were more likely to behave 
altruistically in a subsequent interaction with a black person (Dutton & Lake, 1973). This 
behaviour might have served to restore the participant’s self-image as a person who acts 
unprejudiced in accordance with prevailing social norms. Studies which manipulated the 
salience of norms opposing prejudice tend to find a reduction in prejudiced opinions 
regardless of whether these opinions were expressed publicly or privately (Blanchard et 
al., 1994, 1991; Monteith et al., 1996). These findings also suggest that internalization of 
norms condemning prejudice is common. Conforming with those norms, however, will 
require regulation and inhibition of automatic stereotypic responses. 
3.1.5 Controlling Bias for Successful Intergroup Interactions 
Suppression of prejudiced responses is required to comply with modern anti-
prejudice norms, but in an ethnically diverse society stereotype inhibition is also 
instrumental for forming meaningful relationships. Being able to interact with different 
ethnic groups without expression of prejudice enables positive and high-quality 
encounters (Dovidio et al., 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003). 
When stereotypic responses are not properly regulated during intergroup interactions this 
can have harmful effects for the exchange. Non-Muslim participants with high implicit 
bias and low cognitive control are rated as less likeable in interaction with Muslims 
(Gonsalkorale, von Hippel, et al., 2009). Inhibition of stereotypes is therefore a 
requirement for making favourable impressions on members of other cultural and ethnic 
groups, something that should obviously be of high importance in a culturally diverse 
environment. 
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3.2 Controlling Intergroup Bias in Social Judgements 
Apart from controlling one’s own behaviour in intergroup interactions, the 
inhibition of stereotypes is likely to also be required when making sense of social actors 
in a diverse environment. As discussed in the previous chapter, social diversity leads to 
more encounters with stimuli that are stereotype-inconsistent (e.g. observing surprising 
category conjunctions such as a Romanian entrepreneur in the UK). Processing these type 
of stimuli should require inhibiting the unhelpful stereotypic associations to allow for 
more generative thinking about the inconsistency (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Fitting with 
this idea, categorising individuals with low prototypicality (e.g. stimuli with ambiguous 
facial features or well-liked outgroup members) generally has been found to take longer 
than for stimuli with high prototypicality (Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Richeson & 
Trawalter, 2005a). It has been suggested that this delay in categorisation might be caused 
by a response conflict that requires self-regulation to be resolved (Bartholow, 2010). This 
would be similar to response conflicts in classic cognitive control tasks such as the 
Eriksen Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) or the Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991). 
Indeed, when target Black faces in a modified Flanker task are paired with stereotype-
inconsistent words (‘flankers’) categorisation is slowed compared to a pairing with 
stereotype-consistent words (Bartholow & Dickter, 2008). This is in line with the idea 
that processing stereotype inconsistent information can be conceptualised as a response 
conflict. Further findings from the same study showed that when flankers showed a high 
rate of stereotype-consistent information, the EEG response during incompatible trials 
showed a positive deflection of the lateralized readiness potential, just before a response 
was made. This is usually considered as evidence of conflicting response tendencies, 
indicating an initial preparation of the incorrect response, before this response is 
overwritten with the execution of the correct one (Spencer & Coles, 1999). Furthermore, 
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on incompatible trials the N2 amplitude was increased, indicating activation of the 
conflict monitoring system. These results strongly indicate that observing stereotypical 
inconsistencies does require self-regulation to resolve the conflict. Since stereotypical 
inconsistencies are likely to be more frequent in ethnically diverse environments; it is not 
just preventing expression of prejudice that requires self-regulation in intergroup 
interaction, but also the task of making sense of one’s social environments.  
Hence, there is considerable evidence that inhibition of stereotypic responses 
could be a key skill for functioning in a diverse environment. Inhibition of automatically 
activated stereotypes can prevent the expression of prejudice. This ensures conforming to 
societal norms and one’s own personal standards, but also enables positive and high-
quality intergroup encounters. In addition, supressing dominant stereotypic associations 
can aid the understanding of other social actors, especially if they seem inconsistent with 
prevalent stereotypes. Thus, stereotype suppression might be helpful not only in making 
a favourable impression on others, but also in understanding the motives of members of 
different social groups. These benefits of stereotype inhibition should be invaluable when 
attempting to build coalitions across group boundaries. The ability to cooperate across 
group boundaries should be a clear benefit if not a necessity for functioning in a diverse 
environment, since options for coalitions within ingroups will be the more limited the 
more socially heterogeneous a society is. This has led some researchers to speculate that 
it was the increasing complexity (i.e. diversity) of human societies that promoted the 
evolution of cognitive mechanism to suppress stereotypical representations, thus allowing 
for intergroup alliances (Crisp & Meleady, 2012; Crisp, 2015).  
3.3 Benefits of Diversity for Self-Regulation 
Functioning in an environment of ethnic diversity thus seems to require the skill 
to inhibit stereotypic responses: Inhibiting stereotypes through cognitive control is vital 
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for having fruitful interactions in a socially diverse setting (Devine & Monteith, 1999), 
and stereotype inhibition also plays a key role in comprehending actors in socially diverse 
environments by enabling the resolution of stereotypical inconsistencies (Crisp & Turner, 
2011). Such inconsistency resolution is necessary to make sense of information that 
contradicts common stereotypes, something that is especially likely to occur in 
environments with cross-cutting and dynamic social identities, a characteristic of social 
diversity. 
Inhibiting stereotypes through cognitive control is assumed to prevent irrelevant 
information from interfering with understanding counter-stereotypical individuals. This 
idea is supported by findings suggesting that stimuli containing conflicting stereotypical 
information activate a conflict monitoring system which is also recruited in other tasks 
requiring inhibitory control (Bartholow & Dickter, 2008). Collectively the findings 
reviewed so far strongly suggest that frequently engaging in cognitive control is a 
necessity to function in a socially diverse environment. That is, inhibitory control seems 
to be a necessary component to understand members of other social groups and to build 
meaningful relationships with them. 
Consequently, individuals who are exposed to ethnic diversity on a regular basis 
should also be required to regularly engage in the inhibition of stereotypes. Therefore, it 
might be possible that individuals exposed to high levels of ethnic diversity improve in 
their ability to inhibit stereotypes through frequent opportunity for practice. Of course, 
for this practice to have any impact, one must assume that cognitive control is a capacity 
that can be trained. 
3.3.1 Modulating Self-Regulation Through Training 
Indeed, there is ample evidence to suggest that self-regulation can improve 
through practice. Repeatedly engaging in acts of effortful self-control (such as stereotype 
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inhibition) has been found to increase self-regulatory capacity for different kinds of tasks 
requiring control (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006). Training self-control 
over a few weeks (e.g. by using the non-dominant hand for certain tasks such as brushing 
teeth, refraining from colloquial speech or cutting back sweets, etc.) can increase 
cognitive control abilities in unrelated tasks, such as performing on the stop-signal task 
(Muraven, 2010b), a visual tracking task (Oaten & Cheng, 2006) or a concentration task 
(S. A. Hui et al., 2009). Other benefits after a self-control training intervention are 
improved ability to endure physical discomfort (S. A. Hui et al., 2009; Muraven, 
Baumeister, & Tice, 1999), inhibit aggressive behaviour (Denson, Capper, Oaten, Friese, 
& Schofield, 2011; Finkel, DeWall, Slotter, Oaten, & Foshee, 2009), and an increased 
likelihood to successfully quit smoking (Muraven, 2010b). Self-control training also 
increases the chance of following through with various other healthy life-choices such as 
following good eating or spending habits (Oaten & Cheng, 2006). Self-control training 
can also help to minimize depletion following attempts to suppress stereotypes (Gailliot, 
Plant, Butz, & Baumeister, 2007), demonstrating again that stereotype inhibition draws 
from the same resource pool as other cognitive control tasks. 
3.3.2 Exposure to Diversity as Self-Control Training 
These findings demonstrate that frequently engaging in acts of self-regulation can 
lead to long-term benefits for cognitive control in general. Frequent use of cognitive 
control is a necessity when living in an ethnically diverse environment. As discussed 
previously, ethnic diversity requires employing cognitive control on a regular basis due 
to the demands of intergroup interactions and sense-making of other individuals in a 
diverse environment. It might therefore be expected that individuals who are regularly 
exposed to ethnic diversity will ultimately improve in their self-regulatory ability. Such 
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cognitive adaptation would then ensure efficient processing of diversity related stimuli in 
the future.  
The literature on self-control training suggests frequent engagement with ethnic 
diversity (and hence frequent acts of self-regulation), should lead to improvements in 
cognitive control by increasing self-regulatory capacity (Muraven et al., 1999; Muraven 
& Baumeister, 2000; Muraven, 2010a). Since other acts of self-control draw from the 
same resource pool this would benefit other acts of self-regulation outside the context of 
stereotype inhibition. In addition, some researchers have suggested that self-regulation 
might also improve through an alternative path, namely by automatization (Crisp & 
Turner, 2011; Devine & Monteith, 1999). That is, with repeated stereotype inhibition the 
process of suppressing stereotype associations might become automatic and hence occurs 
with much greater speed and ease. Such automatization might then generalise to other 
tasks that require the suppression of dominant responses (Crisp & Turner, 2011). 
Inhibitory control should therefore benefit from chronic exposure to ethnic diversity, 
either by improving self-regulatory capacity or by making the process of supressing 
dominant responses gradually more automatic.  
Stereotype inhibition does indeed seem to improve through practice, as 
demonstrated in laboratory studies. Participants who received training in negating 
stereotype associations were more likely to successfully inhibit distracting stereotype 
associations  (Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Kawakami, Dovidio, 
& van Kamp, 2005). Other supporting evidence comes from research on biculturals. 
Bicultural individuals are especially likely to frequently process social diversity, because 
they often have to negotiate potentially opposing cultural orientations within their own 
identity (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). Thus, this group might engage in acts of 
inhibitory control particularly often (Hirsh & Kang, 2015; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 
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2004). Findings on the effect of multiple social identities on self-regulation are scarce, 
but tentatively support the idea that bicultural integration could lead to improvements in 
self-regulation. Successful linguistic acculturation of Mexican Americans, as measured 
by the use of English, has been found to be related to greater social self-control (Pokhrel, 
Herzog, Sun, Rohrbach, & Sussman, 2013). Also, multiracial participants seem to inhibit 
stereotypical associations more efficiently than monoracials (Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, & 
Peck, 2007). 
Regarding other types of experiences of diversity, such as regular intergroup 
contact, to my knowledge no studies so far have explored the link between frequent 
intergroup contact and cognitive control. While frequent and positive intergroup contact 
has been shown to generally reduce the expression of intergroup bias (Graf, Paolini, & 
Rubin, 2014; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, & Christ, 2011; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), this line of research has traditionally emphasized the role of 
affective components such as intergroup anxiety rather than testing for effects on self-
regulation (Pettigrew, 1998; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; R. N. Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & 
Vonofakou, 2008). Intergroup anxiety certainly has been demonstrated to be crucial in 
predicting when participants will engage in prejudiced behaviour towards outgroup 
members. However, as discussed above, even when intergroup anxiety is absent, self-
regulation is still required to prevent implicit stereotypes from interfering with the 
interaction (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, et al., 2009). Furthermore, self-regulation might also 
be necessary to inhibit stereotypical information when trying to make sense of counter-
stereotypical observations in the interaction (Bartholow & Dickter, 2008; Bartholow, 
2010).  
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3.4 Conclusion  
To summarise, there is strong evidence to suggest that stereotype inhibition 
requires effortful cognitive control. Stereotype inhibition therefore engages self-
regulatory processes active in other non-social tasks that require the suppression of 
dominant responses. Practice in inhibiting dominant responses can be considered a form 
of self-control training and has been shown to improve self-regulatory capacity. Since 
stereotype inhibition represents an act of self-control, frequent repeated stereotype 
suppression could lead to improvements for cognitive control. It seems reasonable to 
assume that an ethnically diverse environment will frequently call for stereotype 
inhibition, and that chronic exposure to ethnic diversity could therefore lead to improved 
self-regulation. This would mean that diversity could affect a whole range of different 
domains through improved cognitive control such as financial responsibility, controlling 
aggressive behaviour or making healthy life choices. However, research on the effects of 
diversity on self-regulation are somewhat scarce, especially concerning the effect of 
intergroup contact for majority members. In the following chapter, I will present a series 
of studies that explore the impact of ethnic diversity on self-regulation. In these studies, 
participants’ exposure to ethnic diversity was measured (Study 1 and 2) as well as their 
contact with other ethnic groups (Study 3). The studies investigated the influence of these 
experiences of diversity on self-report measures of impulsiveness and delay gratification 
(Study 1 and 2), as well as on behavioural measures of cognitive control such as the 
Stroop task (Study 3). 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPOSURE TO DIVERSITY AND SELF-REGULATION 
 
In the preceding chapter, I discussed research demonstrating that regular 
experiences of diversity have the potential to benefit self-regulation in social and non-
social situations. This idea was put to the test in three studies reported in this chapter. I 
tested the hypothesis that experiencing greater levels of diversity would enhance self-
regulatory ability. In general, studies showed that experiences of diversity only affected 
self-regulation when diversity was made salient. However, in contrast to predictions, the 
effect of diversity on self-regulation was detrimental rather than beneficial. Findings from 
Study 1 showed that experiences of diversity were marginally associated with reports of 
weak delayed gratification. This effect was replicated in Study 2, but experiences of 
diversity were also shown to only affect delayed gratification when diversity was salient. 
Self-regulation was measured with a behavioural measure, the Stroop Test, in Study 3. 
Findings demonstrated that experiences of diversity, such as positive contact, led to 
poorer performance on the Stroop when diversity was salient, corroborating results from 
the previous studies. Altogether, these results provide evidence that prolonged experiences 
of diversity are unlikely to result in enhanced cognitive control, and in contrast, may 
actually lead to reduced cognitive control when brought to mind. Implications and 
potential mechanisms that can explain these findings are discussed. 
 
As laid out in the previous chapter, prior work on intergroup contact highlights 
the role of self-control for functioning in a culturally diverse society: Self-regulatory 
control is a crucial skill to manage intercultural interactions (Amodio et al., 2008; 
Schlauch, Lang, Plant, Christensen, & Donohue, 2009) and for making social judgements 
in a diverse environment (Bartholow & Dickter, 2008; Bartholow, 2010; Conrey et al., 
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2005; Payne, 2005). Adjusting to a socially diverse environment requires the ability to 
interact with members of different cultural groups without prejudice, because it enables 
positive and high-quality interactions (Plant, 2004). Individuals who are effective in 
responding without prejudice have been shown to be able to exert more cognitive control 
and engage in more conflict monitoring, even when under cognitive load (Amodio et al., 
2008; Schlauch et al., 2009). Importantly, the ability to control racial stereotypes in such 
situations has been shown to tap the same resource pool as other self-regulatory processes 
(Gordijn et al., 2004; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005b). Furthermore, the ability to control 
racial stereotypes is also predicted by neural correlates of cognitive control (Bartholow et 
al., 2006; Bartholow, 2010).  
Beyond intercultural interactions, just processing perceptions of diverse 
environments seems to engage self-regulatory processes as well. Diverse environments 
are more likely to present stereotype-inconsistent stimuli, and processing these types of 
stimuli have been shown to involve self-regulatory processes within the conflict 
monitoring system (Bartholow & Dickter, 2008; Bartholow, 2010). 
It therefore seems reasonable to expect that living in a socially diverse 
environment can lead to adaptation via enhanced inhibition and self-regulation (Crisp & 
Meleady, 2012; Crisp & Turner, 2011). Increased self-regulatory control would affect a 
whole range of domains such as controlling aggression (Gailliot, Baumeister, et al., 2007), 
making healthy life-choices (Boals, Vandellen, & Banks, 2011; Moffitt et al., 2011), and 
academic success (Bembenutty & Karabenick, 1998; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 
2004). However, while in theory a lot of exposure to diversity might affect self-regulation, 
to my knowledge no available studies have explored this link thus far.  
Furthermore, research on the impact of diversity on cognition has predominantly 
focused on the consequences for biculturals (Benet-Martínez, Lee & Leu, J., 2006; 
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Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012; Tadmor, Hong, et al., 2012; 
Tadmor et al., 2009). This work has played a major role in understanding the broader 
effects of diversity on cognition and behaviour, but work on the psychological 
consequences of ethnic diversity for majority members has been lacking. Theoretical 
work on the CPAG model has stressed that majority and minority members do in principle 
face the same type of challenges in a diverse environment, namely resolving 
inconsistencies of social categories (Crisp & Turner, 2011). This happens either by 
perceiving stereotypical inconsistencies (for majority members) or by belonging 
themselves to social categories that are stereotypically inconsistent (for minority 
members). Cognitive responses to diverse environments should therefore follow a similar 
trajectory for majority and minority members. Culturally diverse environments consist of 
bicultural individuals as well as of members of the cultural and ethnic majority, and the 
consequences of an increased diversity in society can only be fully understood if the 
impact of this change on all groups is studied. 
However, studies that have explored the cognitive impact of perceiving diversity 
on cognition were so far either limited to short term effects to one-off exposure to diverse 
stimuli in the lab or might not generalise to living in diverse environments as majority 
members: Immediate exposure to counter-stereotypes have been shown to elicit a boost 
in flexible, creative cognition (Gocłowska et al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; 
Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). Also, multicultural stimuli containing signifiers of different 
cultures have been shown to have similar effects (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng, Leung, 
& Wu, 2011; Leung et al., 2008). As discussed in the last chapters, these studies provide 
valuable insights as to what cognitive processes are momentarily enhanced when 
processing diverse stimuli. However, it does not necessarily follow from these studies 
that such effects can lead to long-term cognitive change. 
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Other studies have shown that multicultural experiences and time spent abroad 
predicts performance on creativity tasks (Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009, 
2009; Tadmor, Satterstrom, Jang, & Polzer, 2012). Even though these studies are 
important to show that diversity can have long-lasting cognitive benefits, they might not 
directly apply to the situation of majority members living in diverse environments. 
Spending time abroad is comparable to the situation of cultural minorities, since 
sojourners must interact with a majority culture that they are not a member of. Indeed, 
the only difference to classic studies of acculturation of minority members might be that 
sojourners know that their exposure to a different culture will be of limited duration. 
Studies that used multicultural experience as a variable have usually measured it through 
the multicultural experience scale (MES; Leung & Chiu, 2010). This scale taps into a 
broad range of multicultural experiences such as spending time abroad, bilingualism, 
birth place of parents, and exposure to other cultures through cuisine, music or friends 
from foreign countries. While this scale is certainly well suited to measure general 
exposure to diversity, it does not exclusively measure experiences of diversity as a 
majority member. Therefore, more work is needed to investigate if experiencing diversity 
as a majority member is sufficient to elicit cognitive change. 
Pioneering work has shown that majority members that live in ethnically diverse 
neighbourhoods conceptualize their own social identity in more complex ways (Schmid 
et al., 2013). But if living in an ethnically diverse neighbourhood also influences cognitive 
factors beyond social categorization has so far not been studied. 
In the following I will present a series of studies exploring the impact of diversity 
on self-regulation. These studies were conducted with White British participants (the 
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ethnic majority) who grew up in England2. It was predicted that individuals who have 
experienced more diversity should have acquired better self-regulation skills to more 
effectively adapt to a diverse environment. This possibility was first explored in a 
correlational study (Study 1). Findings from this study were then qualified in 
experimental paradigms, measuring self-regulation via self-reports (Study 2) as well as 
through behavioural measures (Study 3).  
Based on the results of a pilot study (reported below), diversity was 
operationalised as mere exposure to ethnic diversity. Ethnic diversity was measured using 
objective as well as subjective methods. Objective methods employed census data on 
district diversity, while subjective methods involved participant’s estimated ethnic 
diversity of their environment. Objective data on district diversity served as a proxy for 
mere exposure to different cultural groups. Subjective diversity, on the other hand, might 
also be influenced by the salience of diversity for the individual. By including both types 
of measures these studies allow to draw a more complete picture of the impact of diversity.  
4.1 Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to determine the most appropriate measures for 
diversity, and which aspect of diversity might be most relevant for self-regulation. 
Diversity was operationalised as mere exposure to diversity and recent subjective 
experiences of diversity. Exposure to diversity was measured through census data on 
ethnic diversity and by questions on the subjective ethnic diversity of participant’s 
environment. Recent subjective experiences of diversity were assessed through various 
                                                 
 
2 The area of origin for the presented studies was restricted to England rather than the United Kingdom, 
because the studies made use of data on ethnic groups from the 2011 Census of the UK. Questions on 
ethnicity differ slightly between countries in this survey. For consistency, I therefore chose to only obtain 
data for England. 
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questions. Self-regulation was operationalised as reporting low levels of general 
impulsiveness. To also obtain a measure of self-regulation that is of practical relevance to 
the participants’ everyday life, an additional measure for compulsive buying behaviour 
was also included in this study. 
4.1.1 Method 
 Participants. For this pilot study, 50 White British participants were recruited at 
the University of Sheffield. Students of the psychology department were invited via email 
to participate in an online study on “Intercultural experiences of students in the UK”. In 
exchange for participation, students were rewarded with course credits. To participate, the 
student’s hometown had to be located within England, and the students had to access the 
survey from a non-mobile device. Ethnic membership was not indicated as a criterion as 
this might have made group membership overly salient which could have influenced 
results. Instead members of ethnic minorities (non-White British participants) were 
filtered out after data collection. The participants (47 females, 3 males) were aged 
between 18 and 50 years (M = 19.60, SD = 4.84). 
Procedure and materials. After signing an informed consent, participants first 
answered demographic questions, followed by questions on their subjective exposure to 
ethnic diversity. Subsequently, participants answered questions on their recent 
experiences of diversity. Participants then completed the BIS-Brief (BIS-Brief; Steinberg 
et al., 2013) and the Compulsive Buying Scale (Faber & O'Guinn, 1992). After 
completion of the study, participants were thanked for participation and debriefed. 
Demographic measures. Participants indicated their age, gender and ethnicity. 
Furthermore, participants were asked about their ethnicity and home district (defined as 
the area in which they spent the most time until they turned 18). 
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Prior exposure to diversity. To assess how much participants were confronted 
with ethnic diversity while growing up, objective data as well as subjective self-reports 
of the ethnic diversity of the participants’ environment were combined into a measure of 
prior exposure to diversity. 
Objective ethnic diversity of home district. To measure the ethnic diversity of 
participants’ home districts I derived an ethnic diversity index for these districts from the 
2011 UK Census (Office for National Statistics, 2013). For this index the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index was subtracted from unity, a measure commonly used in sociology to 
indicate the ethnic diversity of a geographic unit (Hirschman, 1964; Schaeffer, 2013).3 
This index can be written as:  





where si denotes the proportion of individuals belonging to ethnic category i, and k 
represents the number of ethnic groups. This index specifies the chance that two random 
persons of a district belong to a different ethnic group. It can range from 0 (only one 
ethnic group is present) to 1 (population is divided into an infinitive number of ethnic 
groups). 
In the context of this study the main ethnic groups as measured by the 2011 UK 
Census were White British, White Other, Asian or Asian British and Black or Black 
British (Office for National Statistics, 2013). Additionally, an ‘other or mixed’ category 
was also included. The diversity index for this study can therefore be written as: 
 
                                                 
 
3 This index is occasionally also accredited to Taylor and Jodice (1983) or Blau (1977). 
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𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1 − ((𝑝(𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠ℎ)2 + 𝑝(𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)2 +  
𝑝(𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛/𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠ℎ)2 + 𝑝(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘/𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠ℎ)2 + 𝑝(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑)2)  
 
The diversity for England as a whole is .35, with single districts in this pilot study 
scoring from .05 (Allerdale) to .76 (Lewisham) (M = .29, SD = .21). The diversity index 
per region for England is displayed in Table 1; region is a geographical unit two tiers 
higher than district, which is the geographical unit used in this study. This table also lists 
the number of participants per region. 
 
Table 1 
Objective Diversity Index for Regions of England. 
Region Diversity Index n for Pilot Study 
East of England .27 7 
East Midlands .26 5 
London .72 3 
North East .12 4 
North West .24 7 
South East .27 4 
South West .16 3 
West Midlands .36 4 
Yorkshire and the Humber .26 13 
 
Prior subjective exposure to ethnic diversity. After responding to demographic 
questions, participants estimated the proportion of students in their secondary school 
belonging to each of the four major ethnic groups in the UK (White British, White other, 
Asian/Asian British, Black/Black British, Mixed or Other). If the participant went to 
several schools he or she was asked to consider the school, they went to before university. 
They also estimated the proportions for people living in the neighbourhood they grew up 
in. If a participant lived in several neighbourhoods while growing up he or she was asked 
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to make the estimate for the neighbourhood where the participant had lived for the longest 
time period. The full scale is reported in Appendix A. 
For both questions, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index was again computed and 
subtracted from unity to derive an index for participants’ subjective exposure to diversity. 
The resulting index indicated the chance in percentages that two random members of the 
school/neighbourhood belonged to different ethnic groups, assuming participant’s 
subjective distribution of ethnic group members. 
The correlation for the two separate subjective indices was r (48) = .54, p < .001. 
Both indices were averaged into a single measure for subjective exposure to diversity. 
The range of this index was .31 to .71 (M = .31, SD = .16). 
Combined index for prior exposure to diversity. The subjective and objective 
diversity indices showed a strong correlation, r (48) = .62, p < .001. The measures were 
combined into a single index for diversity exposure by transforming the scores on both 
the subjective and objective index to their corresponding z-score and then computing the 
mean of these scores. This standardised composite diversity index ranged from -1.31 to 
2.35 (M = .00, SD = .90). 
Recent experiences of diversity. Recent diversity experiences made during the 
past year were measured through a scale containing 21 items. The items were drafted by 
tapping into different domains of inter-ethnic diversity such as acquiring knowledge about 
different cultures (for example: “I acquired knowledge about a culture that is not my 
own.”) interpersonal contact (for example: “I have met many people from different 
cultural backgrounds.”), interethnic exchange in one’s immediate environment (for 
example: “Where I lived lots of different cultures came together and interacted with each 
other.”), and the experienced challenge elicited by diversity (for example: “I experienced 
situations that were completely new for me.”). Items were rated on a Likert-Scale from 1 
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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The full scale is reported in Appendix B. The 
initial scale showed acceptable internal reliability, Cronbach’s α = .64 (but see results 
section for an exploratory factor analysis of this scale). 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief. After participants answered questions about 
their exposure to diversity, they completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief (BIS-
Brief; Steinberg et al., 2013; reported in Appendix D). The BIS-Brief is a recently 
developed short version of the 11th revision of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Barratt, 
1959; Reise, Moore, Sabb, Brown, & London, 2013; Reise et al., 2013; Stanford et al., 
2009). The BIS-Brief aims to measure general impulsivity as a unidimensional construct. 
The scale includes eight items such as “I do things without thinking” and is scored on a 
Likert-scale from 1 (rarely/never) to 4 (almost always/always). For this sample, the 
measure showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .78). 
Compulsive Buying Scale. The compulsive buying scale was developed to 
identify compulsive buyers (Faber & O'Guinn, 1992), and taps into the behaviours, 
motivations and feelings associated with buying. Compulsive buying is a case of failed 
impulse control and has been linked to low self-regulation (Claes et al., 2010). The scale 
contains seven items such as “If I have any money left before I receive my next income, 
I just have to spend it” and is scored on a Likert-scale from 1 (Never) to 5 (Very Often). 
The full scale can be found in Appendix E. 
4.1.2 Results 
All statistical tests described below were carried out with a level of significance 
of α = .05. 
Data inspection. Data inspection revealed that the index for prior exposure to 
diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution could be 
improved by performing a square root transformation on the data. The following analysis 
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was therefore carried out with the square root transformed data for exposure to diversity. 
Means and standard deviations are reported for untransformed data for ease of 
interpretation. 
Factor analysis of the recent experiences of diversity scale. An exploratory 
factor analysis was conducted on the items of the recent experiences of diversity scale. 
This analysis served to investigate the number and structure of constructs contained in 
this measure. Although the sample size was small and unlikely to have enough power for 
an adequate factor analysis, the analysis was done to explore potentials measures of 
experiences of diversity for future studies.  
The factorability of the 21 items was examined according to several criteria. 19 
of the 21 items had a correlation of r > .3 with at least one other item (see Appendix C for 
correlations between all items), suggesting acceptable factorability. However, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was .59, and therefore below the 
recommended threshold of .6. This led to the exclusion of Item 5 and 6, which both 
correlated only weakly with the other items. After the exclusion of these items, all 
remaining 19 items had correlations of r > .3 with at least one other item. Furthermore, 
the KMO was .64 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that the R-matrix was not 
an identity matrix, χ²(171) = 397.90, p < .001. Conducting a factor analysis on the data 
was therefore deemed appropriate. 
Principle component analysis was used as the method of data reduction, because 
the primary purpose was to obtain composite scores for the factors underlying subjective 
reports of diversity experiences. The initial eigen values showed that the first factor 
explained 28% of the variance, the second factor 12% of the variance, and a third factor 
11% of the variance. Furthermore, the fourth factor explained 8% of the variance, and the 
fifth factor 6%. While the scree-plot suggested a two factor solution, the Kaiser’s 
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Eigenvalue criterion suggested a five factor solution. Five, four, three and two factor 
solutions were considered, using oblimin rotations of the factor loading matrix. While 
double-loading of items was an issue for all solutions, the two factor solution was 
preferred, because it minimised the issue of double-loadings and provided components 
that were less complex than the ones obtained from the other solutions. 
During several steps, a total of five items (Items 1, 2, 3 and 8) were eliminated 
because they did not contribute to a simple factor structure and failed to meet the criteria 
of having a primary factor loading of .4 or above, and no cross-loading of .3 or above. 
A principle-components factor analysis of the remaining 14 items, using oblimin 
rotation was conducted, with the two factors explaining 45% of the variance.  All items 
had primary loadings over .42 with no cross-loading above .3.  The factor loading matrix 
for this final solution is presented in Table 2. The first component of the final solution 
explained 30% of the variance and was labelled personal experiences of diversity as it 
seemed to centre around personal experiences of cultural diversity. The lead item for this 
component was ‘I had much exposure to different cultures’. The second component 
explained 15 % of the total variance and was labelled experienced homogeneity of 
environment, because this component appeared to indicate the perceived cultural 
homogeneity (versus diversity) of the participants’ immediate social environment. The 
lead item of this component was ‘Where I lived most people coming from a different 
culture mostly stayed to themselves’. 
Internal consistency for the personal experiences of diversity scale was 
Cronbach’s α = .82, and Cronbach’s α = .72 for the homogeneity of environment scale. 
Composite scores were computed for both factors based on the mean of the items which 
had their primary loadings on each factor. The homogeneity of environment component 
was reversed to reflect the diversity of a participants’ environment. 
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Table 2  
Factor Loadings and Communalities for the Final Two Factor Solution Based on a 
Principle Components Analysis With Oblimin Rotation for the Recent Experiences of 








7 - I had much exposure to 
different cultures 
.87  .78 
9 - I met many people from 
different cultural backgrounds 
.77  .18 
14 - I regularly socialized with 
people from different cultures 
.71  .59 
13 - Most of my social 
activities involved my usual 
group of friends 
-.64  .24 
11 - I met people with attitudes 
and values very different from 
mine 
.63  .39 
12 - I had the opportunity to 
meet people outside my usual 
group of friends 
.60 -.29 .50 
20 - I had to change some of 
my habits in order to adapt to 
the people around me 
.55  .40 
10 - Most people I met were 
from the same culture as I am 
-.50  .54 
4 - Many of my friends live or 
have lived abroad 
.42  .55 
16 - Where I lived most people 
coming from a different culture 
mostly stayed to themselves 
.26 .73 .54 
15 - Where I lived lots of 
different cultures came 
together and interacted with 
each other 
 -.71 .55 
16 - Where I lived most people 
from other cultures were well 
integrated 
 -.70 .56 
18 - Where I lived most people 
did not have a lot of contact 
with people from other cultures 
-.21 .69 .21 
19 - The people in my 
neighbourhood mostly had the 
same cultural background as 
me 
 .47 .31 
Note. Factor loadings < .2 are suppressed 
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Correlations. The intercorrelations between the different measures, means and 
standard deviations are displayed in Table 3. Partial correlations controlling for age is 
displayed in Table 44. After controlling for age, high exposure to ethnic diversity in one’s 
hometown was related to higher general impulsivity as measured by the BIS, r (47) = .29, 
p = .04. No other reliable correlations between variables emerged from the analysis, rs 
< .20, ps > .17. 
Power analysis. It should be noted that the purpose of this pilot study was not to 
establish statistical significance for associations between variables, but rather to explore 
potential types of diversity experience which might impact self-regulatory performance. 
Such potential associations still have to be confirmed in further studies with more 
appropriate sample sizes. Nonetheless, I evaluated the ability of this pilot study to detect 
associations between diversity and measures of impulsiveness. Previous studies suggest 
that diversity has large to medium effects on some factors outside the intergroup domain 
such as creativity (Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Tadmor et al. 2012; 
Leung & Chiu, 2010). I therefore first calculated the power for an assumed effect size of 
r = .35. The post-hoc power for this study was power = .69. Furthermore, this study had 
an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum effect size of r = .38 at power = .80. 
However, it should be noted the effect size of a potential association between diversity 
and cognitive inhibition might very well differ substantially compared to creativity, since 
this was the first study investigating the link between diversity and inhibition. 
                                                 
 
4 The data was not controlled for gender as only three participants were male. Gender is also not included 
in table 1 for the same reason. 
5 I based the calculation of power on estimated population effect sizes rather than the observed effect size 
in this study. Power analysis based on the observed effect size (sometimes called post-hoc power analysis) 
only restates the obtained p-values in a different way (i.e. p-values can be directly converted to power; also 
see Goodman & Berlin, 1994; O’Keefe, 2007). I therefore opted to conduct a power-analysis based on 
estimated population effect sizes to make more informative claims about the sensitivity of this study. 





Intercorrelations, Means and Standard Deviations for the Pilot Study 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD 
1. Exposure to diversity -      -.8 .88 
2. Personal experiences of diversity .20 - 
 
   2.97 .60 
3. Experienced homogeneity of 
environment 
.17 .24† - 
 
  2.82 .75 
4. BIS-Brief .25† .15 -.05 -   2.14 .47 
5. Financial Impulsivity  .19 .10 -.05 .14 - 
 
1.7 .40 
6. Age  -.21 -.26† -.21 -.13 .15 - 19.6 4.84 
Note: BIS-Brief = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
Table 4 
Partial Correlations for the Variables in the Pilot Study Controlling for Age 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Exposure to diversity - 
 
   
2. Personal experiences of diversity .13 -    
3. Experienced homogeneity of environment .16 .20 -   
4. BIS-Brief .29* .15 .08 -  
5. Financial Impulsivity .17 .12 -.07 .16 - 
Note: BIS-Brief = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
4.1.3 Discussion 
In this pilot study, participants who had been exposed to more diversity in their 
home district were more likely to report higher impulsiveness. Given that this effect was 
opposite to prior predictions, it warrants further inspection. Therefore, Study 1 set out to 
validate this effect. 
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While this study was successful in establishing a preliminary scale for personal 
experiences of diversity and perceived diversity of one’s environment for the past year, 
these scales were not related to either exposure to diversity in one’s hometown or to 
measure of self-regulation. One reason might be that these types of experiences of 
diversity are quite different. Personal experiences of diversity might tap into experiences 
of diversity that are more intense and potentially influenced by personal choice. Exposure 
to diversity that occurred simply because the hometown of the participant is more 
ethnically diverse might be perceived as relatively mundane and natural. These casual 
experiences of ethnic diversity in everyday life might be important for the participant to 
respond to the diversity by cognitive change and not by sub-typing challenging aspects 
of diversity as exception to the stereotypical rule (Weber & Crocker, 1983; Hewstone, 
1994). Furthermore, a participant has usually no control over the area in which he or she 
grows up and has limited options to escape the realities of this social environment. Thus, 
growing up in a socially diverse environment might be more likely to drive cognitive 
change than experiences of diversity that happen through voluntary choice.  
The perceived diversity of one’s current environment is of course conceptually 
similar to exposure to diversity due to ethnic diversity of the participant’s home district. 
However, the low correlation between these two measures might simply occur because 
the participants relocated when beginning their studies. This explanation seems likely as 
only three of the 50 participants in this pilot study grew up in the Sheffield district, which 
is where participants in this study went to university.  Regarding the impact on 
impulsiveness, the time period in which participants grew up might be more influential 
for the development of the participants’ self-regulatory abilities, and therefore show an 
impact on self-regulation measures, while the diversity of the current social environment 
does not. 
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Hence, exposure to diversity due to ethnic diversity of the participant’s home 
district seemed to influence the participant’s impulsiveness. However, this effect was 
opposite to prior predictions. As such an effect would have important theoretical 
implications it was further investigated in the following studies. 
4.2 Study 1: Diversity, Impulsiveness and Delayed Gratification 
Following up on the pilot study, the first study aimed to investigate if growing up 
in an ethnically diverse environment has an impact on self-regulation. Self-regulation was 
operationalised as reporting less impulsive behaviour and resisting immediate rewards. 
Self-reported impulsive behaviour was measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-
Brief (BIS-Brief; Steinberg, Sharp, Stanford, & Tharp, 2013). This measure is intended 
to measure general impulsiveness as an uni-dimensional concept. This measure was 
chosen to investigate impulsiveness as expression of failed inhibitory control (Enticott, 
Ogloff, & Bradshaw, 2006; Logan et al., 1997). An additional variable was the self-
reported ability to delay gratification in an academic context, as measured by the 
Academic Delay of Gratification Scale (ADOG; Bembenutty & Karabenick, 1998). This 
measure was served as a measure of self-regulation that is of immediate relevance to the 
(student) participants.  
4.2.1 Method 
 Participants. For this study, 128 White British participants were recruited at the 
University of Sheffield. Students of all faculties were invited via email to participate in 
an online study on how “university students make decisions related to their studies”. In 
exchange for participation, students entered a prize draw for vouchers for several British 
shops. To participate, the student’s hometown had to be located within the UK, and the 
students had to access the survey from a non-mobile device. Ethnic membership was not 
indicated as a criterion as this might have made group membership overly salient which 
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could have influenced results. Instead members of ethnic minorities (non-White British 
participants) were filtered out after data collection. The participants (90 females, 38 
males) were aged between 18 and 49 years (M = 21.59, SD = 4.44). Some participants 
had missing data (i.e. did not answer all questions); 119 participants provided data for all 
variables. To maximise power, I applied a pairwise deletion of missing cases for the 
correlations reported below (degrees of freedom are reported for each individual 
correlation). 
Procedure and materials. After signing an informed consent, participants first 
answered demographic questions, followed by questions on their subjective exposure to 
ethnic diversity. Subsequently, participants completed the brief version of the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-Brief; Steinberg et al., 2013), and the Academic Delay of 
Gratification Scale (ADOG; Bembenutty & Karabenick, 1998). After completion of the 
study, participants were thanked for participation and debriefed. 
Demographic measures. Participants indicated their age, gender, and subjective 
socioeconomic status (SES) by ranking themselves on a 10-rung ladder representing 
socioeconomic status in society (Singh-Manoux, Adler, & Marmot, 2003; reported in 
Appendix F). Scores on this measure for this study ranged from 2 to 9 (M = 5.84, SD = 
1.46). Apart from subjective SES, communal SES was also measured by using the Index 
of Multiple Deprivation (IMD, see below). Furthermore, participants were asked about 
their ethnicity and home district (defined as the area in which they spent the most time 
until they turned 18). 
Index of Multiple Deprivation. The IMD is an index employed by the British 
government to assess the level of social and economic deprivation of small regional areas 
(Lad, 2011), and summarises a range of various indicators (e.g. income, health 
deprivation and crime). For this study the average score per district was used (Department 
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for Communities and Local Government, 2013). In this sample, the IMD for participant’s 
home district ranged from 4.47 to 37.62 (M = 20.10, SD = 8.49). 
Diversity. To assess how much participants were confronted with ethnic diversity 
while growing up, objective data as well as subjective self-reports were combined into a 
measure of prior exposure to diversity. This measure was identical to the measure of prior 
exposure to diversity reported in the pilot study. 
Self-regulation. Self-regulation was operationalized as the tendency for 
impulsive behaviour and the ability to delay gratification. Measures used were the BIS-
Brief (identical to the pilot study) and the Academic Delay of Gratification Scale. 
Academic Delay of Gratification Scale. In addition to the BIS-Brief, participants 
completed the Academic Delay of Gratification Scale (ADOG; Bembenutty & 
Karabenick, 1998), a scale measuring university students’ ability to delay immediate 
rewards in favour of long-term academic success. Items on this scale describe a 
hypothetical scenario in which the participant can choose one of two options. One option 
offers an immediate reward while the other represents delayed gratification (for example: 
“A. Miss several classes to accept an invitation for a very interesting trip OR B. Delay 
going on the trip until your courses are over”). Participants indicated which of the two 
options they would most likely choose on a 4-point scale: 1 - definitely choose A, 2 -
probably choose A, 3 - probably choose B, and 4 - definitely choose B. The full scale is 
reported in Appendix G. The measure showed acceptable internal consistency for this 
sample (Cronbach’s α = .66). 
4.2.2 Results 
All statistical tests described below were carried out with a level of significance 
of α = .05. 
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Data inspection. Data inspection revealed that diversity had a non-normal, 
positively skewed distribution. The distribution could be improved by performing a 
square root transformation on the data. The following analysis was therefore carried out 
with the square root transformed data for diversity. Means and standard deviations are 
reported for untransformed data for ease of interpretation. 
Correlations. The intercorrelations between the different measures, means and 
standard deviations are displayed in Table 5. Partial correlations controlling for age, 
gender, communal SES and subjective SES are displayed in Table 6.   
After taking control variables into account, low scores on the ADOG scale were 
related to stronger general impulsivity as measured by the BIS, r (113) = -.47, p < .001, 
thus suggesting that both measures tapped into similar constructs. In opposition to 
predictions, diversity was marginally negatively correlated with the ability to delay 
gratification, r (113) = -.17, p = .08.  
Power analysis. I evaluated the ability of this study to detect associations between 
diversity and impulsivity or the ability to delay gratification by calculating the level of 
statistical power. Based on the observed effect size in the pilot study, I calculated the 
power for an assumed effect size of r = .29. The power of this study for such a population 
effect size was power = .90. Furthermore, this study had an appropriate sample size to 
detect a minimum effect size of r = .25 at power = .80. 
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Table 5  
Intercorrelations, Means and Standard Deviations for Study 1 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD 
1. Diversity - 
 
     .02 .17 




   2.05 .45 






  3.01 .44 








 21.59 4.44 























- 20.10 8.49 













Note: BIS-Brief = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief; ADOG = Academic Delay of 
Gratification Scale; SES = socioeconomic status; IMD = Index of Multiple Deprivation 
Degrees of freedom for significance tests are given in parenthesis.  
aGender was coded 0 for female and 1 for male. 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001




Table 6  
Partial Correlations for Study 1 Controlling for Age, Gender, Communal SES and 
Subjective SES 
Variable 1 2 
1. Diversity - 
 
 
2. BIS-Brief .04 
(113) 
- 




Note: Degrees of freedom for significance tests are given in parenthesis.  
BIS-Brief = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief; ADOG = Academic Delay of 
Gratification Scale 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
In this first study, participants who had been exposed to more diversity in their 
home environment were marginally more likely to be poor at delaying gratification in an 
academic context. While this effect was only approaching significance, it might still be 
worth further consideration, especially since the direction of the effect was opposite to 
prior predictions. At the same time, this pattern was not accompanied by a tendency 
towards increased impulsiveness. 
Hence, exposure to diversity while growing up might be related to a preference 
for immediate rewards. This might indicate that experiences of diversity do have a 
generally detrimental effect on self-regulation. It is worth noting, however, that the delay 
gratification scale was completed after participants had answered questions on their home 
district’s diversity. It is possible that reduced self-regulation among individuals from high 
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diversity environments is a learned response to thinking about diversity itself. For 
individuals with diversity experience, thinking about diversity might activate a mindset 
(Wyer & Xu, 2010) focussed on processing diversity, which might also affect self-
reported delay gratification. In this case experiences of diversity would only be 
detrimental for self-reported self-regulation in certain contexts. Study 2 therefore 
investigated if the effects of diversity experiences on self-regulation might depend on the 
salience of diversity itself, and not be present under neutral conditions. 
4.3 Study 2: The Salience of Diversity as a Moderator 
In Study 1 participants coming from environments with high diversity were 
marginally more likely to show a weak ability to delay gratification. Since this effect was 
only approaching significance it warrants further investigation. It is also unclear, however, 
if such an effect was induced by having participants think about their experiences of 
diversity first. Participants from diverse areas might show poor self-regulation only when 
diversity is salient. Salient diversity might influence self-regulation because it activates a 
mindset (Wyer & Xu, 2010) unique to individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity. 
A further study therefore attempted to replicate the findings from Study 1 and to 
investigate possible boundary conditions of the effect. It was tested whether participants 
with a lot of exposure to diversity would always report weaker delay gratification or only 
when diversity was salient for them. In other words, this study investigated whether the 
effect of exposure to diversity on delay gratification was moderated by the salience of 
diversity. In this study, participants were reminded of their experiences of diversity simply 
through the questions about their exposure to diversity used in Study 1. These questions 
were presented either before or after participants completed questionnaires measuring 
their ability to delay gratification and general impulsiveness. 




Participants. For this study, 151 White British participants were recruited at the 
University of Sheffield in the same fashion as for Study 1. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions (diversity salience or control). In the diversity salience 
condition, participants were reminded of their experiences of diversity before they 
answered questions on their ability to delay gratification and general impulsiveness. To 
participate, the student's hometown had to be located in England, and the students had to 
access the survey from a non-mobile device. The participants (105 females, 46 males) 
were aged between 18 and 72 years (M = 23.91, SD = 9.15). Some participants had 
missing data. 144 participants provided data for all variables. Only participants with 
complete data on all variables were included in this analysis. Incomplete data had to be 
excluded since fitting a multivariate General Linear Model (the main analysis in this 
study) allows only for a list-wise deletion of missing data. 
Procedure and materials. Materials were identical to Study 1. However, the 
order in which these materials were presented to participants depended on the condition. 
Diversity salience condition. The procedure for this condition was identical to 
Study 1. That is, participants first received demographic questions and questions about 
their exposure to diversity. This served to make diversity salient. Subsequently, 
participants completed the ADOG and BIS-Brief. 
Control condition. In the control condition, participants first received the ADOG 
and BIS-Brief, and only then proceeded to respond on demographic questions and 
questions about their exposure to diversity. 
4.3.2 Results 
In theory, the data could be nested within the geographic area of participants’ 
home districts. However, multilevel analysis might be unnecessary if the underestimation 
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of standard errors due to clustering is relatively low (Maas & Hox, 2005). In this case a 
conventional unilevel analysis is still likely to produce unbiased estimators. The 
underestimation of the standard error due to clustering can be specified by the design 
effect (Maas & Hox, 2005; Muthen & Satorra, 1995). The design effect can be understood 
as the ratio of the actual variance, under the sampling method used, compared to the 
variance computed under the assumption of simple random sampling. A design effect of 
three would thus indicate that the sample variance is three times bigger than it would have 
been if the sampling would have been perfectly random (Sturgis, 2004). A design effect 
below two is generally considered small, indicating that a conventional unilevel analysis 
is acceptable and should not lead to overly misleading results (Maas & Hox, 2005; 
Muthen & Satorra, 1995). Design effects for the dependent variables were small for all 
geographic levels (district, county and region) for early as well as current place of 
residence (DEs < 1.29). Therefore, a multilevel analysis was not conducted.  
All statistical tests were carried out with a level of significance of α = .05. All 
results were controlled for gender, age, subjective SES, and communal SES. 
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. Participants that took an unusually long 
time to complete the questionnaire were excluded. This was done to ensure that 
participants paid sufficient attention to the questions and that the manipulation of 
diversity salience would be effective. Using Tukey's method (Tukey, 1977), participants 
were excluded if they scored three times the interquartile range above the third quartile 
on study duration. The median time in minutes for completing the study was Mdn = 7. 
Participants were excluded from analysis if they scored three times the interquartile range, 
IQR = 4, above the third quartile, Q3 = 10. Therefore, all participants taking longer than 
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22 minutes were omitted from analysis. This led to the exclusion of seven participants 
with 137 remaining participants (132 provided data for all variables).6 
Data inspection revealed that diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed 
distribution. The distribution could be improved by performing a square root 
transformation on the data. The following analysis was therefore carried out with the 
square root transformed data for diversity. 
Inferential analysis. To examine the effect of the diversity condition and 
exposure to diversity on delay gratification and general impulsiveness a multivariate 
General Linear Model (GLM) was fitted to the data. ADOG and BIS-Brief scores were 
entered into the model as dependent variables, and condition and exposure to diversity 
were used as predictors. The condition*diversity interaction term was also added to the 
model as a predictor. 
There was no significant multivariate main effect for exposure to diversity, Willk's 
Λ = 0.97, F (2, 123) = 1.92, p = .15. Diversity salience, however, showed a multivariate 
main effect across conditions, Willk's Λ = 0.95, F (2, 123) = 3.32, p = .04, partial η²= .05. 
This main effect of diversity salience was qualified by a multivariate interaction effect of 
diversity salience with diversity exposure, Willk's Λ = 0.95, F (2, 123) = 3.23, p = .04, 
partial η²= .05. These significant multivariate effects were followed up on by univariate 
tests to investigate which of the dependent variables contributed to the multivariate effects. 
                                                 
 
6 Conclusion changed slightly when outliers were included in the analysis, in the sense that the multivariate 
diversity salience*diversity exposure interaction effect was only marginally significant, Willk's Λ = 0.96, 
F (2, 135) = 2.59, p = .08, partial η²= .04. Univariate results with outliers included, showed a significant 
salience*diversity interaction, F (1, 136) = 5.08, p = .03, partial η² = .04 for BIS, but no such effect for 
ADOG, F (1, 136) = 1.99, p = .16, partial η² = .01. 
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Univariate results were obtained by fitting separate univariate GLMs for ADOG and BIS-
Brief with the same predictors as for the multivariate analysis. 
ADOG. The salience of diversity lead to reports of stronger delay gratification, F 
(1, 124) = 6.31, p = .01, partial η² = .05. This main effect was qualified by a significant 
diversity salience*diversity exposure interaction, F (1, 124) = 5.96, p = .02, partial η² 
= .05. This interaction was further investigated by performing a moderation analysis in 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). There was no reliable effect of diversity on ADOG in the 
control condition, standardised effect = .08, t (124) = .68, p = .50, 95%, CI [-.16, .33]. 
When diversity was salient, however, diversity predicted weaker delay gratification, 
standardised effect = -.36, t (124) = -2.68, p = .01, 95% CI [-.63, -.09]. These findings 
thus confirm the marginal detrimental effect of diversity on delay gratification observed 
in Study 1. However, it also qualifies this finding in the sense that it was only present 
when diversity was salient. 
BIS-Brief. The salience of diversity predicted marginally lower scores for 
impulsiveness, F (1, 124) = 3.54, p = .06, partial η² = .03. This trend was also qualified 
by a marginally significant interaction effect of diversity salience*diversity exposure, F 
(1, 124) = 3.77, p = .054, partial η² = .03. This interaction effect was also further 
investigated by performing a moderation analysis. Diversity did not have any reliable 
effect on impulsiveness in the control condition, standardised effect = -.01, t (125) = -.04, 
p = .97, 95% CI [-.25, .24]. However, diversity predicted higher impulsiveness when 
diversity was salient, standardised effect = .36, t (125) = 2.69, p = .01, 95% CI [.10, .63]. 
The effect of exposure to diversity on delay gratification found in Study 1 was therefore 
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replicated and this time extended to measures of impulsiveness as well, but only when 
diversity was salient. These moderation effects are also displayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Partial regression plots of exposure to diversity and Academic Delay of 
Gratification (ADOG) as well as Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief scores (BIS-Brief) 
with fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. Partial regression plots are adjusted 
for control variables (age, gender, subjective SES and communal SES). 
 
Power analysis. I evaluated the ability of this study to detect a multivariate 
interaction effect of diversity salience and diversity experiences on the dependent 
variables by calculating the level of statistical power. Given the small effect size obtained 
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in Study 1, I calculated the power for an assumed effect size of η² = .03. The post-hoc 
power for this study was power = .40. Furthermore, this study had an appropriate sample 
size to detect a minimum population effect size of η² = .07 at power = .80.  
4.3.3 Discussion 
When diversity was salient, participants who came from ethnically diverse 
environments were more likely to prefer immediate gratification and to report marginally 
stronger impulsiveness. Under neutral conditions, exposure to diversity had no influence 
on delay gratification or impulsiveness. These findings replicate and qualifies the effect 
of diversity on self-regulation present as a trend in Study 1. Past experiences of diversity 
thus do seem to affect self-regulation, but only under when diversity is salient (i.e. when 
social diversity is likely to be present).  
The fact that self-regulation only appears to be weakened when diversity is salient 
indicates that this might be the result of an alternative strategy to handle information 
related to diversity. Crisp and Meleady (2012) suggested that an adaptive strategy for 
processing diversity needs to involve (a) the inhibition of category representation in 
favour of (b) generative thinking which ultimately results in the creative reconstrual of 
the combination of social categories. Creative performance has been found to be higher 
among individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity (Cheng et al., 2011; Leung & 
Chiu, 2010; Tadmor, Satterstrom, et al., 2012), and spontaneous exposure to social 
diversity (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng et al., 2011) or counter-stereotypes (Gocłowska 
et al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013) has been found to increase creative performance. 
However, results from this study could suggest that maybe cognitive inhibition is not as 
crucial to generative thought about diversity as originally thought. The weakening of self-
control might therefore represent a trade-off necessary to boost other cognitive processes 
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like divergent thinking or an artefact caused by other processes that aid the divergent 
thinking process.  
It was also found that the salience of diversity itself had a positive main effect on 
delay gratification. This is in parallel to recent findings showing that thinking about 
counter-stereotypes can temporarily lead to enhanced inhibitory control on the Stroop 
task (Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). Exposure to counter-stereotypes is one example of 
diversifying experience so just thinking about ethnic diversity in general might have 
similar (if weaker) effects. However, the presence of an interaction effect with diversity 
salience makes a straight-forward interpretation of this main effect difficult. 
To sum up, two experiments provided evidence that participants who had been 
exposed to more ethnic diversity were more likely to report weaker self-regulation. This 
is initial evidence that diversity might affect self-regulation. Study 2 also demonstrated 
that this effect only holds if diversity is salient. The salience of diversity might have made 
individuals with a lot of diversity experience anticipate processing diversity related 
stimuli. It might also have activated memories of past experiences of diversity, which 
might have put them into a mode for processing further diversity. As discussed above, an 
increase in impulsive tendencies in this mode might be a necessary trade-off to ensure 
optimal processing of information related to diversity. In any case, past experiences of 
diversity seem to only hinder self-control when diversity is salient and have no effects 
under neutral conditions. 
An important limitation of the first studies was that self-regulation was measured 
purely by self-report. That means that it is unclear if the effect of salient diversity only 
affects self-reports of impulsiveness or actual behaviour as well. It is possible that, for 
whatever reason, participants who have experienced a lot of diversity place less emphasis 
on appearing self-controlled when diversity is made salient. Their actual ability to self-
EXPOSURE TO DIVERSITY AND SELF-REGULATION 73 
 
 
regulate, however, might not be affected at all. To explore whether salient diversity does 
indeed affect self-control 'in action', a further study was conducted in which the Stroop 
task was employed as a test of self-regulation.  
4.4 Study 3: Positive Contact and Behavioural Effects on Self-Regulation 
A further study explored if experiences of diversity and the salience of diversity 
do indeed affect self-regulatory behaviour or if they only affect participants’ subjective 
notion of their self-regulatory ability. This study therefore included both behavioural as 
well as self-report measures of self-regulation. Participants completed the Stroop task 
(MacLeod, 1991) alongside self-report measures of impulsiveness. Self-report measures 
included the 15 item short version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS 15; Spinella, 
2007) and the Monetary choice questionnaire (MCQ; Kirby & Maraković, 1996; Kirby, 
Petry, & Bickel, 1999). 
Furthermore, it was explored what kind of experiences of diversity might lead to 
changes in self-regulatory ability. The previous studies showed that mere exposure to 
ethnic diversity predicts self-regulation when diversity is salient. However, it might not 
necessarily be mere exposure to diversity alone that leads to cognitive change. The CPAG 
model (Crisp & Turner, 2011) assumes that cognitive adaptation to diversity requires the 
repeated experience of stereotypic inconsistencies as well as the motivation and ability to 
process these. While ethnically diverse environments might provide several instances of 
stereotypic inconsistencies, they might not always provide the ideal conditions for 
processing these stimuli. Specifically, ethnic diversity can promote negative as well as 
positive interethnic contact (Koopmans & Veit, 2014). Negative contact is usually 
accompanied by feelings of threat and intergroup anxiety (Pettigrew, 2008; Stephan & 
Stephan, 1985, 1989; Stephan et al., 2002), and anxiety is known to deplete cognitive 
resources (Easterbrook, 1959; Kahneman, 1973). Negative contact is therefore unlikely 
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to provide ideal conditions for processing stereotypical inconsistencies. Positive contact, 
on the other hand, should provide more ideal conditions to promote processing 
stereotypical inconsistencies and ultimately cognitive change: Positive contact reduces 
feeling of intergroup anxiety, and is accompanied by positive affect (Pettigrew, 1998; 
Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Positive mood is associated with enhanced creative 
performance (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009; Grawitch, Munz, Elliott, & 
Mathis, 2003), breadth of attention (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Fredrickson, 1998; 
Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007) and cognitive flexibility (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Fredrickson, 1998; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990). 
Since these are all factors that contribute to successful resolution of inconsistencies (Crisp 
& Turner, 2011), positive contact should provide ideal processing conditions for stimuli 
of stereotypical inconsistencies. 
It was therefore expected that only positive intercultural contact should lead to 
cognitive change, because in such situation individuals should be free of cognitive load 
and experience positive affect. An effect of exposure to diversity on self-regulation should 
thus be mediated by positive contact. 
4.4.1 Methods 
Participants. For this study, 94 White British participants were recruited at the 
University of Sheffield. This study was carried out in the laboratory. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions (diversity salience or control). In exchange 
for participation, participants were either rewarded with course credits or were entered a 
prize draw for vouchers for several British shops. In the diversity salience condition, 
participants were reminded of their experiences of diversity before they completed the 
self-regulation measures. To participate, the student's hometown had to be located in 
England. Furthermore, only data from White British participants was included in the 
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analysis. The participants (74 females, 20 males) were aged between 18 and 32 years (M 
= 19.86, SD = 3.14). One participant who had missing data was excluded, leaving 93 
participants who provided data for all variables. 
Procedure and materials. As in the previous two studies, participants received 
demographic questions and questions on their early exposure to diversity. They also 
completed questions on the amount of positive interethnic contact they experienced. This 
study also investigated if current diversity would have any influence on self-regulation. 
For this reason, questions on participant's subjective exposure to diversity and positive 
contact during the last 6 months were added. In addition, they completed various 
measures tapping into their ability to self-regulate. These were the Stroop, the BIS-15, 
and the monetary choice questionnaire. As in the previous study, the order of the measures 
differed depending on the condition. 
Current subjective diversity. The current subjective exposure to diversity was 
measured similarly to subjective exposure to diversity for participant's home district. 
Participants were asked to estimate the proportion of students in their university 
belonging to each of the major ethnic groups. They were then asked to make the same 
estimate for the neighbourhood they were currently living in. These questions are reported 
in Appendix I.  
For both questions, I used the Hirschman-Herfindahl index subtracted from unity 
(see Study 1) to derive an index for participants' present subjective exposure to diversity. 
The correlation for the two separate subjective indices was r (92) = .44, p < 001. Both 
indices were combined to create a single measure for subjective exposure to diversity. 
As this study was conducted in the lab of the psychology department of the 
University of Sheffield, all participants can be assumed to have been living in the district 
of Sheffield at the time of the study. Census data on the current objective district diversity 
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was therefore assumed to be identical for all participants and was not used as a measure 
in this study. 
Positive interethnic contact. Positive contact was measured through two 
questions: "How often did somebody help you that was from an ethnic background 
different from your own?" and " How often did you have interesting conversations with 
people from ethnic backgrounds different from your own?"  (see Appendix H for the full 
scale). These questions were presented for the time when participants were growing up 
in their home area, as well as for the past six months. Each set of questions was preceded 
with the instruction to think of the appropriate time-period. The questions correlated 
strongly for the period participants spent in their home area (r (92) = .72, p < .001), as 
well as for the past six months (r (92) = .73, p < .001). 
Self-regulation. Self-regulation was measured through behavioural measures as 
well as through self-report. Participants completed the Stroop, the BIS-15, and the 
monetary choice questionnaire. 
Stroop. Participants completed a computerised version of the Stroop task. In the 
Stroop task participants have to classify the colour of words appearing on the screen by 
pressing a button (MacLeod, 1991). Possible colours were green, blue and red. The 
meaning of the words, however, represents one of these colours as well and does not 
necessarily have to match the actual colour of the word (i.e. the word 'blue' might appear 
in red, requiring a press of the red button). People generally tend to make more errors and 
need more time to react if the ink colour and word meaning are in mismatch. This 
interference is known as the Stroop effect. Smaller Stroop effects are considered to 
indicate better self-regulatory ability (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). After 
a short trial block, participants completed 5 blocks of the Stroop, each consisting of 3 
congruent trials (25%) and 12 incongruent trials (75%). The target word was displayed 
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after an interstimulus interval of 500ms, and stayed on screen until a response was made. 
This experimental paradigm is displayed in Figure 2. Reaction times were trimmed and 
transformed based on procedures developed in previous work (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). 
All reaction times exceeding 2.5 standard deviations (1238 ms) were recorded as 1238ms, 
and reaction times less than 200ms were recorded as 200ms.  
 
 
Figure 2. Experimental paradigm for the Stroop task. (A) On each trial, participants 
were either presented with congruent or incongruent stimuli. The task consisted of 5 
blocks with 3 congruent trials (25%) and 12 incongruent trials (75%) each (75 trials 
total). (B) The stimulus was displayed after an interstimulus interval of 500ms, and 
stayed on screen until a response was made. For a correct response, participants had to 
correctly classify the colour of the word by pressing a button. 
 
The performance on the Stroop was measured by the reaction time interference 
caused by Stroop trials. Stroop interference was calculated as the difference in reaction 
time between incongruent and congruent trials, corrected for overall reaction time (mean 
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RT incongruent trials - mean RT congruent trials)\overall mean RT; Posner et al., 2002). 
Stroop interference in this study ranged from -.09 to .23 (M = .04, SD = .08). 
15 item short version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS 15). In this study 
the BIS-Brief was exchanged for the 15 item short version of the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale (BIS 15; Spinella, 2007). Like the BIS-Brief, the BIS 15 is a short version of the 
11th revision of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). In 
contrast to the BIS-Brief it also allows for a more fain-grained measurement of 
impulsiveness through three subscales (non-planning impulsivity, motor impulsivity, 
attentional impulsivity). The three subscales are measured by 5 items each, scored on a 
Likert-scale from 1 (rarely/never) to 4 (almost always/always). The full scale is reported 
in Appendix J. For this sample motor and non-planning impulsivity showed acceptable 
internal consistency (Cronbach's αs > .75). However, internal consistency of attentional 
impulsivity, was poor (Cronbach's α = .58). The scale's internal consistency as a whole 
was good (Cronbach's α = .82). In other words, the BIS-15 seemed to be a more internally 
reliable indicator of impulsiveness as a univariate construct than for more fain-grained 
facets of impulsiveness. It was therefore planned to test for effects on impulsiveness as a 
univariate factor first, and to follow up testing for effects on the subscales only in the case 
of significant findings.  
Monetary Choice Questionnaire (MCQ). The monetary choice questionnaire can 
be used to measure participant's ability to delay immediate gratification for a larger 
reward later on (Kirby & Maraković, 1996; Kirby et al., 1999). More specifically, this 
questionnaire measures participant's discount rate for future monetary rewards. 
Participants with a higher discount rate will assign a lower value to future rewards, and 
therefore tend to prefer smaller immediate monetary rewards to larger rewards later in the 
future. 
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This questionnaire presents participants with 27 hypothetical choices between a 
smaller immediate reward and a larger delayed reward. For example, on one of the items 
participants are asked 'would you prefer £54 today, or £55 in 117 days?'. The questions 
vary in the amount of the immediate monetary reward, the delayed monetary reward as 
well as in the amount of time participants would have to wait. The full scale is reported 
in Appendix K. For each participant, an estimate of the participant's discount rate 
parameter k was computed, using the geometric mean of all trials. This was done by 
making use of the automated scoring sheet provided by Kaplan et al. (2014). A higher 
value of k indicates a poorer ability to delay gratification. 
Conditions. Participants were randomly allocated to either the control or diversity 
salience condition, determining the order in which the materials were presented to them. 
Diversity salience condition. In the diversity salience condition, participants first 
received questions about their exposure to diversity and positive interethnic contact. This 
served as a prime for their experiences of diversity. Subsequently participants completed 
the Stroop, BIS 15 and MCQ. Finally, participants answered demographic questions. 
Control Condition. In the control condition, participants completed the Self-
Regulation measures (Stroop, BIS 15 and MCQ) first, and only then proceeded to respond 
to questions about their exposure to diversity and positive contact. Finally, participants 
answered demographic questions. 
4.4.2 Results 
As in Study 2, I first assessed the necessity for a multilevel approach. Design 
effects for the dependent variables were small for all geographic levels (district, county 
and region) for early as well as current place of residence (DEs < 1.81). Therefore, a 
multilevel analysis was not conducted. All statistical tests were carried out with a level of 
significance of α = .05. All results, except for correlations, were controlled for gender, 
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age, subjective SES and communal SES. Since this study was conducted in the laboratory 
it could be made sure that all participants paid sufficient attention to the material, and 
therefore no outliers were excluded from analysis. 
Data inspection. Data inspection revealed that early exposure to diversity had a 
slightly non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution could be improved 
by performing a square root transformation on the data. In contrast, current subjective 
exposure to diversity showed a non-normal, negatively skewed distribution. The 
distribution could be improved by performing a square transformation on the data. The 
following analysis was therefore carried out with the square root transformed data for 
early diversity and square transformation for current subjective diversity. Means and 
standard deviations are reported for untransformed data for ease of interpretation. 
Correlations of diversity and contact measures. The correlations between the 
different measures of experiences of diversity are displayed in Table 7. Early diversity 
was correlated with early positive contact, r (91) = .27, p = .01. This might represent the 
fact that growing up in an ethnically diverse environment creates opportunity to engage 
with people from other ethnicities in a positive way. 
Surprisingly, current subjective exposure to diversity was uncorrelated with 
current contact, r (92) = -.09, p = .41. Current positive contact was also not correlated 
with prior positive contact, r (92) = .12, p = .27. However, current contact was strongly 
correlated with early diversity, r (91) = .56, p < .001. This was an unexpected finding, but 
it points to the possibility that early exposure to diversity might be a crucial factor to 
lower the barrier for future attempts to seek intercultural contact. 
 
EXPOSURE TO DIVERSITY AND SELF-REGULATION 81 
 
 
Table 7  
Intercorrelations, Means and Standard Deviations of Diversity Measures in Study 3 
Variable 1 2 3 M SD 
1. Early Diversity - 
 
  -.10 .82 
2. Current Subjective Diversity  .13 
(91) 
-  .60 .13 




- 3.60 1.02 







Note: Degrees of freedom for significance tests are given in parenthesis.  
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
Correlations between self-regulation measures. The correlations between the 
different self-regulation measures are displayed in Table 8. Stroop interference was 
unrelated to all other measures of self-regulation. A high discount rate was associated 
with the non-planning facet of impulsiveness, r (92) = .22, p = .03, reflecting the cognitive 
nature of delay gratification. Stroop interference was uncorrelated with discount rate, r 
(92) = -.12, p = .23 and BIS-15, rs < .03, ps > .85. It is not clear why Stroop performance 
was not correlated with other measures of self-regulation. This finding is in conflict with 
previous results which found Stroop interference and BIS scores to be moderately 
correlated (Enticott et al., 2006). Given the fact that the BIS-15 and MCQ were 
administered last it is possible that fatigue might have affected these measures, even 
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Table 8  
Intercorrelations, Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Regulation Measures in Study 
3 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD 
1. Stroop Interference -      .04 .08 
2. Discount Rate k -.12 -     .02 .05 
3. BIS-15: Total .01 .13 -    2.27 .42 
4. BIS-15: Motor .02 .00 .80*** -   2.33 .56 
5. BIS-15: Non-Planning .01 .22* .84*** .50*** -  2.18 .55 
6. BIS-15: Attention  -.02 .10 .74*** .37*** .48*** - 2.31 .45 
Note: Degrees of freedom for all significance tests was df = 92. 
BIS-15 = 15 item short version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
Early experiences of diversity and self-regulation. To examine the effect of 
salient diversity and prior experiences of diversity on self-regulation, separate univariate 
General Linear Models (GLM) were fitted to the data for each dependent measure (Stroop 
interference, BIS-15 total score and discount rate). A multivariate GLM was deemed 
inappropriate since the correlation between the dependent variables was unexpectedly 
low (Verma, 2015). Predictors entered into all models were condition, early diversity, 
early positive contact as well as condition (control or diversity salience) and the two 
interaction terms of diversity and positive contact with condition. 
Stroop performance. Diversity approached significance as a predictor of Stroop 
interference. It predicted marginally stronger Stroop interference across conditions, F (1, 
83) = 3.60, p = .06, partial η² = .04. No main effects emerged for diversity salience or 
positive contact, Fs < .72, ps > .40. Diversity salience and positive contact did, however, 
form a significant interaction term, F (1, 83) = 4.83, p = .03, partial η² = .06. To determine 
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the nature of this interaction effect, a moderation analysis was conducted in PROCESS. 
Positive contact had no reliable effect in the control condition, standardised effect = -.17, 
t (83) = -1.24, p = .22, 95% CI [-.45, .10]. When diversity was salient, however, positive 
contact predicted marginally stronger interference, standardised effect = .29, t (83) = 1.77, 
p = .08, 95% CI [-.04, .62]. This is a conceptual replication of the patterns in Study 1 and 
2: Experience of diversity predicted weaker self-regulation when diversity was salient.  
The pattern for this interaction effect is also shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Partial regression plots of early positive contact and Stroop interference with 
fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. Partial regression plots are adjusted for 
control variables (age, gender, subjective SES, communal SES) and early exposure to 
diversity. 
 
Power analysis. The ability of this study to detect an interaction effect of diversity 
salience and diversity experiences on Stroop performance was evaluated by calculating 
the level of statistical power. The population effect size was estimated to be similar to the 
one found in Study 2, η² = .05. The power of this study for this population effect size was 
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power = .59. Furthermore, this study had an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum 
population effect size of η² = .08 at power = .80.  
Mediation analysis. To test for the presence of a mediation effect, bootstrapping 
procedures in PROCESS were used. More specifically, it was tested if any effect of 
subjective diversity on Stroop interference was mediated by positive contact. No indirect 
effect of diversity through frequency or quality of positive contact was found, 
standardised effect < .01. However, results from the GLM above indicated that effects 
through positive contact might be moderated by condition. Therefore, an additional 
analysis tested if a moderated mediation effect was present.  
In a further analysis in PROCESS, it was tested if any effect of subjective diversity 
on Stroop interference was mediated by positive contact, and if this mediation was 
moderated by condition.  As shown in Figure 4, there was evidence of mediated 
moderation with positive contact mediating the effect of diversity, standardised index of 
moderated mediation = .12, 95% CI [.01, .37]. The indirect effect of positive contact was 
moderated by condition, coefficient for interaction = .47, t (83) = 2.14, p = .03. The 
indirect effects per condition were not significant for both conditions, although the 
indirect effect of diversity on Stroop interference via positive contact was negative in the 
control condition, standardised ab = -.05, 95% CI [-.16, .004] and positive when diversity 
was salient, standardised ab = .08, 95% CI [-.02, .26]. This pattern would be consistent 
with the positive contact*diversity salience effect observed in the GLM described above 
(i.e. positive contact predicting worse Stroop performance only when diversity was 
salient). The remaining direct effect of diversity predicted higher Stroop interference (i.e. 
worse Stroop performance), standardised c' = .23, t (83) = 2.01, p = .048, 95% CI 
[.04, .42]. 
 




Figure 4. Relationship between early exposure to diversity and Stroop interference as 
mediated by early positive contact and moderated by condition. Coefficients are 
standardised, except for interaction effects with condition. All coefficients are 
controlled for control variables (age, gender, communal and subjective socioeconomic 
status). The regression coefficient between early diversity and Stroop interference, 
controlling for quality of early positive contact, is given in parenthesis. †p <.10 *p < .05. 
***p < .001 
 
BIS-15. For impulsiveness as measured by the BIS-Brief, positive contact 
emerged as a marginal predictor across conditions, F (1, 83) = 3.48, p = .07, partial η² 
= .04, β = .23 with positive contact predicting self-reports of stronger impulsiveness. 
Following up with separate GLMs for each subscale (motor, non-planning and attention), 
revealed that the effect was mostly driven by a marginal increase in motor impulsiveness, 
F (1, 83) = 3.13, p = .08, partial η² = .04, β = .15. Positive contact had no reliable effects 
on the other two subscales, Fs < 1.9, ps > .17.  
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Delay gratification. No reliable main or interaction effects on discount rate 
emerged from the analysis, Fs < .81 , ps > .37. 
Current experiences of diversity. The effect of salient diversity and recent 
diversity experiences on self-regulation was investigated in the same manner as for prior 
diversity experiences by fitting separate univariate General Linear Models (GLM) for 
each dependent variable (Stroop interference, BIS-15 Total Score, discount rate parameter 
k). Predictors entered into all models were condition, subjective diversity and positive 
contact of the past 6 months, as well as both interaction terms with condition. 
The only effect emerging from the analysis was a marginally significant main 
effect of current positive contact on the discount rate for delay gratification, F (1, 83) = 
2.98, p = .09, partial η² = .04, β = .33, with positive contact predicting a marginally higher 
discount rate (indicating worse self-regulation). No other reliable effects emerged from 
analysis, Fs < 2.31, ps > .13. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
When diversity was made salient, participants who had made a lot of positive 
contact in the past took marginally longer to react to Stroop trials. This was a significant 
interaction between diversity salience and positive contact. Results therefore showed that 
a) the effect of diversity on self-regulation found in Study 1 and 2 does indeed affect self-
regulatory behaviour and not just self-reports, and b) positive contact plays an important 
role in explaining the effects of diversity. 
Furthermore, this moderation between diversity salience and positive contact 
seems to be part of a mediated moderation. In this mediated moderation diversity affected 
positive contact which in turn affected self-regulation, with the direction of the effect 
depending on condition. The effects of positive contact separated per condition were not 
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significant, but this issue might be due to sample size. Either way the effect of positive 
contact seems to change its direction when diversity is made salient. 
Marginal effects of positive contact were found for some dependent variables 
without an interaction effect present. This might indicate a debilitating effect on self-
regulation. While these effects did not reach significance, it is worth noting that these 
effects seemed to be specific to positive contact, and not general exposure to diversity. 
This might point to the possibility that the long-term response to positive contact involves 
a general weakening of self-regulation as well. However, since this is essentially a 
correlational finding (i.e. it is not affected by the experimental condition) it might also 
indicate that a slight amount of impulsiveness and spontaneity makes positive 
diversifying encounters more likely. 
To sum up, the effects of diversity were moderated by salient diversity. Positive 
contact partially mediates these effects, generally predicting worse Stroop performance 
only when diversity was made salient. 
4.5 General Discussion 
The three studies reported in this chapter tested the hypothesis that prolonged 
experiences of diversity would be associated with enhanced self-regulation. This 
prediction was derived from the assumption that experiences of ethnic diversity should 
require the suppression of stereotypical content. Since suppressing stereotypes relies on 
self-regulation, it was predicted that experiences of ethnic diversity should lead to 
cognitive change in the form of improved self-regulatory ability to enable efficient 
suppression of stereotypical information.  
Preliminary results of a pilot study and findings from Studies 1-3 appear to 
contradict this hypothesis. Across all studies it was found that experiences of diversity 
appear to impair self-regulation when diversity is made salient. Results from Study 1 
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suggested that exposure to diversity is linked to self-reports of low self-regulation. This 
finding was replicated in Study 2, but Study 2 also revealed an important boundary 
condition of this effect: Participants with a lot of exposure to ethnic diversity only 
reported low levels of self-regulation when diversity was brought to mind. This effect of 
diversity also seems to impact behavioural measures of self-regulation such as the Stroop 
task, as was demonstrated in Study 3. To summarise these findings, it was found that 
experiences of diversity were associated with indicators of poor self-regulation, but only 
when social diversity was made salient.7 
Salient diversity represents situations in which social diversity is likely to be 
present. We should therefore expect that responses patterns to diversity are especially 
likely to be activated when social diversity is salient. The fact that salient diversity 
moderates the effect of diversity experiences on self-regulation thus suggests that this 
mechanism is part of a cognitive response to diversity.  
 This might indicate that participants activate a particular mindset when they 
process diversity, and that some aspects of this mindset are linked to impulsiveness, a 
preference for immediate rewards (Study 1 & Study 2), and slower reaction times on tasks 
that require reacting to inconsistent information (Study 3). These findings are in contrast 
to what one might expect given that inhibiting stereotypes requires cognitive control 
(Bartholow & Dickter, 2008; Bartholow, 2010), and inhibition of stereotypical 
information was thought to be a key component in resolving stereotypical inconsistencies 
(Crisp & Turner, 2011). 
                                                 
 
7 These findings are also supported by a meta-analysis of all studies on diversity experiences and self-
regulation. This meta-analysis is reported in Chapter 8, together with meta-analyses of other effects reported 
in this thesis. Generally, salient diversity was found to moderate the effect of diversity experiences on self-
regulation. When diversity was salient, the mean effect of diversity on self-regulation over all studies was 
r = -.16, p = 002. No effect was present when diversity was not salient, r = .06, p = .45. 
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This begs the question why such a mindset should be activated in the first place. 
If individuals develop a mindset to adapt to diversity, it ultimately would have to allow 
for more efficient inconsistency resolution. The current results indicate that inhibition 
might not be essential for this process. A more vital aspect to inconsistency resolution 
might be forming unconventional connections between conflicting information. This 
might require temporarily down-regulating the motivation to monitor cognitive "rules" or 
schemas (DiMaggio, 1997) in general, including stereotypical information or behavioural 
rules (norms). A willingness to break some rules, including norms, has been suggested to 
be part of creative thinking (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). Being open to unconventional 
ways of thinking might help understanding diversity but might be at odds with monitoring 
the adherence to behavioural rules. Such a strengthened motivation to disregard 
categorical rules would represent a change in motivational and attentional focus rather 
than a decrease in self-regulatory ability, even at the cost of weak self-regulatory 
performance. That is, findings that appear to indicate impaired self-regulation in Studies 
1-3 might have been caused by a temporarily lowered motivation to monitor cognitive 
rules. This idea will be further explored in the following Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: ADAPTATION TO DIVERSITY THROUGH NON-CATEGORICAL 
THINKING 
 
In this chapter, I revisit the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 and 3 
and integrate it with the implications of the findings reported in Chapter 4. I argue that 
the temporary decrease in cognitive control observed in Chapter 4 might represent the 
activation of a mindset that is characterised by a low reliance on cognitive rules and 
categories. As a by-product of this flexible stance towards cognitive rules, scripts and 
norms, the monitoring of conflicts with behavioural rules can be impaired as well, leading 
to poor self-regulation under some circumstances. In other words, individuals who have 
experienced a lot of diversity might, under certain conditions, lean towards abandoning 
categorical thinking in favour of more unconventional and divergent thinking. I will 
discuss how this hypothesis is supported by research on diversity and divergent thinking 
and show how a revised version of the CPAG model can integrate previous research with 
the findings reported in Chapter 4.  
 
In Chapter 2 I have argued that the unprecedented rise of ethnic diversity in 
Western societies will lead to new cognitive challenges for all members of society, and I 
have shown that these challenges can be characterized as conflicts of information about 
social categories. Per the CPAG model (Crisp & Turner, 2011), resolving such conflicts 
requires stereotype inhibition as well as generative thought. Diversity might therefore 
offer the opportunity to improve both processes. However, while improvements in 
creative thought from experiences of diversity have been demonstrated in research, little 
is known about benefits for cognitive control. In Chapter 3 I have shown that inhibiting 
stereotypical information requires processes of cognitive control which are active in other 
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non-social tasks of self-regulation as well. Regular practice of such self-regulation tasks, 
social or non-social, has been shown to improve the capacity for cognitive control 
(Baumeister et al., 2006; Denson et al., 2011; Finkel et al., 2009; Gailliot, Plant, et al., 
2007; S. A. Hui et al., 2009; Muraven et al., 1999; Muraven, 2010a, 2010b; Oaten & 
Cheng, 2006). It was therefore postulated that repeated experiences of diversity should 
provide the opportunity to improve self-regulatory capacity, because it should frequently 
call upon these processes. It was thus predicted that exposure to diversity should be 
associated with better self-regulation. This prediction was tested in three studies reported 
in Chapter 4.  
The findings described in Chapter 4 demonstrated how experiences of diversity 
do indeed influence individuals’ self-regulatory performance if diversity was made salient. 
However, the direction of this effect was unexpected: Participants who had experienced 
a lot of diversity displayed a decrease in self-regulatory performance when diversity was 
salient, rather than the expected increase. This was an unexpected finding because the 
CPAG model predicts that inhibitory control is required to suppress stereotypical thought 
when resolving stereotypical inconsistencies (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Processing 
stereotypical inconsistencies should be a common task in ethnically diverse environments 
so there should be frequent opportunities to engage in and improve inhibitory control 
(also see Chapter 3). The fact that repeated exposure to diversity seems to decrease self-
regulation when diversity is salient was therefore surprising. This suggests that improved 
cognitive control might not be crucial for understanding socially diverse stimuli, at least 
not for people adapted to diversity. To understand the implications of these findings for 
the CPAG model it is important to carefully re-evaluate the assumptions made within this 
model in regard to diversity and stereotype inhibition. In this chapter, I will re-examine 
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the CPAG model and integrate it with the findings reported in the previous chapter as well 
as previous research. 
5.1 Revisiting the CPAG Model 
The CPAG model (Crisp & Turner, 2011) made a novel contribution to the 
research on the psychological effects of diversity by presenting a coherent and 
comprehensive model of how a whole range of experiences of diversity can lead to 
stereotypical inconsistencies, and how these inconsistencies are resolved. Based on these 
observations the CPAG model postulates how repeated experiences of diversity can lead 
to benefits for cognitive flexibility. Within the CPAG model, experiences of diversity are 
assumed to be cognitively challenging if they contain information that mismatch 
stereotypes. In Chapter 2 I have argued that this could be more broadly conceptualised as 
conflicts of cognitive categories. Per the CPAG model, conflicts of social categories 
instigate a process of inconsistency resolution if the perceiver of the conflict is motivated 
and able to untangle the inconsistency. This process involves the suppression of 
stereotypical information and generative thought. It is assumed to become more efficient 
with practice, primarily through improved stereotype suppression, which is assumed to 
eventually generalise to other tasks that require the resolution of conflicting categorical 
information. The result of this increased efficiency in dealing with categorical 
inconsistencies is improved cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility in the context of 
the CPAG model can be understood as the ability to think about cognitive categories in a 
flexible and efficient way.  
The idea that diversity leads to enhanced flexibility and divergent thought is 
supported by studies with bicultural individuals who are more cognitively flexible 
(Gutierrez & Sameroff, 2008; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012), as well as by studies 
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showing that multicultural experiences can boost creative thinking (Leung & Chiu, 2010; 
Leung et al., 2008; Maddux et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, if this superior ability for flexible and divergent thinking does 
indeed help individuals to resolve conflicts of categorical information, we should also 
expect participants who have experienced a lot of diversity to display greater efficiency 
in acknowledging and integrating conflicting perspectives. Thus, participants with a lot 
of diversity experience should also display greater cognitive complexity. This does indeed 
seem to be the case, as demonstrated by studies in which cognitive complexity was found 
to be higher among biculturals (Benet-Martínez et al., 2006; Tadmor et al., 2009), and 
among participants with strong multicultural engagement during their MBA training 
(Maddux, Bivolaru, Hafenbrack, Tadmor & Galinsky, 2014).   
However, while these studies do offer evidence for increased cognitive flexibility 
and complexity in dealing with cognitive categories among participants with diversity 
experience, they do not directly test the assumption that this improvement stems from 
enhanced inhibition. A key assumption within the CPAG model is that repeated 
experiences of diversity ultimately lead to improved cognitive flexibility through 
enhanced inhibitory control. Since experiences of diversity did not lead to greater self-
regulation in Studies 1 to 3, it seems sensible to review its role within the CPAG model. 
5.1.1 The Role of Self-Regulation Within the CPAG Model 
As described above, the CPAG model assumes that repeated experiences of 
diversity lead to enhanced inhibitory control which in turn allows for greater cognitive 
flexibility and more divergent thinking when dealing with categorical inconsistencies. 
This hypothesis rests on the assumption that inhibition is a prerequisite for the efficient 
resolution of categorical inconsistencies. The CPAG model assumes that stereotypical 
inconsistencies are resolved by inhibiting the stereotypical information to then enable 
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divergent thinking and the generation of emergent attributes that resolve the categorical 
contradictions.  
Inhibition does indeed seem to play a role for inconsistency resolution, as 
indicated by slower reaction times to constituent attributes for surprising category 
combinations when compared to unsurprising category combinations (Hutter & Crisp, 
2006). Furthermore, participants who generated a list of counter-stereotypes showed 
superior inhibitory control in a subsequent Stroop task (Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). This 
finding also signifies that, for most people, processing surprising category combinations 
increases the tendency to inhibit categorical content. Therefore, the default strategy in 
dealing with categorical inconsistencies seems to be to first inhibit the categorical content 
and to then think divergently about the category combination.  
While the default strategy for processing categorical conflicts relies on cognitive 
inhibition, this does not mean that people who are experienced in resolving categorical 
inconsistencies (e.g. through experiences of diversity) necessarily use the same strategy. 
A more efficient strategy would be learning when to forego activation of the categorical 
content in the first place so that engaging in inhibitory control becomes unnecessary. If 
diversity should lead to the acquisition of such a superior strategy it could aid the 
resolution of categorical conflicts and could therefore account for findings showing that 
prolonged experiences of diversity lead to enhanced divergent thinking (Leung & Chiu, 
2010; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Steffens et al., 2015; Tadmor, 
Galinsky, et al., 2012) and cognitive complexity (Benet-Martínez et al., 2006; Tadmor et 
al., 2009; Maddux, Bivolaru, Hafenbrack, Tadmor & Galinsky, 2014). In the following, I 
will expand on this argument by reviewing research on the impact of diversity on 
divergent thinking and creativity. I will show how the cognitive response to social 
diversity can be best characterised as the activation of a mindset that involves flexible 
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boundaries between categories. This cognitive change results in cognitive flexibility when 
handling categorical inconsistencies which aids the ability to think divergently (i.e. 
outside of conventional categorical boundaries.). 
5.1.2 Diversity and Divergent Thinking 
There is plentiful empirical evidence suggesting that social diversity does benefit 
cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking. Studies in this line of research have 
investigated both the influence of experiences of diversity that were temporarily induced 
in the laboratory as well as the impact of prolonged experiences of diversity that were 
part of participants’ life experiences. 
The impact of spontaneous experiences of diversity on divergent thinking. 
Inducing experiences of diversity in the laboratory provides the opportunity to isolate the 
types of processes that are stimulated and enhanced during and after the processing of 
diversity through clear experimental designs. It should be kept in mind that this kind of 
studies alone cannot determine the long-term psychological changes that result from 
frequent experiences of diversity. What these studies can provide on their own, however, 
is a deeper understanding of the cognitive operations active in processing diversity and 
clear evidence for causal relationships with diversity. 
One way of inducing experiences of diversity in the laboratory is by letting 
participants process surprising combinations of social categories, also called counter-
stereotypes (Hastie et al., 1990; Kunda et al., 1990; Weber & Crocker, 1983). When asked 
to describe a counter-stereotypic person (e.g. female mechanic) participants have been 
found to show increased divergent creativity (Gocłowska et al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 
2013). Similarly, when participants had to generate counter-stereotypical examples they 
subsequently generated more creative concepts and promotion material for a themed party 
night (Gocłowska et al., 2012). This effect of counter-stereotypes on divergent thinking 
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seems to be moderated by need for personal structure, the tendency to think in relatively 
simple and clear structures: Presenting counter-stereotypes did only benefit divergent 
creativity for participants who were low in personal need for structure (Gocłowska & 
Crisp, 2013). This is noteworthy, since a clear sense of structure is usually enforced by 
relying on simplified cognitive categories (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). These studies 
thus show that counter-stereotypes seem to only stimulate superior divergent thinking for 
participants with a low reliance on cognitive categories. 
A different method of inducing experiences of diversity has been presenting 
symbols of different cultures together. For example, participants might be presented with 
a slide-show presenting cultural aspects associated with American or Chinese culture (e.g. 
arts, architecture or food). When participants were presented with a slide-show containing 
symbols of both American and Chinese culture they subsequently showed superior 
performance on creativity tasks than participants who had watched a slide-show 
containing cultural symbols of only American or only Chinese culture (Cheng et al., 2011; 
Leung & Chiu, 2010). Creative performance was also enhanced when participants had 
watched a slideshow containing stimuli that represented a fusion of American and 
Chinese culture (e.g. a McDonald’s rice burger; Leung & Chiu, 2010). Creativity was 
thus enhanced when participants processed a dual exposure to American and Chinese 
cultural symbols. In these studies, the dual exposure occurred either by combining both 
cultures in the same slide-show or by presenting stimuli that fuses both cultures together. 
No matter how the dual exposure is achieved, it is likely to be perceived as a categorical 
inconsistency, because America and China harbour relatively distant cultures. These 
results could therefore mirror findings from studies which utilised counter-stereotypes. 
As for counter-stereotypes, cultural stimuli that contain conflicts of social categories seem 
to enhance creative performance. 
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Further analysis of dual cultural exposure has revealed that its beneficial influence 
on creative flexibility in the Unusual Uses Test (Guilford, 1959) is mediated by positive 
emotion (Cheng et al., 2011). Dual exposure to two psychologically distant cultures led 
to a decrease in positive emotion, and positive emotion was negatively related to creative 
flexibility. Thus, the greater the reduction of positive emotion caused by dual culture 
exposure the bigger the benefit for creative performance. This finding underscores that 
cultural diversity with categorical inconsistencies is likely to be experienced as 
cognitively challenging and therefore unpleasant, because the inconsistencies do not fit 
into common social categories (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, the fact that benefits for 
creativity were only observed under unpleasant dual cultural exposure indicates that 
environmental pressure (i.e. categorical inconsistencies) is necessary for a change in 
cognitive processes.  
The idea that experiencing categorical inconsistencies are crucial to promote 
creative performance is further corroborated by a study manipulating the comparison 
mindset of participants (Cheng & Leung, 2013). In this study, dual presentation of 
symbols from two distant cultures (American and Chinese) only benefitted creative 
performance if participants were in a mindset that emphasises dissimilarities. Such a 
mindset should direct attention to potentially conflicting features of both cultures. 
Participants should therefore be more likely to experience categorical inconsistencies, and 
engage in a process of inconsistency resolution, promoting creative performance. If 
participants were in a mindset focussing on similarities no increase in creativity was 
observed. Creative performance was also not affected if the cultural symbols presented to 
the participants were from two cultures with low distance (Chinese and Indian). 
To summarise, spontaneously experiencing diversity appears to benefit creativity. 
However, various findings indicate that experiences of diversity only promote creativity 
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if they contain conflicts between social categories, such as counter-stereotypes or 
simultaneous presentation of symbols from distant cultures. Similarly, being in a mindset 
that emphasises differences between stimuli is likely to bring categorical inconsistencies 
to mind and therefore promotes creativity when processing diversity. Furthermore, 
individuals who rely relatively little on cognitive categories as indicated by a low need in 
personal structure are most likely to improve in creativity performance after processing 
social diversity. This suggests that individuals with a low reliance on cognitive categories 
are most well-suited to think flexibly about categorical conflicts and are more likely to 
bring this cognitive flexibility to subsequent creativity tasks. 
The impact of prolonged experiences of diversity on divergent thinking. 
Rather than inducing experiences of diversity in the laboratory, some studies have 
investigated if social diversity as part of participants’ life experiences affect divergent 
creativity. This approach lends itself well to study persistent cognitive changes caused by 
prolonged exposure to diversity. However, this type of research utilises variations in 
experiences of diversity in the population, and therefore must rely on semi-experimental 
or correlational methods. Thus, inferences about causal relationships are usually less 
conclusive. However, when this type of study is combined with findings from laboratory 
studies, converging evidence can pinpoint which cognitive processes should benefit from 
prolonged exposure to diversity. 
Extended experiences of diversity can occur when a person is living abroad and 
interacting with foreign cultures. Time spent abroad has been found to predict 
performance in problem solving tasks requiring divergent thinking and creative flexibility 
such as the Duncker candle problem or finding a hidden solution in a negotiation task 
(Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). In contrast to time spent living abroad, time spent merely 
travelling abroad was not a significant predictor of creativity in these studies. While living 
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abroad often requires some degree of adaptation to the foreign culture, travelling a foreign 
country usually does not. Experiences of diversity should thus be more intense and 
frequent for participants who lived abroad. In support of this idea, the effect of time spent 
living abroad on creative problem-solving was mediated by cultural adaptation. In a 
similar vein, creative directors of major fashion houses with a lot of work experience 
abroad generate more innovative products (Godart et al., 2015), and paintings from well-
travelled artists tend to sell for higher prices (Hellmanzik, 2013). 
The beneficial effect of time spent abroad on creativity seems to be enhanced 
when experiences of living abroad or experiences of adapting to a foreign culture are 
made salient (Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). This suggests that 
individuals who have frequently experienced diversity possess a mindset benefitting 
creative performance that is activated when diversity is salient. 
Experiences of diversity are also especially prevalent among biculturals, members 
of the cultural minority who are influenced by both their minority culture and the majority 
culture (see Chapter 2). Asian American Individuals with high levels of identity 
integration have been found to come up with more original recipes, but only when Asian 
and American ingredients were presented to them simultaneously (Cheng et al., 2008). In 
this study, there was no impact of identity integration on originality when ingredients 
from only a single culture were present. The authors originally interpreted this finding as 
an effect of identity integration on creativity that is specific to tasks where knowledge 
about both social identities is relevant. However, this finding might also indicate that 
experiences of diversity only influences creativity in situations where diversity is salient. 
This reading of the findings is supported by results from Saad et al. (2013). In their study, 
Chinese American participants viewed cultural symbols from either American, Chinese 
or both cultures. When participants viewed both American and Chinese symbols, they 
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showed superior performance on the Unusual Uses Test, a divergent creativity task that 
is unrelated to cultural knowledge.  
In a similar line of research, beneficial effects for divergent creativity were also 
found for having a large number of different social identities (Steffens et al., 2015).8 
Participants who indicated that they belonged to many social groups came up with more 
names for a new kind of pasta and also scored higher on the Unusual Uses Test. This 
effect of multiple social identities on originality was mediated by cognitive flexibility. 
Thus, participants who identify with a lot of different social groups were more proficient 
in switching between different cognitive categories which allowed them to come up with 
more creative alternatives.  
The level of diversity experiences can also be assessed by the Multicultural 
Experience Survey (MES; Leung & Chiu, 2010). This scale taps into different types of 
experiences of diversity such as time spent living abroad, speaking a foreign language, 
having parents originating from other countries, or contact to other cultures through food, 
music or friends. Participants who score high on the MES were found to come up with 
less conventional (i.e. divergent) gift ideas. 
Diversity aids divergent thinking through a non-categorical mindset. 
Numerous findings thus show that prolonged experiences of diversity promote divergent 
thinking and creativity. While these studies are necessarily either correlational or semi-
experimental they offer converging evidence to the laboratory studies described in the 
previous section. It seems plausible that prolonged experiences of diversity contain the 
                                                 
 
8 Identifying with different social groups was not restricted to ethnic or cultural groups in this study. 
However, for the purpose of this discussion it is assumed that the cognitive process through which 
categorical inconsistencies between different social identities are resolved are similar to processes through 
which biculturals integrate their social identities (also see Chapter 2) 
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very type of experiences that are induced in laboratory studies: Episodes in which 
different social categories are activated simultaneously and conflict with each other. As 
described above, processing such experiences seems to activate a mindset in which the 
ability to think flexibly about categories is enhanced which aids creative performance. 
Individuals with a lot of exposure to diversity might be more apt at creativity tasks 
because they are accustomed to switching to such a mindset. 
This beneficial effect of experiences of diversity on divergent thinking was 
moderated by salient diversity in some studies. In some cases, participants who have 
frequently experienced diversity only showed superior creativity when social diversity 
was salient (Cheng et al., 2008; Saad et al., 2013). Also in other studies experiences of 
diversity had a persistent effect on creativity across situations, but the effect was amplified 
when diversity was made salient (Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). While 
there seems to be a clear effect of experiences of diversity on flexible thinking and 
creativity it is possible that this effect might be strengthened by salient diversity. Cues for 
social diversity might therefore augment the effect of diversity on divergent thinking. This 
is again in accordance with the idea that diversity promotes divergent thinking by 
enabling a mindset that is associated with flexible categorical boundaries. 
Such cognitive flexibility in dealing with categorical information would also 
explain why individuals who have extended experience with diversity, such as biculturals 
tend to display greater cognitive flexibility (i.e. ability to integrate information from 
different viewpoints; Benet-Martínez et al., 2006; Tadmor et al., 2009; Maddux, Bivolaru, 
Hafenbrack, Tadmor & Galinsky, 2014). Integrating information from different 
viewpoints can require making connections across different categorical domains (such as 
social identities; Tadmor et al., 2009). This task should be considerably easier when 
boundaries between categories are weak and relatively flexible.  
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5.1.3 When Non-Categorical Thinking Can Hurt Self-Regulation 
Experiencing diversity thus seems to enable individuals to think in more creative 
and divergent ways, especially when diversity is made salient. However, a high degree of 
diversity experiences and salient diversity are the precise conditions under which self-
regulatory performance was found to suffer in Studies 1-3. How can these findings be 
reconciled? As indicated above, current findings suggest that diversity strengthens 
creativity because it enables people to think more flexibly about cognitive categories. In 
other words, cognitive categories might be seen less as rigid rules that perception must 
adhere to, and more as fluid guidelines that can be combined and changed. This decreased 
reliance on categorical rules might lead to reduced rule monitoring which might affect 
self-regulatory performance. A weak reliance on categorical rules and structure, such as 
observed in individuals with low need for cognitive closure (NFCC), has sometimes been 
linked to poor performance on cognitive control tasks, especially when the task requires 
following clear and specific rules (Kossowska, Bukowski, & Czarnek, 2014; Kossowska, 
2007a, 2007b). This has been explained as a trade-off for the increased cognitive 
flexibility, because cognitive flexibility might be disadvantageous when tasks require 
active monitoring of a specific goal despite distracting stimuli (Kossowska et al., 2014). 
In such situations, cognitive rigidity can lead to superior performance as it seems to 
enhance the attentional focus on goal-relevant attributes9. 
Diversity might thus be linked to an increased flexibility towards cognitive 
categories, which allows for superior divergent thinking, creative performance and 
                                                 
 
9  However, cognitive rigidity and the simple filtering strategy associated with it seems to become 
ineffective when cognitive load is high (Kossowska, 2007a). Similarly, cognitive rigidity is detrimental 
when the task is more complex and requires integration of various sources of information (Bukowski, Sędek, 
Kossowska, & Trejtowicz, 2012; Bukowski, Von Hecker, & Kossowska, 2013). 
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cognitive complexity. This tendency seems further amplified when social diversity is 
made salient. This additional enhancement in flexibility towards categories seems to carry 
the drawback of temporarily decreased self-regulatory performance, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 4. This idea is supported by studies showing that cognitive flexibility can be 
accompanied by decreased attentional selectivity and a decreased monitoring of specific 
rules (Kossowska et al., 2014; Kossowska, 2007a, 2007b). In other words, diversity seems 
to benefit divergent thinking and creativity, because it promotes a flexible mindset 
towards cognitive categories as well as a relatively lax monitoring towards such cognitive 
processing rules. Amplifying this tendency when diversity is salient should decrease the 
attentional selectivity towards goal-relevant stimuli and make self-regulation less 
efficient (at least for simple tasks) as monitoring goal-relevant rules will be more difficult 
when perception is organised by relative fuzzy boundaries between categories. However, 
this style of processing might be adaptive when diversity is high, because it is likely to 
make inconsistency resolution easier as categorical conflicts should be less pronounced 
when boundaries between categories are less strict.  
Such a form of adaptation to diversity would involve a low reliance on clearly 
defined categories and rules, and a recent study by Lu et al. (2017) suggests that this might 
indeed be a common response to diversity. Findings from this study revealed that 
experiences of diversity such as spending time abroad were linked to a relativistic moral 
stance and an increased willingness to commit immoral acts (Lu et al., 2017). This finding 
is in line with previous research showing that diversity improves divergent creativity 
(Godart et al., 2015; Hellmanzik, 2013; Leung & Chiu, 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009), 
which relies on breaking free from domain-specific rules to create unusual (i.e. creative) 
mental associations and combinations (Bailin, 1987). Creative individuals tend to neglect 
rules not only during creativity tasks, but for other domains as well, as they generally feel 
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unconstrained by rules (Baucus, Norton, Baucus, & Human, 2008; Gino & Wiltermuth, 
2014). Hence, diversity seems to promote a certain aspect of divergent thinking that 
involves a tendency to question and disregard conventional rules and norms. The need to 
rely on such rules for structure has also been found to be decreased in studies on diversity 
and need for cognitive closure. Individuals low in need for closure tend to have a low 
desire to impose structure to their perception through unambiguous schemas (e.g. Pierro 
& Kruglanski, 2008). Need for cognitive closure was found to be decreased after induced 
exposure to cultural diversity by recalling an episode in which the participant was exposed 
to a different culture (Tadmor, Hong, et al., 2012) or coming up with examples for 
counter-stereotypes (Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013). 
In the preceding sections I have reviewed how experiences of diversity promotes 
divergent thinking and superior creative performance, especially when diversity is made 
salient. I have also argued how this improved creative potential is mostly caused by an 
increased cognitive flexibility when it comes to managing cognitive categories. This 
elevated cognitive flexibility, however, can have the drawback of impaired self-regulation, 
at least when it comes to maintaining focus on specific goals and simple tasks. In a more 
general sense, it can thus be said that experiencing diversity promotes a flexible stance 
towards categories and rules. Individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity will 
tend to have a low reliance on rules and categories and feel relatively unconstrained by 
them. In the following section, I will incorporate these ideas into the theoretical 
framework of the CPAG model. 
5.1.4 A Revised Adaptation Process for the CPAG Model 
The central assumption of the CPAG model is that individuals who are exposed 
to challenging diversity on a constant basis will eventually adapt to this experience by 
becoming more cognitively flexible, especially when it comes to handling inconsistencies 
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between cognitive categories (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Flexibility in managing categories 
should be especially useful when it comes to tasks requiring divergent creativity, because 
these tasks demand unconventional thinking that breaks categorical conventions and rules. 
As reviewed above, there are a multitude of studies showing the benefits of diversity for 
creative performance and the ability to incorporate competing viewpoints. There is thus 
clear evidence on the benefits of diversity for cognitive flexibility. 
What is put into question, however, is the hypothesised mechanism through which 
superior cognitive flexibility is acquired. The CPAG model originally suggested that 
prolonged exposure to diversity leads to superior cognitive inhibition, making stereotype 
suppression less depleting. This should leave more cognitive resources for generative 
thought, and hence improving cognitive flexibility. These assumptions seem incompatible 
with the findings reported in Chapter 4: Participants who had experienced a lot of 
diversity reported weaker self-regulation and displayed inferior performance on the 
Stroop, at least when diversity was salient. Why does experiencing diversity promote 
improved cognitive flexibility, but also seems to be linked to poor cognitive control?  
To understand how this pattern might occur, it is important to consider how the 
original hypothesis was derived. Adaptation to diversity ultimately has to improve the 
ability to resolve categorical inconsistencies, and empirical evidence suggests that this is 
achieved by superior divergent and flexible thinking. Studies on counter-stereotypes show 
that generative thought in inconsistency resolution requires inhibition of stereotypical 
content. Inconsistency resolution for most people seem to involve a) inhibiting the 
stereotypical content to then b) generate emergent attributes (Hutter & Crisp, 2006; 
Macrae et al., 1999). It was therefore assumed within the CPAG model that increased 
cognitive flexibility has to occur via improved cognitive inhibition. However, in Studies 
1-3 participants’ self-regulation was decreased in situations in which previous studies 
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found improved divergent thinking (high degree of diversity experiences and salient 
diversity). This suggests that individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity achieve 
superior divergent thinking without relying too much on cognitive inhibition. Their 
strategy of inconsistency resolution thus must differ from the default strategy that has 
been observed in previous studies on counter-stereotypes. Findings from Studies 1-3 
suggest that participants with many experiences of diversity employ a strategy for 
resolving inconsistencies and generating emergent attributes that not only is independent 
of cognitive inhibition, but even might impair self-regulatory performance. 
The available studies on the impact of diversity suggest that diversity promotes a 
mindset that enables thinking about categories in a flexible manner and allows for the 
integration of competing categorical information. Also, experiences of diversity seem to 
be accompanied by a generalised independence of cognitive rules and norms. This 
independence of clear rules and structure is expressed by studies showing that diversity 
leads to a low need for cognitive closure, as well as a relativistic moral stance.  
This type of non-categorical thinking resulting from experiences of diversity is 
similar to the cognitive flexibility originally proposed by the CPAG model (Crisp & 
Turner, 2011), which describes a mode of thinking that is relatively unconstrained from 
automatic stereotypical associations. The CPAG model assumes that such cognitive 
flexibility involves inhibition of stereotypical information as well as generative thought. 
Cognitive flexibility is assumed to improve after repeatedly experiencing diversity mostly 
because the capacity for inhibitory control is increased. The modification of that model 
suggested here is that adaptation as a response to repeated experiences of diversity might 
not lead to improved inhibitory control, because improved inhibitory control is not 
required for more efficient inconsistency resolution. Instead it might rather lead to an 
increase in generative, divergent thought when diversity is made salient. This 
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improvement in divergent thought results from a decreased reliance on categorical 
information when diversity is salient for individuals who have frequently experienced 
diversity. A mode of thinking that is less dependent on categories with sharp boundaries 
should make it easier to resolve inconsistencies between these categories or failing that 
to accept and tolerate these inconsistencies. The result will thus be an enhanced ability to 
integrate and acknowledge potentially conflicting viewpoints (i.e. increased cognitive 
complexity). However, as attention to categorical rules is decreased, performance on 
cognitive control tasks might temporarily suffer as well. Thus, the self-regulatory 
performance of individuals with diversity experience might be weak when diversity is 
salient, not because they have less cognitive resources available, but rather because they 
engage in a mindset with motivational and attentional tendencies which are suboptimal 
for self-regulatory tasks. 
It should be emphasized that this process of cognitive response would still lead to 
improved cognitive flexibility and would therefore still be compatible with previous 
findings suggesting enhanced flexibility after prolonged exposure to diverstiy. The 
suggested modification of the model also should not suggest that stereotype inhibition 
does not take cognitive effort or is not an act of self-regulation. Rather, it is suggested that 
individuals who frequently experience diversity acquire a mindset for certain situations 
that helps them to weaken the activation of the social categories in the first place, making 
stereotype inhibition less of an issue.  
The CPAG model can therefore be modified to incorporate the findings from 
Chapter 4 in the following way: Prolonged exposure to challenging diversity does lead to 
improved cognitive flexibility. This improvement occurs, because experiencing diversity 
leads to the acquisition of a mindset for the resolution of categorical inconsistencies. This 
mindset involves a relatively flexible stance on cognitive rules and norms, with only weak 
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and blurry distinctions between cognitive categories. Under this mindset, reliance on 
categories is low, but so is the active monitoring of specific goals and rules. This mindset 
will usually be activated when diversity is salient to aid the resolution of potential 
categorical inconsistencies. 
If this revised model is accurate, people who frequently experienced diversity 
should display a low reliance on rules. If this generalises to social norms as well, 
individuals with many experiences of diversity should also tend to resist pressure to 
conform conventional norms and tend to act independent of societal rules, especially 
when diversity is made salient. This prediction was tested in three studies which are 
reported in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: DIVERSITY, RULE INDEPENDENCE AND CONVENTIONAL 
VALUES 
 
Experiencing diversity is likely to challenge stereotypes and therefore requires the 
resolution of stereotypical inconsistencies. Resolving such inconsistencies requires 
generative and unconventional thinking. Frequently experiencing diversity might 
therefore lead to a tendency towards unconventional thinking, at least when diversity is 
salient. In this chapter, I present studies to test the hypothesis diversity leads to 
unconventional thinking, a decreased reliance on rules and decreased conformity to 
conventional values. Findings from Study 4 demonstrated that exposure to diversity leads 
people to prioritise autonomy over conformity when diversity is salient. In Study 5 it was 
found that diversity makes positive contact more likely which in turn decreases people’s 
reliance on rules and conventional values. Study 6 also showed a decreased reliance on 
rules and traditions for participants who reported very intense episodes of positive 
contact. In addition, participants with frequent positive contact were less willing to submit 
to authority. The Implications of these results for the understanding of the impact of 
diversity on values and norms as well as potential underlying mechanisms are discussed. 
 
The findings reported in Chapter 4 indicate that prolonged experiences of 
diversity are linked to impaired self-regulation, at least when diversity was made salient. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it seems plausible that these findings represent the activation 
of a mindset with a low reliance on cognitive rules and categories. This decreased 
attention towards cognitive rules and scripts should help in resolving categorical conflicts, 
but might also come at the expense of a more lenient monitoring of conflicts with 
behavioural rules. In other words, individuals with many experiences of diversity might, 
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under certain conditions, lean towards abandoning categorical thinking in favour of more 
unconventional and divergent thinking. 
The idea that experiencing diversity is linked to unconventional thinking is 
supported by a multitude of studies (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng et al., 2011, 2008; 
Gocłowska et al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Godart et al., 2015; Hellmanzik, 2013; 
Leung & Chiu, 2010; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Saad et al., 2013; 
also see Chapter 5). Divergent thinking seems to be linked to a generalised low reliance 
on rules, as demonstrated by the finding that participants with a lot of exposure to 
diversity are more likely to neglect absolute moral rules (Lu et al., 2017). Furthermore, 
experiences of diversity have also been linked to a low need for cognitive closure, 
indicating a low reliance on rules when making sense of one’s environment (Maddux et 
al. 2014; Vasiljevic & Crisp, 2013).  
A low reliance on rules and structure is not uncommon for individuals who excel 
in creative tasks. Divergent thinking requires the ability to break free from domain-
specific rules to create of unusual (i.e. creative) mental associations and combinations. 
This ability has been linked to a general tendency of creative individuals to feel 
unconstrained by rules (Bailin, 1987; Baucus et al., 2008; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). 
Consistent with this idea, groups displayed more creativity in discussions when members 
were low in Need for Closure (Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004). 
There is thus strong evidence to suggest that experiencing diversity in an 
ethnically diverse environment might lead to the development of a mindset favouring 
unconventional, divergent thinking that is relatively unconstrained by categorical rules 
and norms. Therefore, individuals might also feel less inclined to follow confirmatory 
pressure or conventional values. 
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In the following, I will present three studies that explore the influence of diversity 
on the reliance on rules and conventional norms for majority members. Following up on 
the findings from Chapter 4, these studies also serve to investigate if any effects of 
diversity are moderated by salient diversity. 
6.1 Study 4: Diversity and Social Conformity Values 
This study investigated if individuals who have frequently experienced diversity 
feel a lower desire for conformity when expecting diversity-related information (i.e. when 
diversity is salient). Such a change in norm perception might have partly been responsible 
for the down-regulation of self-control observed when diversity was made salient in 
Studies 1-3. In this study, participants’ norms regarding their desire for conformity were 
measured by the Social Conformity/Autonomy Scale (SCA; Feldman, 2003). This scale 
indicates the preference for norms that ensure social cohesion versus norms that 
emphasize social autonomy. In addition, this study examined the role of current 
experiences of diversity.  
6.1.1 Method 
Participants. For this study, 177 White British participants were recruited at the 
University of Sheffield. Students of all faculties were invited via email to participate in 
an online study on “beliefs and experiences of English Students”. In exchange for 
participation, students entered a prize draw for vouchers for several British shops. To 
participate, the student’s hometown had to be located in England, and the students had to 
access the survey from a non-mobile device. Ethnic membership was not indicated as a 
criterion as this might have made group membership overly salient which could have 
influenced the results. Instead, members of ethnic minorities (non-White British 
participants) were filtered out after data collection. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions (diversity salience or control). In the diversity salience condition, 
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participants were reminded of their experiences of diversity before they answered 
questions on social conformity values, their ability to delay gratification and general 
impulsivity. The participants (132 female, 45 male) were aged between 18 and 63 years 
(M = 23.69, SD = 7.74). One participant had missing data (i.e. did not answer all 
questions), leaving 176 participants with data for all variables. 
Procedure and materials. As in the previous two studies, participants received 
demographic questions and questions on their exposure to diversity. In addition, 
participants completed the questions on their positive interethnic contact used in Study 3. 
Measures for participant’s experience of diversity thus included their previous exposure 
to diversity as well as their early and current positive contact 10 . Participants also 
completed the ADOG and BIS-Brief from Study 1 and 2, as well as the Social 
Conformity/Autonomy Scale (SCA; Feldman, 2003). 
Social Conformity/Autonomy Scale (SCA). This scale measures the relative 
priority given to social conformity versus personal autonomy values (Feldman, 2003; see 
Appendix L for the full scale). Social conformity in the context of this scale is understood 
to ensure social cohesion and order through common behavioural norms. Such common 
norms, however, threaten values of personal freedom, because they place rules and 
restrictions on the individual. The SCA indicates how much participants value personal 
autonomy when it conflicts with their desire for social conformity. Participants who score 
high on the SCA have a strong preference for personal autonomy and an aversion to strict 
social norms. A low score on the SCA, on the other hand, indicates a strong desire for 
social conformity and adherence to a particular (i.e. non-diverse) set of norms. 
                                                 
 
10 This study was designed and conducted before study 3 (reported in Chapter 4) but is described here 
because it fits better conceptually with the other studies in this chapter. For this reason, we did not measure 
participant’s current exposure to diversity.  
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 The items in this scale force a choice between two statements (for example: “I 
believe that: A. It is most important to give people all the freedom they need to express 
themselves. Or B. Our society will break down if we allow people to do or say anything 
they want.”), and are scored on a 4-point scale: 1 – strongly agree with A, 2 – agree with 
A, 3 –agree with B, and 4 – strongly agree with B. The measure showed good internal 
consistency for this sample (Cronbach's α = .84). 
Conditions. As in Study 2 and 3, the order in which the materials were presented 
to participants depended on the condition. 
Diversity salience condition. After receiving demographic questions, participants 
answered questions about their exposure to diversity and positive interethnic contact. This 
served as a prime for their diversity experiences. Subsequently participants completed the 
ADOG, BIS-Brief and SCA (order of these scales was counter-balanced). 
Control condition. In the control condition, participants received the ADOG, BIS-
Brief, and SCA (again the order was counter-balanced) before answering the questions 
on their experiences of diversity. 
6.1.2 Results 
As in in the previous studies, I first assessed the necessity for a multilevel 
approach. Design effects for the dependent variables were very small for all geographic 
levels (district, county and region; DEs < 1.06). Therefore, a multilevel analysis was 
deemed unnecessary. All statistical tests were carried out with a level of significance of α 
= .05. All results were controlled for gender, age, subjective SES and communal SES. 
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. Participants that took an unusually long 
time to complete the questionnaire were excluded. This was done to ensure that 
participants paid sufficient attention to the questions and that the manipulation of 
diversity salience would be effective. The median time in minutes for completing the 
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study was Mdn = 10. Using the same criteria as in previous studies (see Chapter 4) all 
participants taking longer than 29 minutes were omitted from analysis. This led to the 
exclusion of 10 participants with 167 remaining participants (166 provided data for all 
variables).11 
As in previous studies, diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. 
Again, the distribution could be improved by performing a square root transformation on 
the data. The following analysis was therefore carried out with the square root 
transformed data for diversity. 
Self-regulation. To examine the effect of salient diversity and early experiences 
of diversity on self-regulation, a multivariate General Linear Model (GLM) was fitted to 
the data. ADOG and BIS scores were entered to the GLM as dependent variables. 
Condition, early exposure to diversity, early positive contact and current positive contact 
were treated as predictors.  
No significant effects on self-regulation emerged from the analysis, Willk's Λ > 
0.97, Fs < 2.13, ps > .12. The findings from previous studies were thus not replicated. 
Social Conformity/Autonomy. The impact of salient diversity and experiences 
of diversity on social conformity values was also examined. A univariate GLM was fitted 
with SCA as dependent variable and condition, early exposure to diversity, early positive 
contact, and current positive contact as predictors. 
Early positive contact predicted preference for autonomy over conformity across 
conditions, F (1, 154) = 8.71, p = .004, partial η² = .05, β = .51. Furthermore, early 
                                                 
 
11 The analysis led to similar conclusions when outliers were included with no significant effects on self-
regulation, Willk's Λ > 0.97, Fs < 1.92, ps > .15, a significant effect of positive contact on SCA, F (1, 164) 
= 5.38, p = .02, partial η² = .03, and a significant positive contact*condition interaction effect, F (1, 164) 
= 5.04, p = .03, partial η² = .03. 
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positive contact formed a significant interaction with condition, F (1, 154) = 4.01, p = .047, 
partial η² = .03. A moderation analysis in PROCESS revealed that positive contact had 
no impact in the control condition, standardised effect = .09, t (154) = .62, p = .53, 95% 
CI [.25, .78]. When diversity was salient, however, more frequent early positive contact 
predicted a stronger preference for autonomy over conformity values, standardised effect 
= .52, t (154) = 3.67, p < .001, 95% CI [-.20, .37]. This moderation effect can also be seen 
in Figure 5. 
No other main or interaction effects reached significance, Fs < .86, ps > .35. There 
was thus no effect of early exposure to diversity or current positive contact. 
 
 
Figure 5. Partial regression plots of early positive contact and Social 
Conformity/Autonomy (SCA) scores with fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. 
Higher scores on SCA indicate a preference of autonomy over social conformity. Partial 
regression plots are adjusted for control variables (age, gender, subjective SES, communal 
socioeconomic status), early exposure to diversity and current positive contact. 
 
Mediation analysis. Even though exposure to diversity had no effect on SCA in 
the previous analysis it is still important to test the hypothesis that effects of early 
exposure to diversity are mediated by positive contact. Diversity is a complex factor with 
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many potentially contradicting aspects. Indirect effects of exposure to diversity on SCA 
through positive contact might have been masked by other opposing factors contained 
within diversity exposure, such as an aggravating effect on negative contact, which in 
turn might have antagonizing effects on SCA. I therefore conducted a mediation analysis 
in PROCESS. As shown in Figure 6, the relationship between exposure to diversity and 
SCA was indeed mediated by positive contact. The standardised regression coefficient for 
the indirect effect was standardised ab = .19, 95% CI [.08, .32], meaning that a higher 
















Indirect effect: ab = .19, 95% CI [.08, .32]
 
Figure 6. Relationship between exposure to diversity and Social 
Conformity/Autonomy (SCA) as mediated by positive contact. Coefficients are 
standardised. The regression coefficient between early diversity and SCA, controlling for 
early positive contact, is given in parenthesis. Higher scores on SCA indicate a preference 
of autonomy over social conformity. †p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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It was also tested if these mediations were moderated by condition. For the 
mediated effect of diversity via positive contact the index for moderated mediation was 
significant (standardised index = .25, 95% CI [.01, .52]). As displayed in Figure 7, the 
indirect effect on autonomy values was present in the diversity salience condition, 
standardised ab = .30, 95% CI [.12, .52]. There was no effect in the control condition, ab 














Control condition: ab = .05, 95% CI [-.11, .21]





Figure 7. Relationship between exposure to diversity and Social 
Conformity/Autonomy (SCA) as mediated by positive contact and moderated by 
condition. Coefficients are standardised, except for interaction effects for condition. The 
regression coefficient between early diversity and SCA, controlling for early positive 
contact, is given in parenthesis. Higher scores on SCA indicate a preference of autonomy 
over social conformity. †p <.10 *p < .05. ***p < .001 
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Power analysis. The ability of this study to detect an interaction effect of diversity 
salience and diversity experiences on social conformity values was evaluated by a power 
analysis. The population effect size was estimated to be close to the interaction effects 
regarding cognitive inhibition found in Study 2 and 3, η² = .05. The power of this study 
for this population effect size was power = .84. Furthermore, this study had an appropriate 
sample size to detect a minimum population effect size of η² = .046 at power = .80. 
Since validating the interaction effect of diversity salience and diversity 
experiences on measures of cognitive inhibition was also a main goal of this study, I 
conducted a second power analysis. This power analysis evaluated the ability of this study 
to detect such a multivariate interaction effect. The population effect size was estimated 
to be η² = .05. The power of this study for this population effect size was power = .75. 
Furthermore, this study had an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum population 
effect size of η² = .056 at power = .80. 
Correlation between self-Regulation and Social Conformity/Autonomy 
Values. Unlike findings in earlier studies, diversity did not have any effect on self-
regulation. It was therefore not possible to test directly if the effect found in Studies 1-3 
might have been mediated by a change in autonomy values. However, it was still possible 
to assess the correlation between self-regulation measures and SCA to see if a change in 
autonomy values might theoretically have influenced self-regulation in previous studies. 
Social conformity values were indeed associated with both reports of low delay 
gratification, r (165) = -.23, p = .002, as well as with reports of high general impulsivity, 
r (165) = .21, p = .007. 
6.1.3 Discussion 
Findings indicated that diversity had an indirect effect on conformity/autonomy 
values via positive contact, leading to a preference for autonomy. However, this pattern 
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was only present when participants were reminded of their experiences of diversity. These 
findings are parallel to the effects of diversity on self-regulation in Study 2 and 3. 
In contrast to earlier studies, however, experiences of diversity had no effect on 
measures of self-regulation. Why previous findings could not be replicated is not clear, 
since the methodology of this study is very close to the previous studies, especially to 
Study 2. Still, the effect might have been weakened in this study, because the order of 
some questionnaires was counter-balanced. Study 2 did not use counter-balancing, and 
also contained less material. However, strong autonomy values were associated with 
strong impulsiveness and weak delay gratification. These findings indirectly support the 
idea that the effects of diversity on self-regulation might be at least partially explained by 
an increase in autonomy values. 
While early positive contact did predict preference for social autonomy when 
diversity was salient, current positive contact had no effect. This might indicate that 
diversity needs to be experienced for an extended period to influence fundamental value 
systems. Participants who report high levels of positive interethnic contact until they 
turned 18 are likely to have made such experiences for extended periods of time while 
they grew up. Positive interethnic contact in the past six months, however, is more likely 
to tap into experiences that are not necessarily experienced on a regular basis for a longer 
time. Furthermore, experiences of diversity that are made before the age of 18 might also 
have a stronger effect because they fall into a developmental period that is crucial for 
forming basic value systems. Fundamental value systems tend to be relatively stable over 
adult life, and stability of attitudes increases with age (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Sears & 
Funk, 1999). 
Findings from this study indicate that individuals who have experienced a lot of 
diversity might depend less on social norms when diversity is made salient. In this study, 
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values concerning social conformity and autonomy were affected by diversity and 
positive contact. However, it is possible that this decreased reliance on norms leads to a 
change in processing tendencies as well. In other words, participants might rely less on 
rules in general. Furthermore, Study 4 demonstrated that diversity is associated with more 
positive contact, which then in turn promotes values that emphasize autonomy over 
conforming to conventional norms. However, diversity might be related not only to 
positive contact but to negative contact as well for majority members (Koopmans & Veit, 
2014). Negative contact has been shown to promote more conventional values as 
measured by scales such as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Dhont & Van Hiel, 
2009). In other words, diversity might be linked to episodes of both positive and negative 
contact which in turn have opposing effects on the tendency to subscribe to conventional 
norms and rules. These possibilities were further investigated in Study 5. 
6.2 Study 5: Diversity, Rule Dependence and Conventional Values I 
This study investigated the effects of positive and negative interethnic contact on 
the reliance on conventional values as well as on rules in general. It was also examined 
whether any effects of positive or negative contact on norm perception or rule dependence 
were moderated by salient diversity. 
The Right-Wing Authoritarianism–conventionalism scale was used as an 
alternative measure for conventional values. For this study, structural equation modelling 
(SEM) was employed to separate effects of diversity on values and rule-dependence. 
Additionally, this study also evaluated the effects of positive and negative contact. This 
allowed me to test a model in which diversity leads to more positive and negative contact 
which in turn affect rule independence and adherence to conventional norms. Two 
separate models were fitted for early and current diversity. This way it could be 
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investigated if past and current experiences of diversity had a similar impact on the 
dependent variables (also see Figure 9 below for a diagram of the models tested). 
6.2.1 Method 
Participants. For this study, 217 White British participants were recruited via 
prolificacademic.co.uk, an online platform for conducting academic studies. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (diversity salience or control). In the 
diversity salience condition, participants were reminded of their experiences of diversity 
before they answered questions on rule independence, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) 
and system justification. To participate, the student's hometown had to be located in 
England, and participants had to access the survey from a non-mobile device. The 
participants (110 females, 106 males, 1 other) were aged between 17 and 59 years (M = 
25.82, SD = 8.59). Some participants had missing data. 209 participants provided data for 
all variables. 
Procedure and materials. As in the previous two studies, participants received 
demographic questions (identical to previous studies) and questions on their experiences 
of diversity. They also completed a set of questions on rule-dependence and RWA-
conventionalism. 
Experiences of diversity. Participants' early exposure to diversity was again 
assessed via a composite measure of their objective and subjective exposure to diversity 
in their home district. The material for these measures was identical to Study 4. To gain a 
more complete picture, participants' positive as well as negative interethnic contact while 
growing up was measured. Additionally, participants' current objective exposure to 
diversity was measured as well as their current level of positive and negative interethnic 
contact. 
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Interethnic contact. Participants received questions on their positive and negative 
interethnic contact. The scale for positive contact contained the same two questions from 
Study 3 and 4 but one additional question to measure negative contact was included as 
well 12  (“How often did somebody pester you that was from an ethnic background 
different from your own?”). The questions were scored on a Likert scale from 1 (never) 
to 5 (very often). Participants were asked about their interethnic contact while growing up 
as well as their current level of contact in the past 6 months (see Appendix M for the full 
scale). 
Current objective exposure to diversity. For participants who were currently living 
in England (n = 181), current objective exposure to diversity was assessed in the same 
manner as diversity for their home district. This was based on their reported place of 
residence. 
Rule independence. To assess how far participants felt unconstrained by rules, 
participants were presented with a set of three pictures (taken from Gino & Wiltermuth, 
2014), each of which displayed people deviating the norms in some form (displayed in 
Figure 8).  Participants responded to the question "If you were in the situation depicted in 
the picture, to what extent would you care about following the rules?" on a 7-point scale 
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much). The full scale can be found in Appendix N. The measure 
showed acceptable internal consistency in this study (Cronbach's α = .67). 
 
                                                 
 
12 The scale originally contained additional questions for positive and negative contact concerning the 
emotional content of interethnic encounters, for example: 'Now think about your encounters with people 
from ethnic backgrounds different from your own. How often did you experience the following emotions? 
- Angry'. However, preliminary factor analysis revealed that these items load on a different factor, 
representing the quality of interethnic contact. These items were therefore dropped from analysis. A refined 
scale measuring both quantity and quality of contact was used in Study 6. 




Figure 8. Images used in Study 5 to assess in how far participants felt unconstrained by 
social rules. 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism-conventionalism (RWA-conventionalism). Three 
items from the RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1996) were used to assess participants’ right-wing 
authoritarianism. These items were selected to represent the conventionalism facet of 
RWA (based on Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). Individuals high in RWA-
conventionalism believe that members in society should be required to follow traditions 
and social norms (Altemeyer, 2007). This scale is thus conceptually similar to the SCA 
scale employed in Study 4. Items contained questions such as "Everyone should have 
their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them 
different from everyone else." (reversed item), and were rated on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The full scale is reported in Appendix O. This 
scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency in this study (Cronbach's α = .79). 
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Conditions. As in Study 2 and 3, the order in which these materials were presented 
to participants depended on the condition. 
Diversity salience condition. After receiving demographic questions, participants 
answered questions about their exposure to diversity and interethnic contact. This served 
as a prime for their diversity experiences. Subsequently participants completed questions 
on rule independence, right-wing authoritarianism and system justification. 
Control condition. In the control condition, participants received questions on rule 
independence, right-wing authoritarianism and system justification before the questions 
on their experiences of diversity. 
6.2.2 Results 
I first assessed the necessity for a multilevel approach. Design effects for the 
dependent variables were very small for all geographic levels (district, county and region) 
for early as well as current place of residence (DEs < 1.26). Therefore, a multilevel 
analysis was not conducted. All statistical tests were carried out with a level of 
significance of α = .05. All models reported below were controlled for gender, age, 
subjective SES and communal SES for home district and current district. All reported 
path coefficients are standardised. 
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. Participants that took an unusually long 
time to complete the questionnaire were excluded from analysis. The median time in 
minutes for completing the study was Mdn = 7. Using the same criteria as in previous 
studies all participants taking longer than 21 minutes to complete the study were omitted 
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from analysis. This led to the exclusion of one participant with 216 remaining participants 
(208 provided data for all variables).13 
Home district diversity as well as the separate scores for past subjective diversity 
had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution of home district 
diversity could be improved by performing a logarithmic transformation on the data. The 
distribution of the indices for subjective diversity could be improved by performing a 
square root transformation on the data. The following analysis was carried out with the 
logarithmic transformed data for home district diversity and the square root transformed 
data for subjective diversity scores. 
Correlations. The estimated intercorrelations between the different latent and 
observed factors, including control variables, are displayed in Table 9. 
Structural equation models. As discussed above, the main goal of this study was 
to test the plausibility of a model in which diversity leads to more positive and negative 
contact which in turn affect rule independence and adherence to conventional norms. 
Such a model was fitted separately for early and current experiences of diversity (see 
below for a combined model which models both early and current diversity). The 
hypothesized models were tested by applying path analysis in Mplus 7. The two main 
models tested in this study are shown in Figure 9.  
                                                 
 
13 The inclusion of this one outlier in the SEM-Analysis lead to identical conclusion with almost identical 
fit indices for the tested models and only very minimal differences for the reported path coefficients. 





Figure 9. Main models tested in Study 5. 
  





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DIVERSITY, RULE INDEPENDENCE AND NORM PERCEPTION 128 
 
 
I first tested a model with diversity in one's home district predicting positive and 
negative contact which in turn predict rule-dependence and RWA (Figure 9A). The 
model showed an acceptable fit, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .92. The results for the modelled 
paths are shown in Figure 10. A high amount of positive contact predicted both lower 
levels of RWA-conventionalism, β = -.22, p = .03 as well as stronger tendency to 
disregard rules, β = .31, p = .01. Negative contact, on the other hand, predicted neither 
RWA-conventionalism nor rule independence, ps > .13. Rule independence and RWA-
conventionalism were unrelated in this model, underscoring that these were distinct 
latent factors, β = .02, p = .89. 
 
Figure 10. Results for model A in Study 5. Path coefficients are standardised. The 
model is controlled for gender, age, subjective socioeconomic status, communal 
socioeconomic status and minority membership (not displayed for simplicity). Solid lines 
highlight significant paths, while dotted lines highlight non-significant paths.  *p < .05. 
**p < .01. ***p < .001 
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It was also tested whether salient diversity moderated the paths to the dependent 
variables. However, none of the tests for moderation reached significance, χ²s < = 2.04, 
ps > .15. 
A parallel model was also tested using current experiences of diversity rather than 
past experiences (Figure 9B). This model provided an excellent fit to the data, RMSEA 
< .001, CFI = 1.00. The model results are shown in Figure 11. Current positive contact 
predicted lower levels of RWA-conventionalism, β = -.21, p = .02. However, it did not 
significantly predict rule independence, β = .09, p = .37. Negative contact also predicted 
RWA-conventionalism, β = .25, p =.005. Objective exposure to diversity did predict 
positive contact, β = .25, p = .002, but not negative contact, β = .05, p = .55. Participants 
who experienced frequent positive contact were also more likely to experience more 
frequent negative contact as well, β = .20, p = .02. 
It was also tested whether the salience of diversity moderated the paths to the 
dependent variables. A trend indicated moderation of the path from positive contact 
leading to rule independence, χ²(1) = 3.3, p = .07: While positive contact in the control 
condition predicted more independence from rules, β = .23, p = .08, the relationship 
reversed when diversity was salient, β = -.11, p = .40. This trend runs counter to the 
expected pattern, but it is possible that adding questions on negative contact has 
effectively changed the experimental manipulation. The additional questions might have 
reminded participants primarily of negative experiences of diversity, either reversing or 
neutralizing the effect found in previous studies which had used questions with a neutral 
or positive framing. No other test for moderation reached significance, χ²s < = 1.8, ps 
> .19. 




Figure 11. Results for model B in Study 5. Path coefficients are standardised. The 
model is controlled for gender, age, subjective socioeconomic status, communal 
socioeconomic status and minority membership (not displayed for simplicity). Solid lines 
highlight significant paths, while dotted lines highlight non-significant paths. *p < .05. **p 
< .01. ***p < .001 
 
A further model that was tested was a combined model, containing both past and 
current experiences of diversity (Figure 12), but the model provided a poor fit for the data, 
as indicated by the fit indices, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .82. The model results are still shown 
in Figure 13 for the sake of completeness, but parameters of this model should be 
interpreted with caution due to the bad fit. 
 
  




Figure 12. Diagram for the combined model tested in Study 5. 
 
 
Figure 13. Results for the combined model in Study 5. Path coefficients are 
standardised. The model is controlled for gender, age, subjective socioeconomic status, 
communal socioeconomic status and minority membership (not displayed for simplicity). 
Solid lines highlight significant paths, while dotted lines highlight non-significant paths. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 




Study 5 showed that diversity makes positive contact more likely, which in turn 
promotes rule independence as well as unconventional beliefs and norms. These were 
separate effects, and rule independence and RWA-conventionalism beliefs were not 
correlated. However, the most stable effect was that of positive contact on RWA-
conventionalism as it was evident both for past as well as for current contact. Effects of 
positive contact on rule independence was only present for past positive contact.  For the 
effect of negative contact on RWA-conventionalism on the other hand, reliable effects 
were only observed for current negative contact, counteracting the effects of positive 
contact. 
In contrast to Studies 2 and 3, salient diversity did not reliably moderate the effects 
of experienced diversity. A possible explanation is that questions on negative contact were 
added for this study to better understand the influence of different types of contact. 
However, this is likely to have affected the manipulation of diversity salience itself. The 
additional questions might have reminded participants primarily of negative experiences 
of diversity due to their greater emotional impact (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, 
& Vohs, 2001). This might have erased the effect found in previous studies, which had 
used questions with a neutral or positive framing. To address this problem a further study 
was conducted in which participants only reported on their positive diversity experiences, 
similar to previous studies. 
6.3 Study 6: Diversity, Rule Dependence and Conventional Values II 
This study was designed to determine whether effects of diversity on conventional 
values and rule independence would be modified by the salience of positive diversity 
experiences. This study also delved deeper into the effects of different aspects of positive 
contact. In the previous studies items measuring positive contact focussed on the 
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frequency of everyday contact. As a result, the effect of the quality of contact has been 
neglected. In this study quality of contact was measured in addition to the frequency of 
contact. 
6.3.1 Method 
Participants. For this study, 98 White British participants were recruited via 
prolificacademic.co.uk, but also through promoting the study at the University of 
Sheffield. Participants completed the study online and were then either awarded with 
monetary payment (prolificacademic.co.uk) or with a spot in a raffle for a High-Street 
Voucher (University of Sheffield). To participate, the participant's hometown had to be 
located in England. Also, participants had to be students, and had to access the survey 
from a non-mobile device. The participants (66 females, 31 males, 1 other) were aged 
between 18 and 55 years (M = 27.54, SD = 9.82). Some participants had missing data. 87 
participants provided data for all variables.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (diversity salience or control). In the diversity salience condition, participants 
were reminded of their diversity experiences before they continued with the RWA and 
rule independence scale. 
As in the previous two studies, participants received demographic questions 
(identical to previous studies) and questions on their experiences of diversity. They also 
completed a set of questions on rule-independence (identical to Study 4) and RWA 
(conventionalism and submission facet). 
Experiences of diversity. To measure the experienced diversity, participants 
received the same material as in Study 4. Additionally, participants received questions on 
their current subjective exposure to diversity. Participants also received additional 
questions on their interethnic positive contact to measure the quality of their contact. 
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Current subjective exposure to diversity. Participants estimated the distribution of 
the four major ethnic groups in the UK (White British, White other, Asian/Asian British, 
and Black/Black British) for members of their university. They also estimated the 
distribution of ethnic groups for people living in their current neighbourhood (see 
Appendix F for the full scale). From these estimates, an index for current subjective 
exposure to diversity was computed, using the same method as for subjective home 
district diversity (see Study 1). 
Quality of interethnic contact. Frequency of interethnic positive contact was 
measured with the same two questions as in Study 4. However, three more questions were 
added, assessing the quality of positive contact. Participants were asked to indicate the 
frequency of positive emotions during interethnic contact: “Now think about your 
encounters with people from ethnic backgrounds different from your own. How often did 
you experience the following emotions?”. Participants indicated the frequency for three 
positive emotions (“satisfied”, “cheerful”, “enthusiastic”) on a Likert-scale from 1 
(never) to 5 (very often). The full scale can be seen in Appendix E. The scale showed 
excellent internal consistency for both past as well as current positive contact, Cronbach's 
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Table 10  
Intercorrelations for Positive Contact Measures in Study 6. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Hometown: Positive Contact - Frequency -    
2. Hometown: Positive Contact - Quality .39*** -   
3. Past 6 Months: Positive Contact - Frequency .29** .39*** -  
4. Past 6 Months: Positive Contact - Quality .23* .58*** .74*** - 
Note: Degrees of freedom for all significance tests was df = 92. 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). This study contained items measuring the 
conventionalism and submission facet of RWA. The conventionalism facet represents the 
conviction that people should be required to follow traditions and social norms. Items 
contained questions such as “Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religous beliefs, 
and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else”. The 
submission facet of RWA represents the willingness to submit to the established authority. 
Items contained questions such as “Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should learn”. This study included a selection of four items for 
conventionalism and three for submission. Selection of this item was based on the factor 
analysis carried out by Mavor et al. (2010).14 The selected items are reported in Appendix 
P. Items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
                                                 
 
14  The original RWA scale also contains items measuring the aggressiveness facet, indicating the 
predisposition to cause harm to deviants or outgroups and to believe that this aggression is sanctioned by 
established authorities (Altemeyer, 1996). However, no items measuring RWA-aggressiveness were 
included in this study, because no predictions were made regarding the effect of diversity on RWA-
aggressiveness. Diversity was expected to lead to a tendency towards unconventional thinking and hence 
lead to lower levels of conventionalism and a decreased willingness to submit to authority to uphold 
conventional values. However, a tendency towards unconventional thinking should not affect 
aggressiveness towards deviants. 
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Conditions. As in previous studies, the order in which these materials were 
presented to participants depended on the condition. 
Diversity salience condition. After receiving demographic questions, participants 
answered questions about their exposure to diversity and positive interethnic contact. This 
served as a prime for their diversity experiences. Subsequently participants completed 
questions on rule independence and right-wing authoritarianism. 
Control condition. In the control condition, participants received questions on rule 
independence, and right-wing authoritarianism before questions on their experienced 
diversity. 
6.3.2 Results 
I first assessed the necessity for a multilevel approach. Design effects for the 
dependent variables were very small for all geographic levels (district, county and region) 
for early as well as current place of residence (DEs < 1.18). Therefore, a multilevel 
analysis was not conducted. All statistical tests were carried out with a level of 
significance of α = .05. All results reported below were controlled for gender, age, 
subjective SES and communal SES for home district and current district.  
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. Participants that took an unusually long 
time to complete the questionnaire were excluded from analysis. The median time in 
minutes for completing the study was Mdn = 11. Using the same criteria as in previous 
studies all participants taking longer than 36 minutes to complete the study were omitted 
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from analysis. This led to the exclusion of 4 participants with 94 remaining participants 
(84 provided data for all variables).15 
Past diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution 
could be improved by performing a square root transformation on the data. The following 
analysis was therefore carried out with the square root transformed data for past diversity. 
In contrast, current diversity showed a normal distribution. 
Effect of home district diversity on rule independence and RWA. To determine 
the effect of diversity on rule independence and RWA, a GLM was fitted to the data. 
Dependent variables in the GLM were rule independence, RWA-conventionalism and 
RWA-submission. The diversity salience condition, diversity of participants' home district 
as well as frequency and quality of positive interethnic contact while growing up were 
entered as independent variables. The three Interaction-terms of condition with each of 
the other independent variables were also entered as independent variables. The same 
control variables were used as covariates as in the previous studies.  
The dependent variables were significantly affected by the frequency of positive 
contact, Willk's Λ = 0.87, F (3, 70) = 3.38, p = .02, partial η² = .13, as well as by the 
quality of contact, Willk's Λ = 0.80, F (3, 70) = 5.78, p = .001, partial η² = .20. The 
multivariate effect of diversity was approaching significance, Willk’s Λ = 0.92, F (3, 70) 
= 2.35, p = .08, partial η² = .09. There were no reliable main effect or interaction effects 
                                                 
 
15 When outliers where included for the analysis, findings are mostly similar to the analysis without outliers: 
Frequency of early positive contact still had a significant multivariate effect, Willk's Λ = 0.88, F (3, 73) = 
3.38, p = .02, partial η² = .12, as did quality of early contact Willk's Λ = 0.81, F (3, 73) = 5.62, p = .002, 
partial η² = .19. The effect of early exposure to diversity, however, was no longer marginally significant, 
Willk's Λ = 0.93, F (3, 70) = 1.93, p = .13, partial η² = .07. There were still no other reliable effects on the 
dependent variables, Fs < 0.84 ps > .47. For current diversity, findings with outliers differed in the sense 
that the multivariate effect of quality of current contact only approached significance, Willk's Λ = 0.92, F 
(3, 81) = 2.33, p = .08, partial η² = .08. 
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with condition, Willk’s Λs > 0.96, Fs < .82, ps > .49. The effect of exposure to diversity 
or contact on the dependent variables was therefore not affected by condition. These 
multivariate main effects were further explored by separate univariate tests for the 
dependent variables. Univariate results were obtained by fitting separate univariate GLMs 
for rule independence, RWA-conventionalism and RWA-submission with the same 
predictors as for the multivariate analysis. 
Rule independence. Quality of contact lead to more rule independence, F (1, 72) 
= 5.20, p = .03, partial η² = .07, β = .41 while the frequency of positive contact or the 
level of exposure to diversity had no reliable effect, Fs < 0.23, ps > .63. 
RWA-conventionalism. Quality of contact also lead to less RWA-conventionalism, 
F (1, 72) = 9.43, p = .003, partial η² = .12, β = -53. Frequency of contacts or the level of 
exposure to diversity had no effect on RWA-conventionalism, Fs < 0.54, ps > .46. 
RWA-submission. More frequent positive contact predicted lower levels of 
submission, F (1, 72) = 6.26, p = .02, partial η² = .08, β = -.29. Higher levels of diversity 
predicted higher levels of RWA-submission, F (1, 72) = 5.98, p = .02, partial η² = .08, β 
= .31. Quality of contact, on the other hand, had no effect on submission.  
Effect of current experiences of diversity on rule independence and RWA. A 
similar GLM was fitted for current diversity. This model used objective and subjective 
diversity of the current residence as well as frequency and quality of positive contact of 
the past 6 months as predictors. Quality of positive contact emerged as a significant 
multivariate predictor, Willk's Λ = 0.89, F (3, 75) = 2.95, p = .04, partial η² = .11. No 
other main effect or interaction effects with condition reached significance, Willk’s Λs > 
0.92, Fs < 1.94, ps > .13. The effect of diversity or contact on the dependent variables 
was therefore not affected by condition. Following up with separate univariate GLMs for 
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each dependent variable revealed that high-quality positive contact predicted lower levels 
of conventionalism, F (1, 77) = 7.31, p = .01, partial η² = .09, β = -.35. 
Power analysis. The ability of this study to detect a multivariate interaction effect 
of salient diversity and diversity experiences on the dependent variables was evaluated 
by a power analysis. The population effect size was estimated to be η² = .05. The power 
of this study for this population effect size was only power = .40. Furthermore, this study 
had an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum population effect size of η² = .11 at 
power = .80. 
6.3.3 Discussion 
A high frequency of positive contact in the past predicted a low willingness to 
submit to established authorities. Individuals who experienced a lot of high-quality 
positive contact on the other hand were more likely to feel less constrained by rules and 
to belief people should not have to follow conventional norms and traditions. These 
effects were generally unaffected by the salience of diversity so these results mirror 
findings from Study 5 in which positive interethnic contact was linked to less 
conventional values regardless of the salience of diversity. It is thus possible that past and 
current experiences of diversity lead to a lower reliance on rules and norms across 
different situations. Together these results support the idea that positive experiences of 
diversity are connected to a decreased reliance on rules and authority as well as an 
increased preference for unconventional beliefs and opinions.  
6.4 General Discussion 
Over three studies frequent positive contact lead to a decreased reliance on 
categorical rules. This manifested itself in a decreased preference for conformity (Study 
4), and a decreased reliance on rules and conventional values (Study 5 & 6). Positive 
contact thus seemed to drive the major changes resulting from diversity. It should be noted 
DIVERSITY, RULE INDEPENDENCE AND NORM PERCEPTION 140 
 
 
that these findings mirror the results from Study 3 (Chapter 4) in the sense that the key 
component of diversity driving cognitive change was positive contact. Together these 
findings suggest that positive contact is an important part of diversity in promoting 
cognitive change and that part of this change involves a low adherence to rules and social 
norms.  
The reliance on rules and norms seems to be more strongly influenced by early 
episodes of positive contact than more recent ones. Early positive interethnic contact was 
consistently linked to a low reliance on rules and norms through all three studies. Recent 
positive contact was still predicting a low level of conventionalism in two studies (Study 
5 and 6), but had no impact on general rule independence or on attitudes towards social 
conformity. This might indicate that positive experiences of diversity before adulthood 
are more fundamental to one’s approach towards social rules than recent experiences. 
The effects of positive contact on rule independence and norm perception were 
visible across conditions in Study 5 and 6, but in Study 4 they were only present when 
diversity was salient. The findings so far are thus inconclusive on whether frequent 
positive contact affects reliance on rules across situations or only when diversity was 
salient. At present, however, evidence seems to be more in favour of the idea that frequent 
positive contact leads to a decreased reliance of categorical rules in general, unaffected 
by the salience of diversity.16 
These results indicate that a decreased reliance on rules across situations is part of 
the long-term cognitive response to repeated episodes of positive interethnic contact. 
                                                 
 
16 This conclusion is also supported by a meta-analysis of Studies 4-6. This meta-analysis is reported in 
Chapter 8, together with meta-analyses of other effects reported in this thesis. Generally, there was no 
evidence for a moderating effect of salient diversity. Frequent positive contact while growing up was overall 
associated with less conventionalism, r = -.19, p < .001. 
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Positive contact in turn seems to be a consequence of living in an interethnically diverse 
environment, since diversity was associated with more positive contact throughout all 
three studies presented in this chapter. However, results from Study 5 suggest that 
diversity is also related to more negative contact as well. Similar effects of diversity on 
positive and negative contact for majority members have been found before (Koopmans 
& Veit 2014). This signifies that diversity is a complex and multifaceted factor which can 
promote factors with opposing effects. This idea is also reflected in an inconsistent 
mediation pattern reported by Schmid et al. (2013). In this study, diversity showed a 
positive indirect effect on trust via positive contact and reduced threat, but diversity also 
had a negative direct effect on trust. This direct effect might have been caused via the 
remaining influence of diversity on negative contact. In either case, these findings suggest 
that diversity can promote negative as well as positive contact. An important question that 
remains for future research will be to determine the moderating factors that maximize the 
influence of diversity on positive contact and minimizes its influence on negative 
encounters. Potential moderators include perceived threat, which might facilitate negative 
contact (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Devine et al., 2001; Schmid et al., 2014), or 
favourable attitudes towards immigrants, which might promote positive contact (B. P. H. 
Hui, Chen, Leung, & Berry, 2015; Pettigrew, 1998). Understanding how diversity can 
lead to episodes of positive contact should be especially important since positive contact 
seems to be the key factor for long-term cognitive change in response to diverse 
environments. 
To reiterate the main findings in this chapter, findings from three studies 
consistently demonstrated that living in an ethnically diverse area is linked to positive 
interethnic contact. Positive contact was associated with a tendency to reject conformity 
and feeling unconstrained by rules and conventional norms. An underlying theme of these 
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findings is that participants who experienced a lot of diversity seem to show flexibility 
towards categorical thinking (such as explicit rules or norms). Categories are primarily a 
mechanism to simplify and speed up processing of information by enforcing structure 
(McGarty et al., 2004), and categorical structure is the epistemic core of rule or norm 
adherence. A low reliance on categorical thinking should therefore also go hand in hand 
with tolerance towards ambiguous information with low structure as indicated by a low 
need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
This idea was further explored in three studies presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: DIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC NEEDS 
 
Findings from Studies 4-6 suggest that experiencing diversity is associated with a 
flexible stance towards cognitive categories. Categorical thinking, however, satisfies the 
epistemic needs for cognitive closure and structure, because it structures perceptions and 
enables quick judgements and decisions. Decreased categorical thinking should thus be 
accompanied by a higher tolerance towards ambiguity and uncertainty, as indicated by a 
low need for closure and a low need for structure. If categorical thinking is reduced in 
response to diversity, it should consequently also lead to a decreased need for closure and 
structure. This idea was tested in three studies presented in this chapter. Across 3 studies 
frequent positive contact was found to be associated with a low need for cognitive closure 
(Study 7a & 7b) and a low need for structure (Study 8). Implications of these results and 
the common themes of findings in this and the previous chapter are discussed. 
 
In Chapter 5 I presented a revised version of the CPAG model (Crisp & Turner, 
2011) by specifying a new adaptation process to diversity. The hypothesised adaptation 
process involves a reduced reliance on categorical thinking and cognitive flexibility 
towards categorical boundaries. Such flexibility towards categories has been commonly 
observed as a result of experiences of diversity in creativity tasks (e.g. Cheng et al., 2011; 
Gocłowska et al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Gutierrez & Sameroff, 2008; Maddux 
et al., 2010; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012). I predicted that this flexible stance on 
categorical information should generalise and manifest itself for the perception of social 
norms. This hypothesis was tested for majority members in three studies reported in the 
previous chapter. These studies demonstrated that experiences of diversity for majority 
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members indeed lead to favouring an aversion towards conventional traditions, rules and 
confirmatory pressure.  
Social rules inform human behaviour by offering behavioural scripts, organised 
sequences of stereotypical behaviour that are regarded as appropriate for a specific 
category of situation. The behavioural scripts associated with norms represent a form of 
schemata. They thus serve the same purpose as other categorical rules in the sense that 
they structure information and simplify decision-making by offering shared behavioural 
scripts for various situations (e.g. eating out might activate a “restaurant” script, which 
includes the behavioural script of “tipping the waiter”, Abelson, 1981; Bicchieri, 2005; 
Raven & Rubin, 1976; Schank & Abelson, 1977).  
The reliance on such social rules was reduced for people who have experienced a 
lot of positive contact in Studies 4-6. This fits with the idea that experiences of diversity 
promote a flexible stance on categorical information in general. It also suggests that 
participants who experienced a lot of diversity are more comfortable with complex 
information as they seem to rely less on categorical thinking to simplify and structure 
their perception. In other words, they are more tolerant towards uncertainty and have a 
low desire to seek immediate closure by resolving ambiguity through categorical 
structures. 
It therefore follows that individuals who experienced a lot of diversity should 
score low on the Need for Closure scale (NFCC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster 
& Kruglanski, 1994). Need for closure has been associated with many factors that have a 
negative relationship with diversity. Need for Closure has been found to relate to 
heightened conformity (Chirumbolo et al., 2004; De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & 
Pierro, 1999; Fu et al., 2007) and conservative values (Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004; 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Kossowska & Hiel, 2003; Onraet, Van Hiel, 
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Roets, & Cornelis, 2011). Individuals high in NFCC prefer to be guided by clear and 
absolute rules, as demonstrated in their preference of absolute moral systems with 
unambiguous rules without exceptions (Van Kenhove, Vermeir, & Verniers, 2001). 
Furthermore, individuals with high NFCC tend to do well on cognitive control tasks that 
involve clear and specific rules (Kossowska et al., 2014; Kossowska, 2007a, 2007b). 
Preference for conformity, conservative values and clear unambiguous rules have 
thus been linked to high levels of NFCC but have also been found to be low among 
participants with a lot of diversity experiences in Studies 4-6. In a similar vein, previous 
studies have also found that experiencing diversity can foster relativistic moral attitudes 
(Lu et al., 2017). High NFCC has also been linked to strong performance on simple 
cognitive control tasks, precisely the type of task participants with a lot of diversity 
experience performed poorly on when diversity was made salient in Studies 1-3. A 
lowered need for cognitive closure due to experiences of diversity might therefore 
indicate why participants in the preceding studies who had experienced a lot of diversity 
tended to prefer less conformity, were low in conservative values, and showed impaired 
self-regulation when diversity was salient. 
Hence, a low need for closure might reflect the underlying adaptation process to 
diversity which involves a flexible stance on cognitive rules and norms and a high degree 
of tolerance towards uncertainty. In support of this idea, spontaneously diversifying 
experiences have been found to lead to a decreased need for cognitive closure (Tadmor, 
Hong, et al., 2012). However, the effect of multicultural experiences on NFCC in this 
work has only been demonstrated by either inducing multicultural experiences in the lab 
or by measuring multicultural experiences using the MES. Such findings are certainly 
well suited to demonstrate the effect of experiencing diversity in general on NFCC. 
However, it is unclear if this relationship generalises to the experiences of majority 
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member living in an ethnically diverse environment. Effects of induced multicultural 
experiences might not necessarily lead to a prolonged decrease in need for closure, and 
the types of experiences of diversity tapped by the MES are too broad to allow specific 
conclusions about the experiences of diversity of majority members. Furthermore, Studies 
1-4 raise the possibility that some responses to diversity are only active when diversity is 
salient. Thus, individuals might possess the ability to process stimuli with great cognitive 
flexibility, relying relatively little on rigid categorical boundaries. However, they might 
only switch to such a mode of processing when it is relevant, namely when it is likely that 
they will process socially diverse stimuli (i.e. when diversity is salient). It therefore seems 
reasonable to test whether effects of diversity on NFCC only occur when diversity is made 
salient. 
This prediction was tested in three studies described below. More specifically, 
these studies examined how experiences of diversity influence the desire for clear 
structure and cognitive closure, and if this influence would be moderated by salient 
diversity. 
7.1 Study 7a: Diversity and Need for Cognitive Closure 
This study examined the extent to which exposure to diversity and positive contact 
lead to a decreased need for cognitive closure, and if this effect was moderated by the 
salience of diversity.  
7.1.1 Method 
Participants. For this study, 127 White British participants were recruited via 
prolificacademic.co.uk in exchange for monetary payment. To participate, the 
participant's hometown had to be located in England. Also, he or she had to be a student, 
and had to access the survey from a non-mobile device. The participants (47 female, 80 
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male) were aged between 16 and 65 years (M = 25.28, SD = 7.29). Some participants had 
missing data. 119 participants provided data for all variables.  
Procedure and materials. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (diversity salience or control). In the diversity salience condition, participants 
were reminded of their experiences of diversity before they continued questions on their 
need for cognitive closure. 
As in the previous two studies, participants received demographic questions 
(identical to previous studies) and questions on their experiences of diversity. They also 
completed the need for cognitive closure scale. 
Experiences of diversity. To measure experiences of diversity, participants 
received the same questions on past and current subjective exposure to diversity, 
frequency and quality of positive contact as in Study 6. An additional question was added 
to the frequency of positive contact scale (“How often did you have positive contact with 
people from ethnic backgrounds different from your own?”). Two items were added to 
the quality of positive contact scale (Feeling “grateful” and “inspired” during interethnic 
exchanges). Both expanded scales showed good or better internal consistencies 
Cronbach's αs > .88.  
Need for cognitive closure. Need for cognitive closure was assessed using the 
Need for Closure Scale developed by (Webster & Kruglanski 1994; reported in Appendix 
Q). It captures the epistemic need to achieve firm, definite answers to ambiguous 
problems. Need for closure is measured by items such as “I enjoy having a clear and 
structured mode of life.”. Items are scored on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 
6 = strongly agree). The scale showed good internal consistency in this study, Cronbach's 
α = .85. 
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Conditions. As in previous studies, the order in which these materials were 
presented to participants depended on the condition. 
Diversity salience condition. After receiving demographic questions, participants 
answered questions about their exposure to diversity and positive interethnic contact. This 
served as a prime for diversity. Subsequently, participants completed the Need for 
Cognitive Closure scale. 
Control condition. In the control condition, participants received the NFCC scale 
before continuing with questions on their experiences of diversity. 
7.1.2 Results 
As for Studies 2-6, the data is theoretically nested within the geographic area of 
participants’ home districts. However, a conventional unilevel analysis is still likely to 
produce unbiased estimators if the underestimation of standard errors due to clustering 
is relatively low (Maas & Hox, 2005). The underestimation of the standard error due to 
clustering can be indicated by the design effect. A design effect below two is considered 
small and indicates that a conventional unilevel analysis should not lead to overly 
misleading results (Maas & Hox, 2005; Muthen & Satorra, 1995, also see Chapter 4). 
I therefore first assessed the necessity for a multilevel approach. Design effects 
for the dependent variables were very small for all geographic levels (district, county 
and region) for early as well as current place of residence (DEs < 1.24). Therefore, a 
multilevel analysis was not conducted. All statistical tests were carried out with a level 
of significance of α = .05. All results reported below were controlled for gender, age, 
subjective SES and communal SES for home district and current district.  
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. To ensure that participants paid sufficient 
attention to the questions and that the manipulation of diversity salience would be 
effective, participants who took an unusually long time to complete the questionnaire 
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were excluded from analysis, using the same criteria as in the previous studies. The 
median time in minutes for completing the study was Mdn = 9. Using the same criteria as 
in previous studies all participants taking longer than 34 minutes were omitted from 
analysis. This led to the exclusion of one participant with 126 remaining participants (118 
provided data for all variables).17 
Early diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution 
could be improved by performing a square root transformation on the data. The following 
analysis was therefore carried out with the square root transformed data for past diversity. 
In contrast, current diversity showed a normal distribution. 
Early experiences of diversity and NFCC. The effect of early experiences of 
diversity on need for closure was investigated by fitting a GLM to the data. Diversity of 
participants' home district as well as frequency and quality of positive interethnic contact 
while growing up were entered as independent variables and need for cognitive closure 
(NFCC) was treated as the dependent variable. The same controls were added to the 
model as covariates as in the previous studies.  
Need for closure was significantly affected by the condition*frequency of contact 
interaction, F (1, 106) = 5.20, p = .03, partial η² = .05. It was also significantly predicted 
by the condition*quality of contact interaction, F (1, 106) = 9.76, p = .002, partial η² = .08. 
                                                 
 
17  Inclusion of the outlier lead to similar conclusions for early diversity, with a significant 
condition*frequency of contact interaction, F (1, 107) = 4.73, p = .03, partial η² = .04, and a significant 
condition*quality of contact interaction, F (1, 107) = 9.21, p = .003, partial η² = .08. No other main effect 
or interaction effect reached significance when the outlier was included, Fs < .42, ps > .52. Regarding recent 
diversity, inclusion of the outlier also made little difference for the findings with a significant interaction 
between frequency of positive contact and condition, F (1, 92) = 4.23, p = .04, partial η² = .04, and a 
significant quality of contact*condition interaction, F (1, 92) = 6.51, p = .01, partial η² = .07. Still, no other 
main effect or interaction effect with condition reached significance when the outlier was included, Fs < 
1.94, ps > .16. 
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No other main effect or interaction effects with condition reached significance, Fs < .40, 
ps > .52. 
The interaction effects were further investigated with a moderation analysis in 
PROCESS. This analysis revealed that frequency of positive contact had no impact in the 
control condition, standardised effect = .22, t (106) = 1.25, p = .21, 95% CI [-.13, .56]. 
When diversity was salient, however, more positive contact marginally predicted a lower 
need for closure, effect = -.38, t (106) = -1.94, p = .06, 95% CI [-.78, .01]. This moderation 
effect is also displayed in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Partial regression plots of the frequency of early positive contact and Need for 
Cognitive Closure scores (NFCC) with fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. 
Partial regression plots are adjusted for control variables (age, gender, subjective SES, 
communal SES), early exposure to diversity and quality of positive contact. 
 
Quality of positive contact, however, showed an unexpected pattern: Quality of 
positive contact predicted lower need for closure in the control condition, standardised 
effect = -.42, t (106) = -2.60, p = .01, 95% CI [-.75, -.10], but for salient diversity it 
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predicted a marginally stronger need for closure, standardised effect = .38, t (106) = 1.97, 
p = .052, 95% CI [-.003, .77]. This moderation is depicted in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15. Partial regression plots of the quality of early positive contact and Need for 
Cognitive Closure scores (NFCC) with fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. 
Partial regression plots are adjusted for control variables (age, gender, subjective SES, 
communal SES), early exposure to diversity and frequency of positive contact. 
 
Recent experiences of diversity and NFCC. A similar GLM was fitted for 
current diversity. This model used diversity of the current residence as well frequency and 
quality of positive contact of the past 6 months as predictors. The interaction between 
frequency of positive contact and condition emerged as significant predictor, F (1, 91) = 
4.30, p = .04, partial η² = .05. Also, the quality of contact*condition interaction reached 
significance F (1, 91) = 6.63, p = .01, partial η² = .07. No other main effect or interaction 
effects with condition reached significance, Fs < 1.99, ps > .16.  
The interaction effects were followed upon by a moderation analysis in PROCESS. 
This analysis showed that frequency of positive contact had no impact in the control 
condition, standardised effect = .12, t (91) = .71, p = .48, 95% CI [-.22, .47]. When 
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diversity was salient, however, more positive contact marginally predicted a lower need 
for closure, standardised effect = -.66, t (91) = -1.98, p = .0502, 95% CI [-1.31, .001]. 
This moderation effect can also be seen in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Partial regression plots of frequency of recent positive contact and Need for 
Cognitive Closure scores (NFCC) with fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. 
Partial regression plots are adjusted for control variables (age, gender, subjective SES, 
communal SES), recent exposure to diversity and quality of positive contact. 
 
Quality of positive contact, however, again showed an unexpected pattern: Quality 
of positive contact marginally predicted lower need for closure in the control condition, 
standardised effect = -.35, t(91) = -1.80, p = .08, 95% CI [-.74, .04], but when diversity 
was salient it predicted a marginally stronger need for closure, standardised effect = .57, 








Figure 17. Partial regression plots of quality of recent positive contact and Need for 
Cognitive Closure scores (NFCC) with fitted regression lines, displayed per condition. 
Partial regression plots are adjusted for control variables (age, gender, subjective SES, 
communal SES), recent exposure to diversity and frequency of positive contact. 
 
Mediation analysis. Early and recent exposure to diversity had no effect on 
NFCC in the previous analysis. However, diversity might still have affected NFCC 
through positive contact, and this mediation might be further moderated by salient 
diversity. I therefore conducted a mediation analysis in PROCESS.  
First, it was tested if any aspect of positive contact mediated the effect of diversity 
across conditions. No indirect effect of diversity via frequency or quality of positive 
contact was found. This was true for early as well as recent experiences of diversity, 
standardised abs < .03. 
As in previous studies, it was also tested for moderated mediation. The tested 
model assumed an indirect influence of diversity through either quality or frequency of 
contact with the direct and indirect path moderated by condition (model 15 in PROCESS; 
Hayes, 2013). As shown in Figure 18, there was a moderated mediation with the quality 
of positive contact mediating the effect of diversity index = .08, 95% CI [.002, .25]. The 
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indirect effect of positive contact was moderated by condition, interaction = .22, t = 2.10, 
p = .04. A trend indicated that an indirect effect of diversity through quality of contact 
was present in the control condition, predicting lower need for closure, standardised ab 
= -.06, 95% CI [-.19, .002]. No indirect effect was present when diversity was salient, 
standardised ab = .02, 95% CI [-.02, .11]. The remaining direct effect was insignificant 
for both conditions, standardised c's < .12, ts < .85, ps > .40. Regarding the other tested 











Control condition: ab = -.06, 95% CI [-.19, .002]





Figure 18. Relationship between early exposure to diversity and Need for Cognitive 
Closure (NFCC) as mediated by quality of positive contact and moderated by condition. 
Coefficients are standardised, except for interaction effects with condition. The regression 
coefficient between early diversity and NFCC, controlling for quality of early positive 
contact, is given in parenthesis. †p <.10 *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
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Power analysis. The ability of this study to detect a multivariate interaction effect 
of diversity salience and diversity experiences on the dependent variables was evaluated 
by a power analysis. The population effect size was estimated to be η² = .05. The power 
of this study for this population effect size was power = .70. Furthermore, this study had 
an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum population effect size of η² = .06 at power 
= .80. 
7.1.3 Discussion 
When diversity was salient, participants with frequent positive contact were less 
inclined to seek immediate closure. This effect was present for early positive contact 
before reaching adulthood as well as for more recent episodes of interethnic contact. 
These results fit with the findings reported in Chapter 6 in the sense that individuals with 
a lot of positive contact felt less inclined to enforce closure and structure by relying on 
categorical rules. This seemed to be especially true in situations where diversity was 
salient (Study 4 and 6). 
However, salient diversity had a different moderating effect on the quality of 
positive contact. Positive contact with high quality predicted low NFCC under neutral 
conditions, but trends indicated that salient diversity might reverse this effect, with high-
quality contact predicting high NFCC. Again, the same pattern was found for early as 
well as recent episodes of positive contact. This raises the possibility that intense episodes 
of high-quality of contact lead to different response patterns than contact that occurs 
frequently but might have a low emotional impact. This possibility will be further 
explored in the following studies. 
There might have been methodological shortcomings with the quality of contact 
scale used in this study. While the scale for quality of contact used in Studies 5 and 6 was 
intended to indicate the positive intensity of the contact, the anchors employed in this 
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scale indicated frequency rather than the strength of the experienced emotion (‘How often 
did you feel the following emotions?’, anchors from 1 – Never to 5 – Very Often). 
Participants might have indicated the frequency of high-intensity contact on these items, 
rather than the positivity of contact. Effects of the quality of contact scale might thus fail 
to represent the impact of the relative positivity of interethnic contact, but rather represent 
the impact of relatively rare emotionally intense episodes of intercultural contact. 
Therefore, a further study was conducted to replicate the findings from this study with a 
more refined version of the quality of contact scale.  
7.2 Study 7b: Diversity and Need for Cognitive Closure II 
Procedure and materials of this study were identical to Study 7a, except for 
different items for quality of interethnic contact.  
7.2.1 Method 
Participants. For this study, 187 White British participants were recruited via 
prolificacademic.co.uk in exchange for monetary payment. To participate, the 
participant's hometown had to be located in England. Also, he or she had to be a student, 
and had to access the survey from a non-mobile device. The participants (88 females, 96 
males, 3 other) were aged between 16 and 56 years (M = 23.91, SD = 6.56). Some 
participants had missing data. 173 participants provided data for all variables.  
Procedure and materials. Procedure and materials were identical to Study 7a, 
except for different questions for quality of positive contact. Participants were asked to 
indicate how they experienced their interethnic contact (separately for early and recent 
contact): “When you met people from different ethnic backgrounds (while growing up in 
your hometown/in the past 6 months), in general did you find the contact...”, and rated 
their contact on three attributes (pleasant, cooperative, natural) on a Likert scale from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (extremely). This revised scale is reported in Appendix R. The revised 
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scale showed good internal reliability, Cronbach's αs > .89. The correlation between the 
different aspects of positive contact is shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 11  
Intercorrelations for Positive Contact Measures in Study 7b 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Hometown: Positive Contact - Frequency - 
 
   
2. Hometown: Positive Contact - Quality .14† 
(179) 
-   














Note: Degrees of freedom for significance tests are given in parenthesis. †p <.10. *p < .05. 
**p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
7.2.2 Results 
I first assessed the necessity for a multilevel approach. Design effects for the 
dependent variables were very small for all geographic levels (district, county and region) 
for early as well as current place of residence (DEs < 1.03). Therefore, a multilevel 
analysis was not conducted. All statistical tests were carried out with a level of 
significance of α = .05. All results reported below were controlled for gender, age, 
subjective SES and communal SES for home district and current district.  
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. To ensure that participants paid sufficient 
attention to the questions and that the manipulation of diversity salience would be 
effective, participants that took an unusually long time to complete the questionnaire were 
excluded from the analysis, using the same criteria as in the previous studies. The median 
time in minutes for completing the study was Mdn = 10. Using the same criteria as in 
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previous studies all participants taking longer than 31 minutes were omitted from analysis. 
This led to the exclusion of three participants with 184 remaining participants (170 
provided data for all variables).18 
Past diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution 
could be improved by performing a square root transformation on the data. The following 
analysis was therefore carried out with the square root transformed data for past diversity. 
In contrast, current diversity showed a normal distribution. 
Early experiences of diversity and NFCC. The effect of early experiences of 
diversity on need for closure was investigated by fitting a GLM to the data. Diversity of 
participants' home district as well as frequency and quality of positive interethnic contact 
while growing up were entered as independent variables and need for cognitive closure 
(NFCC) was treated as the dependent variable. The same controls were used as covariates 
as in the previous studies. No main or interaction effects with condition reached 
significance, Fs < 2.53, ps > .11. 
Recent experiences of diversity and NFCC. A similar GLM was fitted for 
current diversity. This model used diversity of the current residence as well frequency and 
quality of positive contact of the past 6 months as predictors. Frequent positive contact 
predicted lower need for closure, F (1, 147) = 8.80, p = .004, partial η² = .06, β = -.31. 
No other main effect or interaction effects with condition reached significance, Fs <2.45, 
ps > .11. 
                                                 
 
18 Conclusions changed only slightly when outliers were included in the analysis with quality of early 
contact being marginally significant as a predictor of lower NFCC, F(1, 173) = 2.75, p = .099 partial η² 
= .02. No main or interaction effects with condition reached significance for early experiences of diversity 
when outlier were included, Fs < 2.27, ps > .14. Regarding recent diversity, frequent positive contact still 
predicted lower NFCC, F (1, 149) = 8.30, p = .01, partial η² = .05. No other main effect or interaction 
effects with condition reached significance for recent diversity when outliers were included, Fs <2.02, ps 
> .15. 
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Mediation analysis. It was also tested if diversity might affect NFCC through 
either frequency or quality of contact. No reliable pattern of mediation was present, 
standardised abs < .22. Testing if such a mediation might be moderated by condition also 
found no reliable evidence for moderated mediation, standardised indices < .09. 
Power analysis. The ability of this study to detect a multivariate interaction effect 
of diversity salience and diversity experiences on the dependent variables was evaluated 
by a power analysis. Based on the findings of previous studies, the population effect size 
was estimated to be η² = .05. The power of this study for this population effect size was 
power = .77. Furthermore, this study had an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum 
population effect size of η² = .054 at power = .80. 
7.2.3 Discussion 
Participants who had experienced frequent episodes of positive interethnic contact 
in the past 6 months generally had a low desire for immediate closure and definite 
structure. This effect was stable across condition, regardless of the salience of diversity. 
This finding differs from results in the previous study in the sense that the effect of 
frequency of contact on NFCC in Study 7a was only present when diversity was salient. 
The role of salient diversity as a moderating factor thus warrants further investigation. 
However, the results from the current study underscore the impact of frequent positive 
contact on NFCC. 
The effect of the quality of recent positive contact seems to be somewhat more 
inconsistent across the two studies. In Study 7a quality of contact was found to lead to 
lower NFCC under neutral conditions, with a marginal reversal of the effect when 
diversity was made salient. In this study, high-quality interethnic contact was found to not 
have any effect on NFCC. 
DIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC NEEDS 160 
 
 
While recent positive contact showed effects on NFCC in this study, there were 
no effects of early diversity. This is somewhat surprising, given that the effects of 
diversity on norm perception and values seemed to be more consistent for early than for 
recent diversity in Studies 4-6 (Chapter 6). This might suggest that epistemic needs such 
as NFCC are more malleable than values, and that recent experiences are more influential 
on epistemic needs than early experiences. 
While there are some inconsistencies across the two studies, evidence does 
converge on the role of the frequency of positive interethnic contact. Frequent positive 
contact with ethnic minorities within the past six months was associated with a low need 
for definite closure. This supports the idea that prolonged experiences of diversity are 
linked to a high tolerance towards ambiguous information and uncertainty. This idea was 
further tested in another study using another measure focussing on the need for simple 
and definite structures, the  Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993). 
7.3 Study 8: Diversity and Need for Personal Structure 
The third study testing the relationship between diversity and epistemic needs 
sought tested the influence of diversity on the need for structure. If diversity leads people 
to rely less on categorical this tendency might not only be facilitated by a decreased desire 
for concrete, unambiguous answers (as measured by NFCC), but also a relaxed need for 
clearly defined structures (as measured by PNS).  
Tolerance towards a lack of structure (i.e. low PNS) might develop as people rely 
less on categorical thinking, because providing unambiguous structure is precisely the 
reason cognitive categories are used at all (eg. McGarty, 1999). Categorical thinking is 
thus employed to reach definite and immediate closure by enforcing clear and 
unambiguous structure on the individual’s perception of their environment. The decreased 
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reliance on categories in response to prolonged experiences of diversity should thus not 
only be reflected in a low need for cognitive closure, as demonstrated in Study 7a and 7b, 
but also in a decreased need for structure.   
7.3.1 Method 
Participants. For this study, 175 White British participants were recruited via 
prolificacademic.co.uk in exchange for monetary payment. To participate, the 
participant's hometown had to be located in England. Also, he or she had to be a student, 
and had to access the survey from a non-mobile device. The participants (82 female, 90 
male, 1 other) were aged between 17 and 51 years (M = 23.25, SD = 6.34). Some 
participants had missing data. 161 participants provided data for all variables.  
Procedure and materials. Procedure and materials were identical to Study 7b, 
except for exchanging NFCC as dependent variable for the Personal Need for Structure 
Scale (PNS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).  
Personal Need for Structure. The Personal Need for Structure Scale measures to 
what extent people prefer and are more comfortable with simple, well-defined structure. 
People high need for structure tend to enforce cognitive structure by relying on simplified 
generalisations in their judgements (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; see Appendix S for the 
full scale). The PNS scale contains 12 items such as “It upsets me to go into a situation 
without knowing what I can expect from it.”, and is scored on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). 
7.3.2 Results 
I first assessed the necessity for a multilevel approach. Design effects for the 
dependent variables were small for all geographic levels (district, county and region) for 
early as well as current place of residence (DEs < 1.65). Therefore, a multilevel analysis 
was not conducted. All statistical tests were carried out with a level of significance of α 
DIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC NEEDS 162 
 
 
= .05. All results reported below were controlled for gender, age, subjective SES and 
communal SES for home district and current district.  
Outlier exclusion and data inspection. To ensure that participants paid sufficient 
attention to the questions and that the manipulation of diversity salience would be 
effective, participants that took an unusually long time to complete the questionnaire were 
excluded from the analysis. This was done using the same criteria as in the previous 
studies. The median time in minutes for completing the study was Mdn = 6. Using the 
same criteria as in previous studies all participants taking longer than 21 minutes were 
omitted from analysis. This led to the exclusion of five participants with 170 remaining 
participants (157 provided data for all variables).19 
Past diversity had a non-normal, positively skewed distribution. The distribution 
could be improved by performing a square root transformation on the data. The following 
analysis was therefore carried out with the square root transformed data for past diversity. 
In contrast, current diversity showed a normal distribution. 
Early experiences of diversity and PNS. The effect of early experiences of 
diversity on PNS was investigated by fitting a GLM to the data. Diversity of participants' 
home district as well as frequency and quality of positive interethnic contact while 
growing up were entered as independent variables, and personal need for structure was 
treated as the dependent variable. The same controls were used as covariates as in the 
previous studies. Quality of contact was associated with a marginally lower need for 
                                                 
 
19 Findings were similar when outliers were included in the analysis with quality of early contact still being 
a marginally significant predictor for low PNS, F (1, 147) = 2.80, p = .097, partial η² = .02 and no other 
significant main or interaction effects emerging from analysis for early diversity, Fs <.51, ps > .47. 
Regarding recent diversity, frequent positive contact still predicted low PNS when outliers were included 
in the analysis, F (1, 138) = 4.51, p = .04, partial η² = .03. There were also no other significant main or 
interaction effect when outliers were included, Fs <1.40, ps > .23. 
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structure, F (1, 144) = 2.78, p = .098, partial η² = .02, β = -.20. The remaining main effect 
and interaction effects with condition were not significant, Fs <.49, ps > .49. 
Recent experiences of diversity and PNS. A similar GLM was fitted for current 
diversity. This model used diversity of the current residence as well frequency and quality 
of positive contact of the past 6 months as predictors. Frequent positive contact predicted 
lower personal need for structure, F (1, 135) = 5.31, p = .02, partial η² = .04. No other 
main effect or interaction effects with condition reached significance, Fs <1.03, ps > .32. 
Mediation analysis. It was also tested if diversity might affect NFCC through 
either frequency or quality of contact. No reliable pattern of mediation was present, 
standardised abs < 02. Testing if such a mediation might be moderated by condition also 
found no reliable evidence for moderated mediation, standardised indices < .05. 
Power analysis. The ability of this study to detect an interaction effect of diversity 
salience and diversity experiences on PNS was evaluated by a power analysis. Based on 
the findings of previous studies, the population effect size was estimated to be η² = .05. 
The power of this study for this population effect size was power = .82. Furthermore, this 
study had an appropriate sample size to detect a minimum population effect size of η² 
= .049 at power = .80. 
7.3.3 Discussion 
Participants who had experienced frequent episodes of positive interethnic contact 
in the recent past reported a low need for structure. This effect was stable across condition, 
regardless of the salience of diversity. This pattern is thus similar to Study 7b, in which 
participants with frequent positive contact in the recent months showed a low NFCC 
across conditions. Findings from this study as well as Study 7b differs from results in 
Study 7a regarding the effect of salient diversity. The salience of diversity moderated the 
effect of frequent contact for Study 7a. This suggests that salient diversity might only 
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have limited impact on the effect of diversity experiences on epistemic needs. In either 
case, the consistent link of frequent positive contact with low NFCC and PNS emphasises 
the role of frequency of contact for epistemic needs. 
Early experiences of high-quality contact were associated with marginally lower 
levels of PNS in this study.  This is somewhat reminiscent of results from Study 7a, with 
quality of contact predicting low NFCC under neutral conditions. Unlike Study 7a, 
however, the influence of high-quality contact was not moderated by the salience of 
diversity. This finding also seems inconsistent with findings from Study 7b, in which 
high-quality contact was linked to higher NFCC.  
It is therefore not clear from this data how the quality of positive contact 
influences the need for closure or the need for clearly structured information. A possible 
explanation might be that a third variable confounds this relationship and lead to 
inconclusive results. A potential unaccounted variable might be mood since remembering 
emotional intense positive encounters might have put participants in a good mood. 
Positive mood has been shown to lead to more heuristic processing that simplify and 
structure information (Bless, Fiedler, & Forgas, 2006). This includes the reliance on 
categorical thinking such as in the use of stereotypes (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 
1994), and scripts (Bless et al., 1996). Use of such processes that simplify information 
and speed up processing would be in accordance with the need to seek closure and clear 
structure. Thinking of past episodes of high-quality positive encounters might thus lead 
to increased NFCC, because it put participants into a good mood. This would at least 
explain why quality of positive contact leads to a high NFCC when diversity was made 
salient in Study 7a, even if the default effect of high-quality interethnic encounters might 
be decreasing NFCC and PNS. 
DIVERSITY AND EPISTEMIC NEEDS 165 
 
 
7.4 General Discussion 
Over all three studies presented in this chapter, a high frequency of positive 
contact had an impact on the participants’ epistemic needs. In two studies, reporting a 
high frequency of positive contact within the past 6 months predicted tolerance with 
ambiguity, as indicated by the NFCC and PNS scale (Study 7b & 8). In Study 7a, having 
had frequent episodes of positive contact either recently or during the past 6 months 
predicted a low need for low cognitive closure as well but only when diversity was made 
salient. Thus, participants who experienced many instances of positive contact seem to 
feel less inclined to enforce structure by simplifying information through the use of 
categorical thinking.  
These results suggest that frequent positive contact leads to a decreased reliance 
on categories. In this sense, the findings are in line with results from Chapter 6, which 
also suggest a decreased reliance on categorical thinking as a response to frequent positive 
contact. In Studies 4-8 the decreased tendency towards categorical thinking manifested 
itself in a decreased preference for conformity (Study 4), a decreased reliance on rules 
and conventional values (Study 5 & 6), and a decreased desire for structure and closure 
(Studies 7a-8).  
In most cases, these effects were visible across conditions, but in some cases, they 
were only present when diversity was salient (Study 4 & 7a). Current findings are thus 
inconclusive on whether frequent positive contact affects reliance on categorical thinking 
across situations or only when diversity is salient. At present, however, evidence seems 
to be more in favour of the idea that frequent positive contact leads to a decreased reliance 
on categorical thinking in general, with either no or only minimal moderating effects of 
salient diversity. The role of salient diversity for activating or strengthening cognitive 
change in response to diversity will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
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While the effects of frequent positive contact were relatively consistent across 
studies, the effect of the quality of contact seems less clear. In some studies, experiences 
of high-quality contact predicted a low reliance on rules and adopting unconventional 
values (Study 6) as well as a lower need for structure (Study 8). These findings are similar 
to the effects of frequent positive contact in the sense that high-quality contact seems to 
be associated with a relaxed reliance on cognitive rules and categories as well. In other 
studies, however, high-quality contact seemed to antagonize the effects of frequent 
positive contact by predicting a higher need for cognitive closure either across conditions 
(Study 7a) or only when diversity was salient (Study 7b). As discussed above this might 
point to the existence of an unaccounted third variable, such as mood, influencing the 
results. It is possible that high-quality contact affects different factors that had opposing 
effects on the dependent variable. For example, high-quality contact might represent 
influential episodes of diversifying experiences that eventually lead to adapting a less 
rigid and non-categorical style of processing similar to the effect of frequent positive 
contact. At the same time, just remembering intense positive encounters might 
temporarily lead to increased mood. Positive mood could have led to more heuristic style 
of processing which would have led to a tendency to seek quick cognitive closure. Either 
way, it seems possible that the effects of high-quality positive contact are more complex 
than assumed and need to be further unpacked in future studies. 
To summarise the key findings in this chapter, through three studies it was found 
that diversity affected the extent to which people feel the need to simplify information 
and seek immediate closure. Frequent positive contact was consistently linked with a high 
tolerance for ambiguity and a low need to enforce structure and cognitive closure by 
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simplifying information.20 The broader implications of these findings in context with 
findings from previous chapters will be discussed in the next chapter.
                                                 
 
20 This conclusion is further qualified by a meta-analysis of Studies 7a-8 reported in the next chapter. More 
specifically, frequent positive contact was overall associated with a low need for clear structure when it 
occurred recently, r = -.19, p = .001, but not when it occurred while growing up, r = -.03, p = .48. The effect 
of frequent contact was not moderated by salient diversity regardless of when it occurred. However, salient 
diversity did moderate the overall effect of quality of contact on the need for clear structure. Generally, 
episodes of high-quality contact tended to be associated with a low need for structure only when diversity 
was not salient (r = -.23, p = .001 for early contact, r = .09, p = .18 for recent contact). 
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CHAPTER 8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the theoretical framework developed in the 
earlier chapters as well as an overview of the empirical findings from the nine studies 
reported in this thesis. In this thesis, I have reported evidence that experiences of diversity 
lead to cognitive change for ethnic majority members. This cognitive response to diversity 
does not involve enhanced self-regulation, but rather through low reliance on categorical 
information. This chapter, discusses the theoretical implications of these findings as well 
as their limitations. This chapter also provides some suggestions for future research, as 
well as a discussion of the practical implications of the current findings. 
 
8.1 Initial Theoretical Framework 
This thesis explored how members of the ethnic majority in England respond to 
ethnic diversity. For this purpose, I integrated the theoretical framework of the CPAG 
model with literature on self-regulation, stereotype inhibition, norm perception and 
epistemic needs. By doing so this thesis aimed to a) investigate the effects of prolonged 
experiences of diversity for majority members and b) study the specific effects of 
diversity that might lead to heightened cognitive flexibility. 
These research goals addressed shortcomings in the current literature. Research 
on the effects of prolonged diversity in everyday life has usually focussed either on the 
effects of biculturalism (e.g. Cheng et al., 2008; Saad et al., 2013) or on the impact of 
experiencing diversity abroad (e.g. Godart et al., 2015; Hellmanzik, 2013; Maddux et al., 
2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). This research suggests that diversity can promote a 
mode of thinking that is cognitively flexible. More research is needed, however, to 
generalise these findings to other kinds of experiences of diversity, as the types of 
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experiences of diversity studied tend to be exceptions rather than the norm for majority 
members. Biculturals do not necessarily experience diversity the same way than majority 
members, and most individuals will only spend a small portion of their lifetime abroad. 
As diversity increases and becomes commonplace it is likely to affect every member of 
society. Hence, diversity research should extend towards everyday episodes of diversity 
that are common for the ethnic majority. 
The underlying mechanisms by which people respond to diversity needs empirical 
validation as well. A common long-term response to diversity is increased cognitive 
flexibility, as demonstrated by various findings (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Gutierrez & 
Sameroff, 2008; Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung et al., 2008; Maddux et al., 2010; Tadmor, 
Galinsky, et al., 2012). It is assumed by the CPAG model that this occurs through 
enhanced inhibitory abilities, allowing for more efficient generative thought. However, it 
has not been tested if these specific mechanisms are actually affected by diversity.  
In Chapter 2 I reviewed the research on social diversity and its long-term effects 
on cognitive tendencies. I argued that social diversity presents all members of a society 
with challenges. These challenges can concern one’s sense of identity as in the case of 
immigrants trying to integrate different cultural identities into a coherent whole 
(Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). But diversity does not 
only challenge minority members, as just observing and trying to make sense of a socially 
diverse environment presents a challenge in itself. Socially diverse societies harbour more 
members who integrate seemingly contradicting social identities. This leads to dense and 
complex social identities, which can no longer be adequately understood by relying on 
stereotypical knowledge (Hutter & Crisp, 2005; Kunda et al., 1990). In line with the 
CPAG model (Crisp & Turner, 2011), I have argued that the underlying theme for these 
challenges evoked by diversity is the need to resolve stereotypical inconsistencies, which 
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can be considered a conflict of categorical information. Adaptation to diversity thus 
requires people to be efficient in dealing with inconsistencies. According to the CPAG 
model, this is achieved by increased cognitive flexibility, as indicated by several studies 
showing cognitive flexibility and divergent thinking in response to diversity (Crisp & 
Turner, 2011; Gutierrez & Sameroff, 2008; Leung & Chiu, 2010; Leung et al., 2008; 
Maddux et al., 2010; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012). The increased flexibility in thought 
is assumed to stem from enhanced inhibition, which would allow for more efficient 
generative thought (Crisp & Turner, 2011). 
This possibility was further explored in Chapter 3 by reviewing the research on 
stereotype suppression and self-regulation. I illustrated that inhibiting stereotypical 
content can be considered an act of executive control. Stereotype suppression has been 
shown to engage the same processes as other cognitive control tasks (Gordijn et al., 2004; 
Govorun & Payne, 2006), to be affected by ego depletion (Muraven, 2008; Payne, 2005), 
and to be depleting itself (Gordijn et al., 2004; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson & 
Trawalter, 2005b; Richeson et al., 2003, 2005). This point is also underpinned by 
neurological studies demonstrating that the ability to inhibit stereotypes is linked to neural 
correlates of cognitive control (Amodio et al., 2008; Bartholow et al., 2006; Cunningham 
et al., 2010; Richeson et al., 2003). Individuals who are regularly exposed to diversity 
should thus frequently have to engage in acts of self-regulation, namely the suppression 
of stereotypical information. Regularly employing self-regulation has been shown to lead 
to long-term benefits for cognitive control (Baumeister et al., 2006). These benefits apply 
across several domains, such as applying self-control when inhibiting aggressive 
behaviour (Denson et al., 2011; Finkel et al., 2009), making good food choices or 
adopting good spending habits (Oaten & Cheng, 2006). Since experiencing diversity is 
likely to demand the suppression of stereotypes, and since stereotype suppression requires 
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self-regulation, I suggested that diversity could potentially benefit self-regulatory ability. 
Experiences of diversity should be more common among majority members who have 
lived in socially diverse environments. I therefore hypothesized that majority members 
from ethnically diverse districts might show superior self-regulation. This idea was tested 
in Studies 1-3. 
8.2 Empirical Findings on Diversity and Self-Regulation 
The findings from these studies suggested that experiences of diversity were 
associated with indicators of lower levels of self-regulation. However, this effect was only 
present when diversity was made salient, suggesting that participants who have 
experienced a lot of diversity might activate a mindset that interfered either with self-
regulatory ability or the motivation to self-regulate. 
8.2.1 Studies 1 and 2 
Studies 1 and 2 investigated the effect of diversity on self-reported impulsivity 
and ability to delay gratification. Diversity was operationalized as the ethnic diversity 
White British participants from England (i.e. majority members) were exposed to while 
they were growing up. In contrast to the predicted effects, Study 1 revealed that 
participants who experienced greater levels of diversity were marginally more likely to 
report weak delay gratification. This finding was replicated and qualified by Study 2, in 
the sense that participants from ethnically diverse environments reported significantly 
weaker delay gratification and marginally stronger impulsiveness. However, these effects 
were only present when diversity was made salient. 
8.2.2 Study 3 
The effects of diversity on inhibition found in Studies 1 and 2 were conceptually 
replicated and further qualified in Study 3. It was expected that not all types of 
experiences of diversity should necessarily lead to cognitive adaptation. The typical form 
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of experience with social diversity for majority members will be some form of contact 
with members of other ethnic groups. Naturally, such contact can be experienced as 
relatively positive or negative. It was assumed that only frequent episodes of positive 
contact should lead to the development of cognitive adaptation, because they provide 
ideal processing conditions for inconsistency resolution such as reduced intergroup 
anxiety and increased positive affect. Furthermore, this study also tested whether the 
effect of diversity on self-regulation would affect behavioural performance by using the 
Stroop task as a dependent variable. The results revealed that diversity did indeed affect 
Stroop performance via positive contact. The effect of positive contact on Stroop 
performance was moderated by condition, and analysis of the simple effects suggested 
that positive contact lead to marginally inferior Stroop performance when diversity was 
salient but had no effect under neutral conditions. 
 In combination with the results from Studies 1 and 2, these results suggest that 
individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity only show differences on self-
regulation measures when diversity is salient. However, the direction of this difference 
was reverse to what was expected based on the literature. Experiences of diversity were 
related to lower scores on self-regulation measures when diversity was salient, suggesting 
that the long-term responses to diversity either involves an impaired self-regulatory 
ability or a low motivation to apply self-regulation. This also implies that for individuals 
who have experienced a lot of diversity, inhibition might not be as crucial for 
understanding socially diverse stimuli as it is for the general population. These findings 
called for a revaluation of the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
8.3 Revised Theoretical Framework 
Considering the findings from Studies 1-3, in Chapter 5 I revisited the theoretical 
framework developed in earlier chapters. I argued that the temporary decrease in 
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inhibitory performance observed when diversity was salient for participants who had 
experienced a lot of diversity suggests the activation of a mindset geared towards 
processing categorical inconsistencies. Such a mindset would promote non-categorical 
thinking with increased cognitive flexibility towards the use of social and other categories, 
with relatively blurry boundaries between categories.  
This view is supported by studies showing that experiences of diversity predict 
flexible and divergent thinking as expressed in superior performance on creativity tasks 
(Leung & Chiu, 2010; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Steffens et al., 
2015; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012). When diversity is spontaneously induced in the 
laboratory, the activation of multiple competing social categories seems crucial for 
increasing creative thinking (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng et al., 2011; Gocłowska et al., 
2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Leung & Chiu, 2010). This suggests that the increase in 
creativity might stem from an enhanced ability to think about categories in a flexible 
manner. In some studies, the effect of diversity on creativity was moderated by salient 
diversity in the sense that the beneficial effect of diversity was either stronger when 
diversity was salient (Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009) or the effect was 
only present with salient diversity (Cheng et al., 2008; Saad et al., 2013). These findings 
support the view that diversity aids flexible and creative thinking because they enable 
people to switch to a mindset favouring cognitive flexibility. 
Such cognitive flexibility with a decreased use of categorical information would 
also help to explain why individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity have been 
found to demonstrate high cognitive complexity (Benet-Martínez et al., 2006; Tadmor et 
al., 2009; Maddux, Bivolaru, Hafenbrack, Tadmor & Galinsky, 2014). That is, they are 
highly capable to acknowledge and integrate information from different viewpoints. A 
low reliance on categorical boundaries should make it easier to connect and integrate 
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ideas from different viewpoints (i.e. different categorical domains) and achieve high 
complexity. 
However, this tendency to neglect categorical information might sometimes 
impair performance on tasks that require monitoring of concrete rules in the face of 
distracting stimuli such as certain cognitive control tasks. Decreased self-regulatory 
performance would not necessarily indicate an impairment in actual self-regulatory ability, 
but rather a decreased motivation to monitor cognitive rules. Detrimental effects of 
cognitive flexibility on self-regulatory performance have been demonstrated in studies 
investigating the influence of need for cognitive closure (NFCC; Kossowska et al., 2014; 
Kossowska, 2007a, 2007b). The idea that individuals who have experienced a lot of 
diversity tend to rely little on definite categories and rules is also corroborated by recent 
work showing a positive link between time spent abroad and a weak reliance on absolute 
moral rules (Lu et al., 2017). A reduced reliance on rules might explain the decreased self-
regulatory performance when diversity was salient for participants who had experienced 
a lot of diversity in Studies 1-3: Participants’ experience with diversity might have 
activated a mindset of high flexibility but low reliance on rules when diversity was salient, 
leading to poor performance on the measures of self-regulation. 
I integrated these ideas with the CPAG model by offering a revised model of how 
people respond to diversity. Repeatedly experiencing diversity is assumed to lead to 
cognitive adaptation in the form of increased cognitive flexibility in dealing with 
categorical inconsistencies. However, this cognitive flexibility is not achieved by 
enhanced cognitive inhibition, as shown in Studies 1-3. Rather, it might be achieved by 
activating an adaptive mindset when cues for diversity are present. Such a mindset would 
favour a low reliance on categorical processing rules (such as social categories), allowing 
for increased flexibility. 
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Diversity should thus promote a tendency to rely less on categorical rules for 
information processing. I speculated that this tendency should generalise to social norms 
and conventions as well, a hypothesis that was tested in Studies 4-6. 
8.4 Empirical Findings on Diversity and Conventionalism 
Findings from these studies suggested that diversity in the form of positive contact 
is linked to a decreased reliance on conventional thinking. Specifically, positive contact 
was associated with resistance towards social conformity (Study 4), and a decreased 
reliance on rules and conventional values (Studies 5 and 6). 
8.4.1 Study 4 
Study 4 tested if diversity would affect the desire for social autonomy versus 
conformity, as measured by the SCA scale (Feldman, 2003). It also investigated if the 
decrease in self-regulation when diversity was salient for participants who had 
experienced a lot of diversity was mediated by an increase in social autonomy. Results 
showed that early diversity had an indirect positive effect on the preference for social 
autonomy via positive contact. Similar to Studies 1-3, this effect of early diversity was 
only present when diversity was made salient. However, in this study diversity had no 
effect on measures of self-regulation. Reports of self-regulation were still correlated with 
a strong preference for autonomy values. Therefore, it might still be plausible that a 
change in rule dependence might be partially responsible for the temporary decrease in 
self-regulatory performance observed in Studies 1-3. 
8.4.2 Studies 5 and 6 
 The effect of diversity on the reliance on conventional norms and rules in general 
was further explored in Studies 5 and 6. Study 5 also investigated the impact of different 
types of experiences of diversity by measuring both negative as well as positive 
interethnic contact. Study 6 delved into specific aspects of positive contact by measuring 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 176 
 
 
both quantity and quality of contact. Results from Study 5 revealed that early diversity 
predicted early positive contact and negative contact, but only positive contact influenced 
the dependent variables, predicting a low reliance on rules and conventional values. 
Current diversity predicted only positive contact which in turn promoted low 
conventional values. This effect was counteracted by recent negative contact, which 
predicted strong conventional values. Findings from Study 6 showed that frequent 
positive contact predicted a low willingness to submit to authorities, while the quality of 
positive contact promoted a low reliance on conventional values as well as rules in general. 
 Together with findings from Study 4 these results suggest that diversity is linked 
to a low reliance on rules, norms and authority. This supports the idea that diversity 
favours a low reliance on categorical rules over different domains. A reduced use of 
categorical rules runs counter to some epistemic needs such as the need for cognitive 
closure and the need for structure, because utilising categorical thinking is a key tool for 
enforcing structure and achieving quick closure (McGarty et al., 2004; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). If diversity does favour a low reliance on categorical thinking, this 
cognitive change should also be accompanied by a high tolerance towards uncertainty, 
unstructured information and a low need for cognitive closure. This prediction was tested 
in Studies 7-8. 
8.3 Empirical Findings on Diversity and Epistemic Needs 
 Findings from Studies 7-8 generally suggested that a high frequency of positive 
contact is linked to a low need for structure and immediate closure. However, results on 
the role of quality of positive contact were inconclusive. 
8.3.1 Study 7a and 7b 
Study 7a and 7b investigated if experiences of diversity would be linked to a 
lowered need for cognitive closure (NFCC) when diversity is salient. In both studies, 
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frequent positive contact within the past 6 months predicted a low need for closure. 
Furthermore, frequent positive contact while growing up was also a significant predictor 
of low NFCC in Study 7a. However, findings of the two studies diverge regarding the 
role of diversity salience. In Study 7a, the effect of frequent positive contact on NFCC 
was moderated by salient diversity, as frequent positive contact only predicted low NFCC 
when diversity was salient. In Study 7b, however, early frequent positive contact affected 
NFCC regardless of condition. 
Results on the impact of quality of positive contact on NFCC were inconclusive 
across the two studies. In Study 7a, high quality contact predicted low NFCC under 
neutral conditions, but in Study 7b high quality contact was associated with high NFCC 
across conditions. 
Findings from these studies suggest that frequent positive contact is linked to a 
high tolerance towards ambiguous information and delayed cognitive closure. If this 
tolerance towards uncertainty is caused by a decreased reliance on categorical rules it 
should also be accompanied by a decreased need for clearly structured information, as 
measured by the Personal Need for Structure Scale (PNS). This idea was tested in Study 
8. 
8.3.2 Study 8 
Study 8 examined whether early or recent diversity would influence the need for 
structure as measured by the PNS scale, and if such an effect would be moderated by 
salient diversity. As in Study 7a and 7b, epistemic needs were decreased for participants 
who had experienced frequent episodes of positive contact. Need for personal structure 
was significantly lower for participants who experienced frequent positive contact in the 
recent past and marginally lower for participants who had early frequent positive contact 
while growing up. These effects were not moderated by salient diversity. Quality of 
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contact only had a marginal effect on PNS, with high quality of early positive contact 
predicting marginally lower levels of PNS. 
Together with the findings from 7a and 7b these results offer converging evidence 
for the idea that frequent positive contact decreases epistemic needs. Frequent positive 
contact was linked to a low NFCC as well as low PNS. This suggests that participants 
who have experienced a lot of diversity are more comfortable with uncertainty, and 
therefore less likely to rely on categorical knowledge to resolve ambiguous information. 
8.4 Meta-Analysis of Empirical Findings 
I conducted a series of meta-analyses on the empirical findings reported in this 
thesis to obtain a realistic estimate of the sizes of the reported effects of experienced 
diversity. These meta-analyses are reported below. For all investigated effects, two 
separate meta-analyses for both levels of diversity salience were conducted. For studies 
which manipulated the salience of diversity (Studies 2-8), simple effects were split by the 
diversity salience condition and entered the appropriate meta-analysis. Whenever 
possible, the analyses focused on the effects of positive contact rather than mere exposure 
to diversity, as the current findings suggest that positive contact might be the most 
relevant type of experience for determining cognitive change in response to diversity. For 
all analyses, I used fixed effects in which the main effect size (i.e., mean correlation) was 
weighted by sample size. Effect sizes were first converted to Pearson’s correlations if 
necessary. All correlations were then Fisher’s z transformed for analysis and converted 
back to Pearson correlations for presentation. 
8.4.1 Self-Regulation 
I meta-analysed all studies reported in this thesis which measured the impact of 
early experiences of diversity on self-regulation (pilot study, Studies 1-4). Effect scores 
were reversed if necessary to indicate a positive effect on self-regulation. The main effect 
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for each study was determined by averaging the effect size across all measures of self-
regulation employed in the study. For Study 3 and 4, positive contact was chosen as 
indicator for experiences of diversity. For earlier studies, mere exposure to diversity was 
used, as positive contact was not measured in these studies. All effect sizes for these meta-
analyses are presented in Table 12. 
 
Table 12  
Effect Sizes for Meta-Analyses on Diversity Experiences and Self-Regulation. 
 
Mean effect r of early diversity 
experiences on self-regulation n 
Measures for  
Self-Regulation 
Pilot Study   BIS 
Compulsive 
Buying Scale 
     Diversity salient -.22 50 
     Diversity not salient - - 
Study 1   
BIS 
ADOG 
     Diversity salient -.11 120 
     Diversity not salient - - 
Study 2   
BIS 
ADOG 
     Diversity salient -.33 67 
     Diversity not salient .08 65 
Study 3   Stroop 
BIS 
ADOG 
     Diversity salient -.19 40 
     Diversity not salient .02 53 
Study 4   
BIS 
ADOG 
     Diversity salient -.06 90 
     Diversity not salient .06 76 
Weighted Mean    
     Diversity salient -.16** 367  
     Diversity not salient .06 194  
     Combined -.09* 561  
Note: BIS-Brief = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-Brief; ADOG = Academic Delay of 
Gratification Scale; †p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
For salient diversity, the overall effect of diversity was significant, mean r = -.16, 
Z = 3.07, p = .002, such that more experiences of diversity were associated with weaker 
self-regulation. When diversity was not salient, the experiences of diversity had no effect 
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on self-regulation, mean r = .06, Z = 0.76, p = .45. This moderating effect of salient 
diversity was significant, as revealed by a contrast analysis, Z = 2.98, p = 0.002. These 
results thus support the conclusions from the separate studies in the sense that participants 
who have experienced a lot of diversity showed lower self-regulation, but only when 
diversity was first made salient. 
8.4.2 Reliance on Conventional Values 
I meta-analysed all studies reported in this thesis which measured the impact of 
early and current positive contact on conventional values (Studies 4-6). Only the effect of 
frequency of contact was investigated, as quality of contact was only included as a 
measure in Study 6. Effect scores were reversed if necessary to indicate an effect towards 
more conventionalism. The main effect for each study for was determined by averaging 
the effect size across all measures for reliance on conventional values employed in the 
study. All effect sizes for these meta-analyses are presented in Table 13. 
For early experiences of diversity, the overall effect of frequent positive contact 
was significant for salient diversity, mean r = -.26, Z = -3.97, p < .001, such that more 
frequent contact was associated with a weaker reliance on social rules. When diversity 
was not salient, the overall effect was only marginally significant, mean r = -.11, Z = -
1.66, p = .097. However, this difference in effect sizes was not sufficient evidence for a 
moderating effect of salient diversity, as revealed by a contrast analysis, Z = 1.27, p = .20. 
The effect sizes for both levels of diversity salience were therefore combined. The 
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Table 13  
Effect Sizes for Meta-Analyses on Frequency of Positive Contact and Conventional 
Values. 
 Mean effect r of frequency 
of early positive contact on 




Study 4   
SCA      Diversity salient -.40 90 
     Diversity not salient -.08 76 
Study 5   Rule-independence 
RWA-
conventionalism 
     Diversity salient -.19 104 
     Diversity not salient -.15 103 




    Diversity salient -.09 42 
     Diversity not salient -.08 42 
Weighted Mean    
     Diversity salient -.26*** 237  
     Diversity not salient -.11† 221  
     Combined -.19*** 458  
Current 
Study 4   
SCA      Diversity salient -.03 90 
     Diversity not salient .00 76 
Study 5   Rule-independence 
RWA-
conventionalism 
     Diversity salient .01 88 
     Diversity not salient -.14 91 




    Diversity salient -.08 44 
     Diversity not salient -.10 45 
Weighted Mean    
     Diversity salient -.02 222  
     Diversity not salient -.08 212  
     Combined -.01 434  
Note: SCA = Social Conformity/Autonomy Scale; RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; 
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
For current experiences of diversity, the overall effect of frequent positive contact 
was neither significant when diversity was salient, mean r = -.02, Z = -.35, p = .73, nor 
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when diversity was not salient, mean r = -.08, Z = -1.17, p = .24. A contrast analysis 
showed no moderating effect of salient diversity, Z = .45, p = .65. Effect sizes were 
therefore combined for both levels of diversity salience. The combined effect of frequent 
positive contact on conventionalism was also not significant, mean r = -.01, Z = -.11, p 
= .91. These results agree with the conclusions from the separate studies in the sense that 
early experiences of diversity are much more impactful on conventional values than 
experiences made later in life. Indeed, more recent experiences of diversity seem to have 
no impact on conventionalism at all. There is also no reliable moderating influence of 
salient diversity on the effect of frequent contact on conventional thinking. 
8.4.3 Need for Clear Structure 
I meta-analysed all studies reported in this thesis which measured the impact of 
early and current positive contact on the need for clear structure as measured by the NFCC 
and PNS scales (Studies 7a-8). As all studies measured the frequency as well as the quality 
of positive contact, the effects of both factors were investigated. Effect scores were 
reversed if necessary to indicate a positive effect on the need for clear structure. All effect 
sizes for these meta-analyses are presented in Table 14. 
For early experiences of diversity, the overall effect of frequent positive contact 
was neither significant when diversity was salient, mean r = -.10, Z = -1.41, p = .16, nor 
when diversity was not salient, mean r = .03, Z = .41, p = .68. A contrast analysis did not 
provide significant evidence for a moderating effect of salient diversity, Z = 1.63, p = .103. 
The effects were therefore combined for both levels of diversity salience. When the results 
of both levels of diversity salience were combined, the weighted mean effect across both 
levels was also not significant, mean r = -.03, Z = -.70, p = .48. 
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Table 14  
Effect Sizes for Meta-Analyses on Positive Contact and Need for Clear Structure 
 Average effect r on  
the need for clear structure 
n 
Measure for 







Study 7a    
NFCC      Diversity salient -.26 .25 58 
     Diversity not salient .19 -.35 60 
Study 7b    
NFCC      Diversity salient .03 .00 84 
     Diversity not salient -.06 -.24 86 
Study 8    
PNS      Diversity salient -.11 -.19 77 
     Diversity not salient .00 -.13 80 
Weighted Mean     
     Diversity salient -.10 .00 219  
     Diversity not salient .03 -.23*** 226  
     Combined -.03 -.12* 445  
Current 
Study 7a    
NFCC      Diversity salient -.35 .31 52 
     Diversity not salient .10 -.23 51 
Study 7b    
NFCC      Diversity salient -.24 .14 80 
     Diversity not salient -.18 .00 80 
Study 8    
PNS      Diversity salient -.15 -.13 68 
     Diversity not salient -.25 -.10 80 
Weighted Mean     
     Diversity salient -.24*** .09 200  
     Diversity not salient -.14* -.09 211  
     Combined -.19*** -.02 411  
Note: NFCC = Need for Cognitive Closure; PNS = Personal Need for Structure;  
†p <.10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001 
 
Episodes of high-quality contact experienced in the past had no impact on the need 
for clear structure, when diversity was salient, r = .00, Z = .00, p = 1.00. When diversity 
was not salient, however, the effect of quality of contact was significant, r = -.23, Z = 3.48, 
p = .001, such that a high quality of contact was associated with a low need for clear 
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structure. A contrast analysis showed that this moderating effect of salient diversity was 
significant, Z = 2.73, p = .01. 
Regarding recent positive contact, frequent positive contact had a significant 
effect on the need for clear structure when diversity was salient, mean r = -.24, Z = -3.37, 
p = .001, but also when it was not salient, mean r = -.14, Z = -2.03, p = .04. Both effects 
were such that more frequent contact was associated with a lower need for clear structure. 
A contrast analysis did not provide significant evidence for a moderating effect of salient 
diversity, Z = 1.44, p = 0.15. The effect sizes were therefore combined for both levels of 
diversity salience. When the results of both levels of diversity salience were combined, 
the weighted mean effect across both levels was significant, mean r = -.19, Z = -3.81, p 
= .001. 
Recent episodes of high-quality contact had no impact on the need for clear 
structure when diversity was salient, r =.09, Z = 1.31, p = .19, or when diversity was not 
salient, r = -.09, Z = 1.34, p = .18. While the separate effects were not significant, the 
effect was moderated by salient diversity, as revealed by a contrast analysis Z = 2.15, p = 
0.03.  
These findings suggest that for early experiences of diversity the intensity (i.e. 
quality) of positive contact is more impactful on the need for structure than the frequency, 
since only quality of early contact was associated with a low need for structure. The 
reverse seems to be true for more recent episodes of positive contact, with frequent 
positive contact being associated with a low need for structure. Furthermore, these results 
also suggest that the salience of diversity moderates the effect of the quality of positive 
contact, both for early as well as more recent episodes of contact. Salient diversity had no 
reliable moderating influence on the effect of frequent positive contact, however. 
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8.5 Theoretical Implications 
Findings from the current investigation provide further support for the CPAG 
model (Crisp & Turner, 2011) as an overarching framework to explain and predict 
responses to prolonged experiences of diversity. Participants who had experienced a lot 
of diversity showed cognitive flexibility as indicated by their low NFCC and PNS scores 
(Studies 7a-8). The reported studies also show that diversity predicted individual 
differences for ethnic majority members specifically. This is noteworthy, because this 
group has not previously been studied in isolation regarding the effects of diversity. 
However, results from this investigation also expand the model as the reduced reliance 
on categorical rules seems to transfer and translate to less conventional values and beliefs 
as well (Studies 4-6). Possibly as a result of this low reliance on rule monitoring, 
experiences of diversity can also be linked to lower self-regulatory performance when 
diversity is salient (Studies 1-3). Furthermore, the findings reported in this work also seem 
to suggest some modification of the adaptation process assumed within the CPAG model.  
8.5.1 Cognitive Adaptation to Everyday Diversity for Majority Members 
 The core element of adaptation to diversity, according to the CPAG model, is 
developing superior cognitive flexibility in regard to categorical information to more 
efficiently handle conflicts of categorical information (Crisp & Turner, 2011). This 
prediction is supported from various studies showing increased cognitive flexibility and 
divergent thinking in response to spontaneous (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng et al., 2011; 
Gocłowska et al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Leung & Chiu, 2010) as well as 
prolonged experiences of diversity (Leung & Chiu, 2010; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux 
& Galinsky, 2009; Steffens et al., 2015; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012). Responses to 
diversity in the form of everyday experiences while living in socially diverse areas has 
been understudied. Previous studies on the response to prolonged experiences of diversity 
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have focussed either on experiences of diversity while living or travelling abroad (Godart 
et al., 2015; Hellmanzik, 2013; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009) or on 
biculturals (Cheng et al., 2008; Saad et al., 2013). These studies are important to establish 
patterns of cognitive adaptation to diversity, but they neglect the form of diversity which 
will be experienced most frequently in socially diverse societies, namely everyday 
experiences of diversity for majority members living in a diverse environment. The 
current project therefore aimed to focus on the impact of diversity for majority members 
specifically. 
One way to assess cognitive flexibility towards categorical information is to 
measure the need to apply categories to structure one’s perception and to achieve quick 
closure. Individuals who score high on such needs as the need for cognitive closure 
(NFCC) or the personal need for structure will tend to apply rigid thinking and to show 
an unquestioned reliance on categorical information such as stereotypes (Hamtiaux & 
Houssemand, 2012; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Members 
of the ethnic majority who had experienced a lot of diversity in the form of positive 
interethnic contact scored low on the NFCC as well as on the PNS scale in Studies 7a-8. 
These findings offer further support for the idea that diversity promote cognitive change 
through increased cognitive flexibility. It also extends previous findings by demonstrating 
that effects of diversity apply to majority members as well, suggesting that responding to 
diversity with the development of cognitive flexibility is a universal process. 
8.5.2 Diversity and Conventionalism 
The CPAG model emphasises that cognitive flexibility as a response to diversity 
should generalise to domains beyond intergroup interactions. This idea has been 
supported by previous studies which have shown the effect of diversity on creative 
performances (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng et al., 2011; Gocłowska et al., 2012; 
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Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Leung & Chiu, 2010, 2010; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & 
Galinsky, 2009; Steffens et al., 2015; Tadmor, Galinsky, et al., 2012). A further domain 
affected by diversity are conventional values and beliefs as demonstrated by Studies 4-6. 
Participants in these studies who had experienced very frequent positive contact reported 
a strong preference for social autonomy over conformity (Study 4), a low reliance on rules 
and conventional values (Studies 5 and 6), and a low willingness to submit to authority 
(Study 6). Together these results suggest that participants who have experienced a lot of 
diversity prefer value sets and beliefs that do not rely on categorical rules and conventions. 
In this sense, these results fit with findings from Lu et al. (2017) showing that time spent 
abroad can promote a preference of relativistic over absolute values. However, results 
from Lu et al. (2017) show that travelling abroad can also increase the chance for immoral 
behaviour. The tendency to cheat was not measured in Studies 4-6 so it is unclear if 
experiences of diversity resulting from living in diverse areas can have the same effect. 
On the other hand, what seems to be consistent over these studies is that individuals who 
have experienced a lot of diversity show a pronounced resistance towards categorical and 
absolute beliefs and norms as well as a critical stance towards authorities that aim to 
enforce these rules. These tendencies can certainly be beneficial as they promote 
questioning unfair societal norms or standards (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). These 
characteristics of individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity might also make 
them more likely to engage in collective action against institutional injustice (e.g. Duncan, 
1999; Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Saeri, Iyer, & Louis, 2015). However, 
scepticism towards categorical norms might also translate into immoral behaviour as 
demonstrated by Lu et al. (2017). This might be the case if the flexibility towards 
categorical thinking is not accompanied by mature moral development (Blasi, 2009; 
Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). The factors determining if the tendencies towards relativistic 
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and unconventional values among individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity 
translate into immoral behaviour have to be clarified by future research. 
The findings discussed this far fit well with the CPAG model as it was originally 
conceived (Crisp & Turner, 2011) in the sense that cognitive adaptation to diversity is 
mainly achieved through increased cognitive flexibility, and that this flexibility can 
influence many domains beyond intergroup interactions. However, results from Studies 
1-3 suggest that some assumptions about how this cognitive flexibility is achieved require 
modification. 
8.5.3 Diversity and Self-Regulation 
The CPAG model assumes that categorical inconsistencies evoked by diversity 
are handled by a) inhibiting the conflicting categorical content to then b) resolve the 
conflict through generative thought (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Prolonged experiences of 
diversity are assumed to promote cognitive flexibility mainly by increasing the ability for 
cognitive inhibition. This implies that individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity 
should be more likely to show superior cognitive control. However, results from Studies 
1-3 revealed that exposure to diversity was not associated with stronger self-regulation. 
In fact, self-regulatory performance was even found to be weaker for participant who 
have experienced a lot of diversity when diversity was made salient. This suggests that 
for individuals with diversity experience, cognitive inhibition does not play a major role 
for inconsistency resolution. Hence, the increase in cognitive flexibility must be achieved 
without an increase in cognitive inhibition. This means that the underlying adaptation 
process that ultimately leads to increased cognitive flexibility as assumed by the CPAG 
model requires revision.  
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8.5.4 A Revised Adaptation Process to Diversity 
A revised model for the adaptation process to diversity was offered in Chapter 5 
in response to the findings from Studies 1-3. Diversity is still assumed to lead to increased 
cognitive flexibility, given the substantial evidence linking diversity and increased 
flexibility and divergence in thought. This increased flexibility, however, was suggested 
to be achieved not through superior cognitive inhibitory ability, but through the activation 
of a mindset favouring flexible non-categorical thinking with weak boundaries between 
categories. This mindset would be activated diversity is salient and would de-emphasize 
the need for inhibiting categorical knowledge, since the activation of this knowledge is 
decreased in the first place. Hence, the motivation to apply monitor categorical rules 
should be reduced. Individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity would thus acquire 
a more efficient strategy for dealing with categorical inconsistencies requiring only 
minimal cognitive inhibition compared to the default mode of processing categorical 
conflict. The ability to forego the activation of categorical knowledge might also be 
enabling greater cognitive complexity. Understanding and integrating ideas that originate 
from different categorical domains is likely to profit from the ability to ignore categorical 
boundaries. 
The idea that diversity leads to a decrease in the use of categorical knowledge was 
supported by findings from Studies 7a-8. In these studies, participants with more frequent 
positive contact reported lower NFCC and PNS, implying a decreased use of categorical 
thinking after prolonged exposure to diversity. This decreased use of categorical rules 
seems to generalise to beliefs and values as well as participants who have experienced a 
lot of diversity showed a low reliance on rules, norms and authority. These studies thus 
offer some initial support for the idea that diversity fosters cognitive flexibility by a 
decreased use of categorical information. 
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However, not all elements of the revised theoretical framework received 
conclusive empirical support. Diversity was assumed to affect the use of categorical 
information only for situations in which diversity was salient. However, findings from all 
studies are inconclusive on whether salient diversity leads to a change in processing mode.  
8.5.5 Adaptation to Diversity and The Role of Salient Diversity 
 Through Studies 1-3 experiences of diversity only had an impact on self-
regulatory ability when diversity was made salient. These findings suggested that salient 
diversity leads to the activation of a mindset for participants who have experienced a lot 
of diversity. It was therefore hypothesised that other forms of cognitive change in 
response to prolonged experiences of diversity would also be part of this mindset and 
only be present when diversity is salient as well. However, while salient diversity clearly 
seems to moderate the effects of diversity experiences on self-regulation (Studies 1-3), 
subsequent results were less consistent on the role of the salience of diversity for 
moderating the effects of diversity on social norms and rules (Studies 4-6) and epistemic 
needs (Studies 7a-8). Salient diversity did moderate the effect of frequent positive contact 
on social conformity values in Study 4 as well as its effect on need for cognitive closure 
in Study 7. No evidence of moderation by salient diversity were obtained in Study 5 and 
6 for the effects of frequent positive on rule independence, conventionalism, and 
submission to authority. Furthermore, no moderation by salient diversity was present for 
the effect of frequent positive contact on the need for cognitive closure in Study 7b and 
for its effect on need for structure in Study 8. In these four studies, experiences of diversity 
had the same effect on the dependent variables independent of condition. 
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 Diversity salience thus failed to moderate the effect of diversity experiences on 
the dependent variables in four out of eight studies which directly tested for moderation21. 
Furthermore, meta-analyses revealed a moderating effect of salient diversity for the effect 
of diversity on self-regulation, but for the effect on conventionalism. For the effect of 
diversity on the need for clear structure, findings are inconclusive: Salient diversity did 
moderate the effect of the quality of positive contact on the need for clear structure, but it 
did not moderate the effect of frequent diversity.  
It should be noted that the manipulation for salient diversity was probably 
relatively weak and unobtrusive, since it was achieved by merely changing the order of 
questions. It is thus possible that a stronger manipulation might be necessary to 
consistently observe a moderating effect of salient diversity. Nonetheless it remains an 
important observation that diversity is associated with a more flexible stance towards 
moral rules, values and categorical structures in general, which in some studies was 
present even when diversity was not salient. In other studies, making diversity salient was 
necessary to observe such effects. A possible explanation for these findings might be that 
experiences of diversity are linked to a reduced reliance on categorical information in 
general, but that this tendency is further magnified when diversity is salient. Since 
amplified effects are more likely to be detected, this would explain why only when 
diversity was salient positive contact was associated with weaker social conformity 
values and a low NFCC. Failure to detect moderation effects of salient diversity in other 
studies might be due to the manipulation of diversity salience not being strong enough. 
In this case, the effect of salient diversity would be in line with findings from other 
                                                 
 
21 Study 1 was a correlational Study without a control condition. In this study the salience of diversity was 
thus not manipulated and its moderating influence was not tested. 
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studies: Several studies have demonstrated that the beneficial effects of diversity on 
creativity can be either enabled or amplified by salient diversity (Cheng et al., 2008; 
Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009; Saad et al., 2013). In Studies 1-3 
diversity only influenced self-regulatory performance under diversity and never under 
neutral conditions. This suggests that individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity 
do not differ in their self-regulatory ability from other people, but when diversity is salient 
they might switch to a mode of increased flexibility which temporarily diminishes their 
motivation to regulate strict categorical rules. However, it might still be possible that 
individuals who have experienced a lot of diversity tend to be slightly impaired in their 
self-regulation due to their different processing tendencies, but these differences were 
only picked up when their reliance towards categorical processing was further decreased 
when diversity was made salient.  
Current results suggest that salient diversity moderates the impact of diversity 
experiences on different cognitive processes, but to a different degree. However, the 
current findings are inconclusive and invite further elaboration by future research. 
8.6 Limitations 
8.6.1 Manipulation Issues 
As indicated above, the manipulation used in the current studies to make diversity 
salient might have been too weak to consistently show an effect. However, this issue is 
difficult to investigate without data on more varied manipulations of diversity salience. 
In the current studies, the manipulation of diversity salience was kept mostly consistent 
to keep findings comparable across studies. However, as the current results are 
inconclusive on the influence of salient diversity it will be important to investigate the 
influence of stronger ways to make diversity salient. Increasing the impact of the diversity 
salience manipulation carries the risk of experimenter bias if the purpose of the research 
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becomes too obvious so the challenge will be to find subtle but effective ways to make 
diversity salience. One way of doing so might be manipulating the ethnic diversity of the 
experimenter or instructing participants to first complete a seemingly unrelated study in 
which they must describe individuals with counter-stereotypical category combinations 
(Kunda et al., 1990). 
8.6.2 Sampling Issues 
The studies reported in the current investigation purposely sampled only White 
British participants to study the cognitive response to diversity for this group specifically. 
However, the sample was biased in a less desirable way as well as it used convenience 
samples recruited either at the University of Sheffield or through an online panel for 
academic studies (prolific.ac). Consequently, the sample is biased in the sense that it 
mostly represents relatively young and educated citizens. This way of sampling was 
chosen mostly because of its efficiency and accessibility. Furthermore, restricting the age 
group might be important when measuring the impact of early diversity. Experiences of 
diversity that occurred while participants were growing up are likely to be influenced by 
the zeitgeist and norms of the time so the early experiences of diversity of older 
participants might differ quite significantly.  
However, diversity affects all members of society so it will be important for future 
research to study its effect using more varied sampling methods. Approaches to diversity 
might, for example, differ substantially across different age or educational levels, so 
including more diverse samples will be important to ensure that the cognitive response to 
diversity is comparable across different samples. 
Furthermore, diversity affects countries outside of Western societies as well 
(Fearon, 2003), so understanding the cognitive response to diversity requires 
investigating cognitive responses to diversity outside Western societies. This is especially 
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true for cultures which tend to subscribe more to collectivistic values. Members of 
collectivistic cultures can differ in important ways in the way they make social 
judgements (e.g. Morris & Peng, 1994) so diversity might have a different impact on them. 
8.6.3 Construct and Ecological Validity 
Another issue that should be taken into consideration for the reported studies is 
their construct and ecological validity. The studies presented in this thesis contained 
measures that could be readily administered online or in the laboratory, but in some cases 
the ecological validity might have suffered. More specifically, Studies 1-4 relied on self-
reports and the Stroop task as measures of self-regulation. While I believe that these 
measures are valid ways to assess self-regulatory strength, they represent a rather narrow 
operationalisation of self-regulation exclusively in terms of inhibition. While social 
psychology has sometimes viewed cognitive inhibition as mostly equivalent to self-
regulation (e.g. Baumeister et al., 2006), researchers in cognitive psychology have 
emphasized that the relationship between these concepts is more complex and multi-
faceted (Hirsh & Kang, 2015). According to one influential framework (Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter & Wager, 2000), there are three basic executive 
functions subserving self-regulation: These are updating, inhibition, and set shifting. 
While the results presented in this work suggest that inhibition does not benefit from 
diversity, it could lead to enhancements for other executive functions, such as set shifting. 
For example, biculturals are known to be proficient at switching between different 
cultural meaning systems (Tadmor & Tetlock, 2006; Hong, Morris, Chiu & Benet-
Martínez, 2000). It has been speculated that this ability might generalise towards superior 
set shifting (Gocłowska & Crisp, 2014). This issue is especially relevant because more 
complex and ecological relevant tasks of self-regulation are likely to rely on all three 
types of executive functions. Furthermore, some findings indicate that self-regulation 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 195 
 
 
might be impaired by cognitive flexibility when the task requires a narrow focus on clear 
and specific rules (Kossowska et al., 2014; Kossowska, 2007a, 2007b). Cognitive 
flexibility can be an asset, however, when the self-regulatory task requires the integration 
of complex information or is performed under cognitive load (Kossowska, 2007a). It 
would therefore be interesting to explore the effect of diversity on more ecologically valid 
measures of self-regulation. Self-regulatory tasks relevant to everyday life might 
sometimes be more complex or involve more cognitive load than classic laboratory 
cognitive control tasks. Performance on these types of tasks might therefore not be 
affected or even benefit from diversity, due to the increased cognitive flexibility. A 
possible way to measure more ecological valid acts of self-regulation might be tracking 
a participant’s success during attempts to attain a personal goal (e.g. to stop smoking, to 
follow a healthy diet, study goals, etc.). 
Further measures in Studies 4-6 employed different questionnaires to assess the 
participants’ reliance on conventional rules and values, as well as their tendency to 
approve of social conformity. However, values and beliefs might not always transfer to 
actual behaviour. For future studies it would be interesting to see if participants who have 
experienced a lot of diversity also differ in regard to their behaviour when it comes to 
promoting or following conventional rules and norms. Cheating would be one way in 
which a low reliance on rules can manifest, and there is indeed an increased tendency to 
cheat for participants who spent a lot of time abroad (Lu et al., 2017). However, 
experiences of diversity were also associated with a low willingness to give in to social 
conformity and a low reliance on conventional norms (Studies 4-6). This might also 
favour questioning social injustice and lead to collective action (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). 
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8.6.4 Generalising to Other Types of Diversity 
 For this thesis, I have decided to focus on the impact of experiences with ethnic 
diversity. This had the benefit to increase the comparability of results across studies within 
this thesis, but also with a multitude of other studies on social diversity which have 
traditionally focussed on ethnic or cultural diversity. However, it must be pointed out that 
social diversity can take many different forms and that only studying one dimension of 
diversity is ultimately limiting the scope and applicability of the research. Social diversity 
can by definition be experienced along any dimension that is considered meaningful for 
categorising people into groups (Plaut, 2010b; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). As indicated 
in Chapter 2, Western societies are experiencing a diversification of social roles in 
domains beside ethnicity such as gender (Giele & Holst, 2003; Smits et al., 2003), age 
(Riley & Riley, 1994, 1989), sexuality (Cohler & Hammack, 2007), and occupations (R. 
H. Turner, 1990; Wroblewski & Huston, 1987). Social categories along these dimensions 
should in theory lead to similar categorical conflicts as ethnic diversity, and could 
therefore lead to cognitive change by the same mechanisms (Crisp & Turner, 2011). 
Although some research has begun to also study cognitive change for different forms of 
diversity (e.g. Di Bella & Crisp, 2016), more research is needed to demonstrate that the 
response pattern to social diversity is truly universal. Future research could therefore 
explore whether other types of diversity also affect self-regulation, the reliance on 
conventional rules or epistemic needs akin to ethnic diversity. 
8.7 Avenues for Future Research 
As discussed in the previous section, future studies should explore the role of 
salient diversity with different types if manipulations, and use broader sampling methods. 
Other important issues to be addressed by future research will be more ecological relevant 
measures and studies on other types of social diversity. In the following, I will also discuss 
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additional suggestions for future studies that might serve to expand the findings of this 
thesis. 
8.7.1 Exploring Different Forms of Diversity 
The findings presented in this thesis have demonstrated that diversity can lead to 
positive contact which in turn makes cognitive change more likely. However, not all forms 
of ethnic diversity might be equally likely to lead to positive interethnic contact. Even if 
positive contact occurs in an environment with some frequency it is not certain that it 
incites cognitive change. The CPAG model has emphasized that experiences of diversity 
must contain unexpected elements and therefore be challenging in order to motivate 
cognitive adaptation (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Future research could therefore explore the 
factors that make positive contact and challenging experiences of diversity more likely. A 
factor that seems likely to moderate the impact of ethnic diversity is the degree of ethnic 
segregation of an area. Even if a larger area (such as a district) is ethnically diverse, on a 
smaller scale (such as neighbourhoods) ethnic identities might be clearly separated. If a 
large majority of a neighbourhood identifies with the same ethnic category, opportunities 
for interethnic contact will be low. Furthermore, since interethnic exchange is low, 
minority members are likely to identify with only one ethnic identity so their identity will 
be less complex than that of biculturals (Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Tadmor et al., 2009). 
Encounters with minority members with low identity complexity are more likely to 
conform to common expectations, since the chance for surprising, cross-cutting identity 
combinations is low. So even if positive contact should occur in areas with segregated 
diversity, it is unlikely to promote cognitive change. Another factor that might have 
similar effects is the predominant preference of acculturation strategy among minority 
groups and among the host society (Berry, 1997; Brown, Zagefka, Zanna, & Olson, 2011). 
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8.7.2 Exploring Different Forms of Contact 
In a similar vein, investigating the impact of different forms contact also 
represents an opportunity for future research. Study 5 has demonstrated that positive 
contact can lead to a low reliance on rules and subscribing to unconventional values, while 
negative contact can have the opposite effects to positive contact for some variables. 
Future studies could narrow in what types of positive contact are most likely to promote 
negative contact. For example, having friends with different ethnic backgrounds might be 
more impactful than frequent but superficial everyday interethnic encounters as 
interactions with friends might be experienced as highly relevant and therefore increase 
the motivation to process potential categorical conflicts. Future studies might thus also 
measure the different types of encounters that participants experienced. A more detailed 
way of exploring this issue could be field studies that report which conditions are more 
likely to promote deeper contact and measure how this moderates cognitive change. 
 8.7.3 Longitudinal Studies 
According to the CPAG model, cognitive adaptation to diversity will only occur 
after chronic exposure to diversity (Crisp & Turner, 2011). Studies measuring the 
cognitive impact of diversity have either measured responses to spontaneous experiences 
of diversity in the laboratory (Cheng & Leung, 2013; Cheng et al., 2011; Gocłowska et 
al., 2012; Gocłowska & Crisp, 2013; Leung & Chiu, 2010), self-reports of prolonged 
experiences of diversity such as experiences abroad (Godart et al., 2015; Hellmanzik, 
2013; Maddux et al., 2010; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009) or have sampled biculturals as a 
population with prolonged experience with diversity (Cheng et al., 2008; Saad et al., 
2013).  
However, true longitudinal studies on the cognitive effect of diversity over time 
are generally lacking. The studies in this thesis have employed self-reports of positive 
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contact during the past 6 months or while growing up as an indicator for prolonged 
experiences of diversity. Future research would benefit tremendously from longitudinal 
projects investigating how diversity would over time lead to cognitive change. A 
relatively cost-effective method of research would be to sample students at the beginning 
of their first semester who have relocated to their new university from areas with 
relatively low levels of ethnic diversity. Ideally, such a project would sample students 
from different universities with different levels of ethnic diversity. This would make it 
possible to measure the effects of different levels of prolonged exposure to diversity over 
time on various cognitive factors. 
8.8 Practical Implications 
 This thesis has presented some findings that have practical relevance for various 
domains which are likely to be characterised by a high degree of ethnic diversity. Such a 
high level of diversity has become the norm for many businesses, universities, schools 
and other types of organisation (Barbosa & Cabral-Cardoso, 2007; Jayne & Dipboye, 
2004). This thesis therefore offers new insights for businesses that want to tap the 
potential of ethnic diversity, but also want to avoid potential problems that might arise 
with it. Below I will make some suggestions on how the findings from this thesis could 
be incorporated in practice. 
 First, findings from Studies 1-3 suggest that salient diversity can lead to 
suboptimal self-regulatory performance for individuals who have experienced a lot of 
diversity. This implies that extra attention should be given when diverse workgroups have 
to work on tasks that require self-regulation with strict monitoring of specific simple rules. 
In such a case, it might be advisable to also avoid unnecessary reminders of diversity. 
 Secondly, ethnic diversity was also found to favour a low tendency towards 
categorical rules and structures (Studies 7a-8). This should make individuals who have 
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experienced a lot of diversity adept at tasks that require handling of unstructured and 
ambiguous information. Examples are creative projects or tasks that demand integrating 
complex information. Individuals with diversity experience and socially diverse 
workgroups should shine in such tasks, especially if the diversity is made salient. 
Thirdly, the findings from Studies 4-6 show that diversity also promotes 
questioning conventional values and social conformity. This could imply that as societies 
are becoming more diverse, its members might be more inclined to question conventional 
norms and established authority. Hence, more socially diverse societies should be more 
likely to question social injustice and demand justification from institutionalised power. 
8.9 Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to contribute to research on the cognitive impact of prolonged 
experiences of diversity by exploring the mechanisms of cognitive change in response to 
prolonged exposure to ethnic diversity for members of the ethnic majority. This approach 
allowed testing of one of the more specific assumptions of the CPAG model, namely the 
idea that diversity should lead to the development of enhanced cognitive inhibition. This 
assumption was not supported by the empirical findings presented in this thesis. This 
suggests that the link between diversity and cognitive flexibility cannot be explained by 
improved self-regulation. However, further studies suggested that diversity can be linked 
to a low reliance on rules and categorical structures, which would fit well with the 
cognitive flexibility observed after exposure to diversity in other studies. These results 
thus offer evidence that the cognitive change in response to diversity occurs primarily by 
a decreased reliance on categorical information, rather than improved inhibition. 
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrated that the cognitive impact of diversity can also be 
studied among ethnic majority members, who experience diversity only through 
observing other social actors belonging to more complex combinations of social 
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categories. By exploring the cognitive response of ethnic majority members to everyday 
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PAST SUBJECTIVE EXPOSURE TO ETHNIC DIVERSITY (ALL STUDIES) 
 
Think of the time you spent in secondary school. Please try to estimate what percentage 
of students in your secondary school belonged to the ethnic groups listed below. If you 
have gone to several secondary schools, please think of the of the one you went to last.  
(Your percentages must add up to 100%) 
______ White British 
______ White other than British 
______ Asian or Asian British 
______ Black or Black British 
______ Mixed or other 
 
Think of the neighbourhood that you grew up in (i.e. spent most of your time before you 
turned 18). If you have experienced several neighbourhoods while growing up, please 
think of the area where you have spent the most time before you turned 18. Please try to 
estimate what percentage of the people living there belonged to the ethnic groups listed 
below. 
(Your percentages must add up to 100%) 
______ White British 
______ White other than British 
______ Asian or Asian British 
______ Black or Black British 






RECENT EXPERIENCES OF DIVERSITY (PILOT STUDY) 
 
The following statements refer to your experiences in the past year (particularly those 
involving other people). Read each statement and respond by choosing the option 
that best represents your agreement. 
 
Thinking of my experiences in the past year, I would say that... 
 
1. I enjoyed media and art from different cultures. 
Strongly Disagree 1   2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
2. Many of my friends come from different cultural-racial-ethnic backgrounds different 
than my own. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  
3. The majority of my friends come from the same culture as I do. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
4. Many of my friends live or have lived abroad. 
Strongly Disagree 1   2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
5. With some of my friends I communicated in a language that is not my first. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  
6. I have spent a lot time living in a country other than my home country. 





7. I had much exposure to different cultures. 
Strongly Disagree 1   2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
8. I acquired knowledge about a culture that is not my own. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  
9. I met many people from different cultural backgrounds. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
10. Most people I met were from the same culture as I am. 
Strongly Disagree 1   2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
11. I met people with attitudes and values very different from mine. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  
12. I had the opportunity to meet people outside my usual group of friends. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
13. Most of my social activities involved my usual group of friends. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  
14. I regularly socialized with people from different cultures. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
15. Where I lived lots of different cultures came together and interacted with each other. 
Strongly Disagree 1   2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
16. Where I lived most people from other cultures were well integrated. 





17. Where I lived most people coming from different cultures mostly stayed to themselves. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
18. Where I lived most people did not have a lot of contact with people from other cultures. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  
19. The people in my neighbourhood mostly had the same cultural background as me. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
20. I had to change some of my habits in order to adapt to the people around me. 
Strongly Disagree 1   2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
 
21. I experienced situations that were completely new for me. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5 Strongly Agree 
  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































BARRAT IMPULSIVENESS SCALE – BRIEF  
(PILOT STUDY, STUDIES 1, 2 AND 4) 
 
People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure 
some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and chose the 
appropriate option. Do not spend too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and 
honestly 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 













 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 





COMPULSIVE BUYING SCALE  
(PILOT STUDY) 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement below. Choose the 
option which best indicates how you feel about the statement. 
 
1. If I have any money left before I receive my next income, I just have to spend it. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
 
Please indicate how often you have done each of the following things by choosing the 
appropriate option. 
 





 Very Often 
 











4. Wrote a check or used a credit card when I knew I didn't have enough money in the 





 Very Often 
 





 Very Often 
 





 Very Often 
 












SUBJECTIVE SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS SCALE  
(ALL STUDIES EXCEPT FOR PILOT STUDY) 
 
Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in society. 
At the top of the ladder are the people who are best off—those 
who have the most money, most education and the best jobs. At 
the bottom are the people who are worst off—who have the least 
money, least education and the worst jobs or no job. The higher 
up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to people at the very 
top and the lower you are, the closer you are to the bottom. Where 
would you put yourself on the ladder? 
 















ACADEMIC DELAY OF GRATIFICATION SCALE (STUDIES 1-4) 
 
We will now show you a series of choices between two alternative courses of action. 
Please read each set of statements carefully. Then tell which course of action you would 
be more likely to choose and the strength of that choice. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Please respond with your true beliefs rather than the way you think you 




A. Go to a favorite concert, play, or sporting events and studying less even though it may 
mean getting a lower grade on an exam the next day,   
OR   
B. Stay home and study to increase your chances of getting a higher grade. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 
2. 
A. Study a little every day for an exam and spend less time with your friends,   
OR 
B. Spend more time with your friends and cram just before the test. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 






A. Miss several classes to accept an invitation for a very interesting trip,   
OR  
 B. Delay going on the trip until your courses are over. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 
4.  
A. Go to a party the night before a test and study only if you have time,   
OR   
B. Study first and party only if you have time. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 
5  
A. Spend most of your time studying just the interesting material for a course even though 
it may mean not doing so well,   
OR   
B. Study all the material that is assigned to increase your chances of doing well in the 
course 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 







A. Skip a class when the weather is nice and try to get the notes from somebody later,   
OR   
B. Attend class to make certain that you do not miss something even though the weather 
is nice outside. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 
7. 
A. Stay in the library to make certain that you finish an assignment that is due the next 
day,   
OR  
B. Leave to have fun with your friends and try to complete it when you get home later 
that night. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 
8 A. Study for a course in a place with a lot of pleasant distractions,   
OR   
B. Study in a place where there are fewer distractions to increase the likelihood that you 
will learn the material. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 






A. Leave right after class to do something you like even though it means possibly not 
understanding that material for the exam,   
OR   
B. Stay after class to ask your instructor to clarify some material for an exam that you do 
not understand.. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 
10  
A. Select an elective with an instructor who is fun even though he/she does not do a good 
job covering the course material,   
OR   
B.  Select an elective with an instructor who is not as much fun but who does a good job 
covering the course material. 
 Definitely choose A 
 Probably choose A 
 Probably choose B 
 Definitely choose B 
 





FREQUENCY AND QUALITY OF POSITIVE CONTACT (STUDIES 3, 4, 6 AND 
7A) 
 
For the following questions, please think of the time you spent growing up in your 
hometown (area where you spent the most time before you turned 18), and your 
experiences with people from ethnic backgrounds different from your own during that 
time. 






 Very Often 
 
2. How often did you have interesting conversations with people from ethnic backgrounds 





 Very Often 
 
3. Now think about your encounters with people from ethnic backgrounds different from 
your own. How often did you experience the following emotions? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
Satisfied           
Cheerful           
Enthusiastic           
Grateful           





For the following questions, please think of your experiences with people from ethnic 
backgrounds different from your own within the last 6 months. 
 






 Very Often 
 
2. How often did you have interesting conversations with people from ethnic backgrounds 





 Very Often 
 
3. Now think about your encounters with people from ethnic backgrounds different from 
your own. How often did you experience the following emotions? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
Satisfied           
Cheerful           
Enthusiastic           
Grateful           
Inspired           
 
Note: Frequency of positive contact is measured by items 1 and 2. Quality of contact is 
measured by the items contained in question 3. Studies 3 and 4 only contained questions 





CURRENT SUBJECTIVEEXPOSURE TO ETHNIC DIVERSITY  
(STUDY 3 AND STUDIES 6-8) 
 
Now think of your current university. Please try to estimate what percentage of students 
in your university belong to the ethnic groups listed below.  
(Your percentages must add up to 100%) 
______ White British 
______ White other than British 
______ Asian or Asian British 
______ Black or Black British 
______ Mixed or other 
 
Think of the neighbourhood that you are living in now. Please try to estimate what 
percentage of the people living there belonged to the ethnic groups listed below.  
(Your percentages must add up to 100%) 
______ White British 
______ White other than British 
______ Asian or Asian British 
______ Black or Black British 





BARRAT IMPULSIVENESS SCALE (15 ITEM SHORT VERSION; STUDY 3) 
 
People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure 
some of the ways in which you act and think. You will be presented with a couple of 
statements. Read each statement and chose the appropriate option. Do not spend too much 
time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly. 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 














 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 














 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 














 Almost Always/Always 
 




 Almost Always/Always 
 
Note: Motor impulsiveness is measured by items 1-5. Non-planning impulsiveness is 
measured by items 6-10 (all reverse coded). Attentional impulsiveness is measured by 





MONETARY CHOICE QUESTIONNAIRE (STUDY 3) 
 
People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure 
some of the ways in which you act and think. You will be presented with a couple of 
statements. Read each statement and chose the appropriate option. Do not spend too much 
time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly. 
 
1. Would you prefer: 54 GBP today, or 55 GBP in 117 days? 
2. Would you prefer: 55 GBP today, or 75 GBP in 61 days? 
3. Would you prefer: 19 GBP today, or 25 GBP in 53 days? 
4. Would you prefer: 31 GBP today, or 85 GBP in 7 days? 
5. Would you prefer: 14 GBP today, or 25 GBP in 19 days? 
6. Would you prefer: 47 GBP today, or 50 GBP in 160 days? 
7. Would you prefer: 15 GBP today, or 35 GBP in 13 days? 
8. Would you prefer: 25 GBP today, or 60 GBP in 14 days? 
9. Would you prefer: 78 GBP today, or 80 GBP in 162 days? 
10. Would you prefer: 40 GBP today, or 55 GBP in 62 days? 
11. Would you prefer: 11 GBP today, or 30 GBP in 7 days? 
12. Would you prefer: 67 GBP today, or 75 GBP in 119 days? 
13. Would you prefer: 34 GBP today, or 35 GBP in 186 days? 
14. Would you prefer: 27 GBP today, or 50 GBP in 21 days? 
15. Would you prefer: 69 GBP today, or 85 GBP in 91 days? 
16. Would you prefer: 49 GBP today, or 60 GBP in 89 days? 




18. Would you prefer: 24 GBP today, or 35 GBP in 29 days? 
19. Would you prefer: 33 GBP today, or 80 GBP in 14 days? 
20. Would you prefer: 28 GBP today, or 30 GBP in 179 days? 
21. Would you prefer: 34 GBP today, or 50 GBP in 30 days? 
22. Would you prefer: 25 GBP today, or 30 GBP in 80 days? 
23. Would you prefer: 41 GBP today, or 75 GBP in 20 days? 
24. Would you prefer: 54 GBP today, or 60 GBP in 111 days? 
25. Would you prefer: 54 GBP today, or 80 GBP in 30 days? 
26. Would you prefer: 22 GBP today, or 25 GBP in 136 days? 
27. Would you prefer: 20 GBP today, or 55 GBP in 7 days? 
 





SOCIAL CONFORMITY/AUTONOMY SCALE (STUDY 4) 
 
On the next few pages you will be given a series of choices between two alternative 
statements. Please read each set of statements carefully. Then tell which statement you 
would be more likely to agree with. There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond 
with your true beliefs rather than the way you think you should respond. 
 
1.  
A. It’s best for everyone if people try to fit in instead of acting in unusual ways.     
OR   
B. People should be encouraged to express themselves in unique and possibly unusual 
ways. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
2. 
 A. Obeying the rules and fitting in are signs of a strong and healthy society.   
OR   
B. People who continually emphasize the need for unity will only limit creativity and hurt 
our society. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 






 A. We should admire people who go their own way without worrying about what others 
think.    
OR   
B. People need to learn to fit in and get along with others. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
4.  
A. It is most important to give people all the freedom they need to express themselves.   
OR   
B. Our society will break down if we allow people to do or say anything they want. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
5. 
 A. Society is always on the verge of disorder and lawlessness and only strict laws can 
prevent it.  OR  
 B. It is more important to give people control over their lives than to create additional 
laws and regulations. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 






A. People can only develop their true potential in a fully permissive society.   
OR   
B. If we give people too much freedom there will just be more and more disorder in 
society. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
7.  
A. Rules are there for people to follow, not to change.   
OR   
B. Society’s basic rules were created by people and so can always be changed by people. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
8. 
A. People should not try to understand how society works but just accept the way it is.   
OR   
B. People should constantly try to question why things are the way they are. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 






A. People should be guided more by their feelings and less by the rules.   
OR   
B. The only way to stay out of trouble is to respect the established rules of society. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
10.  
A. People should be given the opportunity to hear all sides of a question, regardless of 
how controversial it is.   
OR   
B. If we cannot achieve agreement on our values we will never be able to keep this 
society together. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 






 A. In the long run our cultural and ideological differences will make us a healthier, 
more creative, and stronger society.   
OR   
B. It is unlikely that this country will survive in the long run unless we can overcome 
our differences and disagreements. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
12. 
A. Society should aim to protect citizens’ right to live any way they choose.   
OR   
B. It is important to enforce the community’s standards of right and wrong. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 






A. Students must be encouraged to question established authorities and criticize the 
customs and traditions of society.   
OR   
B. One of the major aims of education should be to give students a few simple rules 
of behavior to make them better citizens. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
14. 
A. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up they ought to get 
over them and settle down.   
OR   
B. If some people don’t occasionally come up with rebellious ideas there would be 
less progress in the world. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 






A. It may well be that children who talk back to their parents respect them more in the 
long run.  OR   
B. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
16.  
A. Children should be taught to do what is right even though they may not always feel 
like it.  OR   
B. Children should be encouraged to express themselves even though parents may not 
always like it. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 
17.  
A. The most important values children should learn are love and respect for their parents.   
OR   
B. The most important values children should learn are independence and self-reliance. 
 Strongly Agree with A 
 Agree with A 
 Agree with B 
 Strongly Agree with B 
 






POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE INTERETHNIC CONTACT SCALE (STUDY 5) 
 
For the following questions, please think of the time you spent growing up in your 
hometown (area where you spent the most time before you turned 18). If you have 
changed location while growing up, please think of the area where you have spent the 
most time before you turned 18. 
 






 Very Often 
 
2. How often did you have interesting conversations with people from ethnic backgrounds 





 Very Often 
 











 4. Now think about your encounters with people from ethnic backgrounds different from 
your own. How often did you experience the following emotions? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
Satisfied           
Cheerful           
Angry           
Irritated           
Fearful           
 
For the following questions, please think of your experiences in the last 6 months.  






 Very Often 
 
2. How often did you have interesting conversations with people from ethnic backgrounds 





 Very Often 
 











4. Now think about your encounters with people from ethnic backgrounds different from 
your own. How often did you experience the following emotions? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often 
Satisfied           
Cheerful           
Angry           
Irritated           





RULE INDEPENDENCE SCALE (STUDIES 5 AND 6) 
 
We will now a show you a couple of questions relating to a situation shown in a picture 
on the same page. There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond with your true 




1. If you were in the situation depicted in the picture, to what extent would you care about 
following the rules? 
 Not at all 
 A little bit 
 Somewhat 
 Quite a bit 







2. If you were in the situation depicted in the picture, to what extent would you care about 
following the rules? 
 Not at all 
 A little bit 
 Somewhat 
 Quite a bit 






3. If you were in the situation depicted in the picture, to what extent would you care about 
following the rules? 
 Not at all 
 A little bit 
 Somewhat 
 Quite a bit 
 Very much 
 
 





RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM – CONVENTIONALISM (STUDY 5) 
 
Please read each set of statements carefully. Then tell which statement you would be more 
likely to agree with. There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond with your true 
beliefs rather than the way you think you should respond. 
 
1. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religous beliefs, and sexual preferences, even 
if it makes them different from everyone else. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
  
2. There is no ‘ONE right way’ to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
3. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
 





RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM (STUDY 6) 
 
Please read each set of statements carefully. Then tell which statement you would be more 
likely to agree with. There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond with your true 
beliefs rather than the way you think you should respond. 
 
1. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religous beliefs, and sexual preferences, even 
if it makes them different from everyone else. 
 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
2. There is no ‘ONE right way’ to live life; everybody has to create their own way. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
3. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
5. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
6. The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight 
and narrow. 





7. It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a normal proper appearance is 
still the mark of a gentleman and, especially, a lady. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
Note: Conventionalism is measured by items 1-4 (all reverse coded). Submission is 





NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE (STUDIES 7A AND 7B) 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 
according to your beliefs and experiences. 
 
1. I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
2. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a 
different opinion. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
  
3. I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
4. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
5. I like to have friends who are unpredictable. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
6. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
7. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might 
happen. 





8. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what 
to 
expect. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
9. I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
life. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
10. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group 
believes. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
11. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
12. I would describe myself as indecisive. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
13. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is I want. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
14. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
15. When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 






16. I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment. 






17. I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
18. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
19. My personal space is usually messy and disorganised. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
20. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
21. I tend to struggle with most decisions. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
22. I believe orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics 
of a 
good student. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
23. When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be 
right. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
24. I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
25. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them. 





26. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
requirements. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
27. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as 
possible. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
28. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
29. I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
30. I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
31. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
32. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
33. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
34. I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own. 






35. I like to have a plan for everything and a place for everything. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
36. I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
37. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
38. I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
39. I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
40. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
41. I dislike unpredictable situations. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
42. I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
Note: Items 2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 27, 34, 37, 38, and 42 are reverse scored. 





FREQUENCY AND QUALITY OF POSITIVE CONTACT – REVISED SCALE 
(STUDIES 7B AND 8) 
 
For the following questions, please think of the time you spent growing up in your 
hometown (area where you spent the most time before you turned 18). If you have 
changed location while growing up, please think of the area where you have spent the 
most time before you turned 18. 
 






 Very Often 
 
2. How often did you have interesting conversations with people from ethnic backgrounds 










3. How often did you have positive contact with people from ethnic backgrounds different 





 Very Often 
 
4. When you met people from different ethnic backgrounds (while growing up in your 
hometown), in general did you find the contact... 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
...pleasant?           
...cooperative?           
...deep?           
...natural?           
 
For the following questions, please think of your experiences in the last 6 months. 
 






 Very Often 
 
2. How often did you have interesting conversations with people from ethnic backgrounds 










3. How often did you have positive contact with people from ethnic backgrounds different 





 Very Often 
 
4. When you met people from different ethnic backgrounds (in the past 6 months), in 
general did you find the contact... 
 Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
...pleasant?           
...cooperative?           
...deep?           






PERSONAL NEED FOR STRUCTURE SCALE (STUDY 8) 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 
according to your beliefs and experiences. 
 
1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
2. I'm not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
  
3. I enjoy being spontaneous. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
4. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
5. I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
6. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
7. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 






8. I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
9. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
10. I hate to be with people who are unpredictable. 
believes. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
11. I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
12. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear. 
Strongly Disagree 1  2  3  4  5  6 Strongly Agree 
 
Note: Items 2, 3, 4, and 11 are reverse scored. Items were presented in random order.
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